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Introduction
1. POLITICAL PhILOSOPhy AnD GLOBAL JUSTICE
In the past five decades the idea of global justice has come to dominate the debate
in political philosophy. (For overviews see Armstrong, 2012; Mandle, 2006; Valen-
tini, 2011c; Risse, 2012; ypi, 2012.) Economic, political, technological and social
changes under the banner ‘globalization’ have created an ever-growing sense of in-
terconnectedness in human relationships (see Gilabert, 2012). And, as the world has
become more interconnected, moral and political philosophers have become in-
creasingly concerned about the nature and extent of the moral and political obligations
between different persons and political communities. 
The current debates have also become more sophisticated and more specialized
(see Armstrong, 2012). From the foundations of human rights to fair trade, and from
immigration restrictions to climate change, numerous fields of argument have
emerged, each with its own specificity, key texts and peculiar arguments (see held
and Maffettone, 2016, introduction). yet, accepting the complexity that such debates
have undoubtedly reached, it is not implausible to claim that the intellectual pre-
occupations of global justice theorists have had two main issues at heart. The first
relates to the very justification of the current international system. The division of
today’s world into self-contained territorial units called states – a modern invention
– is a historically contingent aspect of our global political history. The point, then,
is to ascertain whether this current global political architecture can be granted jus-
tification in some form, or whether other forms of political governance, from sys-
tems of overlapping sovereignty to a more encompassing global state, are more de-
sirable (see Pogge, 1992; Cabrera, 2004; held, 2002; Kukathas, 2003). 
The second and related debate concerns the nature of the distributive obligations
between different persons at the global level (see Risse, 2012, ch. 4). At least since
the publication of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971), Anglo-American political phi-
losophy (to the regret of some, it must be admitted, see Kukathas, 2003) has been
largely dominated by discourses concerning distributive justice between members
of the same political community. It is perhaps less than surprising, then, that the glob-
al justice debate itself has been, from the start, deeply marked by the desire to un-
derstand how the traditionally ‘domestic’ ideas of social and distributive justice could
be extended to global politics. here the choice we seem to face is between those that
believe that conceptions of egalitarian distributive justice should apply beyond the
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boundaries of different political units (see Beitz, 1979; Caney, 2005; Moellendorf,
2002) and, on the other hand, those who believe that any such extension would be
unjustifiable (see Blake, 2002; Miller, 2008; nagel, 2005; Sangiovanni 2007). 
Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (henceforth LP) provides distinctive answers to these
questions. In the next section of this introduction I will provide a more detailed
overview of the contents of LP, but, synthetically stated, Rawls’ vision of global jus-
tice is one in which the international order based on distinct political communities
is seen as at least potentially just, provided that political communities adapt their
powers to recognize the importance of human rights and the political participation
of their members, and respect each other’s freedom and independence at the in-
ternational level. LP also provides an answer to the second fundamental question raised
in global justice debates. It states that a conception of distributive justice, especial-
ly an egalitarian conception such as Justice as Fairness, would not be adequate to
describe the reciprocal obligations of persons and political communities toward each
other at the global level. 
In this book, I will address both aspects of Rawls’ international theory and will
attempt a vindication of the coherence and plausibility of Rawls’ answers. By ‘co-
herence’ I simply mean the idea that the answers elaborated by Rawls in LP are es-
sentially a systematic continuation of his previous work as developed in his two ma-
jor contributions, namely A Theory of Justice (1971/1999, henceforth TJ) and Political
Liberalism (1996, henceforth PL). Of course, claiming that LP is a coherent exten-
sion of Rawls’ vision of domestic political philosophy is not to claim that LP provides
perfectly conceived answers to all the questions it addresses. Rather, presenting LP
as a coherent component of the Rawlsian corpus means acknowledging that the main
ideas in LP are reconcilable with the major insights that have informed the evolu-
tion of Rawls’ thinking over time. 
In the same way, presenting LP as offering plausible answers to main questions
raised within debates about global justice does not entail the idea that such answers
are necessarily true, let alone perfect. The point is, rather, that by providing a coherent
extension of one of the twentieth century’s most developed accounts of liberal po-
litical philosophy, LP, in my view, also acts as a distinctively convincing guide to ad-
dress some of the more difficult questions concerning global political morality. need-
less to say, Rawlsian liberalism is but one way to understand liberalism (see, for ex-
ample, Kukathas, 2003; Grey, 1995; Williams, 2005) and LP ’s suggestions can be
improved. however, assuming that all normative theories have their own problems
and shortcomings, my claim is that LP provides answers to the central questions of
global political morality that are sounder than most contributors to the global jus-
tice debate have so far been able to see. 
In the following section I briefly rehearse the main contents of LP Throughout
the book I have assumed familiarity with Rawls’ work and therefore provide only an
overview of the main elements of Rawls’ international theory. In the third section
of the introduction I present the core of my argument and the substance of the con-
tribution to the debate made by this book. Put shortly, my main goal is to definitively
put to rest the idea that LP is an incoherent extension of Rawlsian political philos-
iNTRoducTioN12
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ophy to international relations and to show that it articulates a reasonably attrac-
tive global political theory. 
2. A SKETCh OF LP
The ideal theory of LP
LP provides a remodelling of the ‘social contract’ put forward by Rawls in TJ. Rawls’
domestic version of the social contract was primarily concerned with the justice of
the basic structure of a self-contained social system. The second version of the Rawl-
sian (hypothetical) social contract, the one presented in LP, aims at the establish-
ment of an international ‘Law of Peoples’. As with the domestic case, representatives
of the ‘parties’ select the best account of the relevant regulative principles (i.e. prin-
ciples of justice) behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (TJ: 118-123). The crucial difference
at this stage in Rawls’ international theory is that the parties are not individuals but
‘peoples’. Consequently, the characteristics of the veil of ignorance (i.e. the kind of
information that the representatives of the parties are unable to avail themselves
of) are shifted so as to correspond to the different nature of the parties themselves.
Peoples are initially framed as liberal societies, and Rawls sees the purpose of LP as
propounding an ideal of foreign policy for them. Liberal peoples are characterized
by three main features: a) they have a political organization consistent with the mod-
el of a constitutional democracy; b) they are, internally, structured and united by
‘common sympathies’; and c) they all (that is, each separately) endorse a moral/po-
litical liberal conception of right and justice (LP: 23). 
As Rawls clarifies, peoples differ from states (LP: 25). Peoples are reasonable and
rational actors, while states are only rational. To be reasonable means, pre-eminently,
to be capable of reciprocity, while to be rational means to be primarily guided by a
conception of self-interest. Furthermore, Rawls also maintains that what he calls ‘de-
cent Peoples’ should be able to join in the international social compact of liberal peo-
ples (LP: 62). Decent peoples1 are peoples that, while not fully liberal, possess a set
of what we can call threshold requirements: a) their attitude towards other politi-
cal communities is non-aggressive; b) they respect a (restricted) set of human rights;
c) they provide for proper forms of political participation; d) they are capable of sus-
taining a conception of justice that, while not liberal, is nonetheless oriented towards
the common good of its members (LP: 64–5). Liberal and decent peoples together
form what Rawls calls the ‘Society of Peoples’ (LP: 61). Representatives of liberal
and decent peoples, according to Rawls, would, behind the veil of ignorance, select
exactly the same eight laws to govern their mutual undertakings, namely:
13
1. Rawls explicitly states that his overall classification of peoples is open-ended, or to put it more
precisely, that there might be other types of decent peoples that he does not mention.
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1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are 
to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equals and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have a right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons 
other than self-defence.
6. Peoples are to honour human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime
(LP: 37) 
The nonideal theory of LP
At this stage Rawls leads us from ‘ideal theory’ (how well-ordered peoples deal with
each other) to ‘nonideal theory’ (how well-ordered peoples deal with other types of
societies that are not well-ordered). According to Rawls, three kinds of political com-
munities are not well-ordered: outlaw states, benevolent absolutisms and burdened
societies (LP: 90). The goal of well-ordered peoples is to live in a system of international
politics in which all participants are well-ordered. Rawls believes that in the cir-
cumstances of the real world, nonideal theory needs to guide us toward that objective.
There will be cases in which some political communities are either ‘unwilling’ or ‘un-
able’ to follow the dictates of the law of peoples. In such cases liberal and decent peo-
ples will need to sanction those who do not comply and help those who are unable
to do so.
There are two parts to Rawls’ nonideal theory. The first deals with cases of ‘non-
compliance’, and concerns outlaw states. Outlaw states show aggressive behaviour
and actively refuse to abide by the prescriptions of the law of peoples that concern
the use of force (the right to wage war, but also the projection of influence through
power) in international relations. Well-ordered peoples should not tolerate the ex-
ternally aggressive conduct of outlaw states. Severe violations of human rights (in-
ternal repression) might also be cause enough for legitimate interference or inter-
vention and, overall, LP takes sovereignty to be conditional on the protection of ba-
sic human rights and interests. The second part of nonideal theory deals with what
Rawls calls ‘unfavourable conditions’, regarding burdened societies. Burdened so-
cieties are societies lacking the main tools (resources and/or human capital and/or
political culture) to develop as a well-ordered people; Rawls states that well-ordered
peoples have a ‘duty of assistance’ (henceforth DOA) towards these burdened soci-
eties (LP: 90). Finally, we have benevolent absolutisms. The latter are not outwardly
aggressive, and also respect a minimal account of human rights, but they do not al-
low their citizens to play a role in the internal political process. The government of
a benevolent absolutism does not represent in a liberal or decent way the will of its
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constituency and hence benevolent absolutisms cannot be considered well-ordered
peoples. Benevolent absolutisms are non-aggressive and so have a right to self-de-
fence (while outlaw states do not; LP: 92). But they are not well-ordered and so can-
not be parties to a fair law of peoples.
3. ThE LAW OF PEOPLES AnD ThE PROBLEM OF COhEREnCE
Examining the basic tenets of LP shows it to be both a very traditional and very in-
novative normative reconstruction of the main elements of international law and prac-
tice. It is traditional insofar as it takes political communities (of a special kind) to
be the fundamental unit of analysis for international politics; in this way Rawls shares
the framework of most international relations theory (see Donnely, 2005). It sees
global politics as international politics, or at the very least as politics between cor-
porate agents of some sort. Rawls also appears as a traditional thinker if we look at
the content of most of the principles he proposes in his LP. his focus on the self-de-
termination of peoples and respect for human rights broadly reflects the core of the
post-Second World War consensus that led to decolonization and the institution of
the international human rights regime. 
But this is as far as Rawls’ traditionalism goes. Rawls’ LP refuses to consider states
as the main actors in international politics and instead considers the idea of ‘peo-
ples’, a different sort of collective agent, as the appropriate unit of analysis. Fur-
thermore, Rawls’ account of how peoples understand their mutual undertakings is
also peculiar from the standpoint of international relations theory. Rawls offers, in
both cases, normatively laden reconstructions of these ideas. Peoples have a moral
nature and are capable of setting limits to the pursuit of their interests. In a similar
way, Rawlsian international politics is not driven by the balance of power (as Re-
alists would have it, see Krasner, 1999) or the concordance of interests (as argued
by liberal institutionalists, see Keohane 1987) but is founded on moral reasons. The
inevitability of competition, conflict and bargaining are replaced by the ideal of a
moral order based on mutual respect. Finally, while Rawls refuses to apply his do-
mestic account of distributive justice to international relations, he proposes a very
conspicuous principle of assistance (i.e. the DOA). This replaces international aid
as a commitment to the welfare of individuals with a concern for the political au-
tonomy of peoples. In so doing Rawls redefines standard conceptions of international
economic obligations by creating a middle ground between distributive justice and
charity. 
In other words, Rawls’ LP imagines a realistic utopia in which peoples, as moral
agents, live together according to the (normative) dictates of a just law of peoples
and achieve a form of peaceful coexistence founded on moral reasons. Most of Rawls’
eight principles of the law of peoples remain faithful to a very traditional understanding
of international law and practice. But his way of conceiving the collective agents that
form the basic units of analysis for his theory, and his understanding of their mu-
tual obligations, is not.
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Can LP’s eclectic mix of existing political structures and practices and its nor-
matively laden reconstruction of them be portrayed as a consistent and integral part
of Rawls’ work as a whole? The tension between these two aspects of Rawls’ theo-
ry has not escaped critical scrutiny. The initial reaction to Rawls’ treatment of in-
ternational justice has been, by and large, very critical (for an overview see Miller,
2006). The main problem for many (cosmopolitan) readers has been a sense of be-
trayal (see Wenar, 2001 for a discussion) based on the (alleged) inconsistency be-
tween Rawls’ domestic and international theories. In a sense, many readers, and es-
pecially those who endorsed Rawlsian liberalism at home, were disappointed that
Rawls’ two principles of justice (the principles of Justice as Fairness) were not to form
the backbone of a global political morality based on liberal democratic ideals. Some
were baffled by Rawls’ (quasi-) silence concerning international institutions
(Buchanan, 2000). Others strongly disapproved of LP’s dismissal of the international
economic order as a source of responsibility for existing international injustices (Pogge,
2002). Others still were unimpressed by Rawls’ intervention-driven account of hu-
man rights (Tasioulas, 2002). Many were unconvinced by the lack of remedial pro-
visions against the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources (Caney,
2005). More broadly, most liberal cosmopolitans were disappointed by the total lack
of any distributive principles whatsoever in LP (Beitz, 2000).2 And a number of schol-
ars (see Tan, 2000) were upset by the extent of toleration granted to nonliberal peo-
ples. In sum, the main thread running through these negative critical reactions has
been a wholesale rejection of the Rawlsian conception of international justice. Fur-
thermore, one of the basic charges has been that, whatever the merits of Rawls’ work
on international relations, it is inconsistent with the development of a moral theo-
ry of international relations based on Justice as Fairness (Pogge, 2004). 
having acknowledged this disappointment, it would be inaccurate not to attend
to the many favourable appraisals of LP. Defenders of Rawls have pointed out that
his account of international justice takes place in ideal theory (Reidy, 2006a; Mace-
do, 2004). This could explain why Rawls’ text seems so distant from the many in-
justices that we witness in the international arena. Existing international institutions
and the current international economic order are no doubt based on power relations
and economic interests. yet, so the argument goes, they would clearly be different
in a world in which all peoples duly complied with Rawls’ law of peoples. Defend-
ers have also pointed out that it is incorrect to state that LP features no real concern
for individuals. Rather, it would be more accurate to state that such concern is me-
diated by the existence of collective agents. It is by setting limits to what peoples can
do internally and externally that Rawls shows, albeit indirectly, concern for the well-
being of individual human beings (see Freeman, 2007b for an overview). Those more
sympathetic to Rawls have also argued that to require the extension of liberal rights
2. By ‘distributive principle’ I refer to a type of principle that does not have a cut-off point. If the
duty of assistance is acknowledged as having a limit, then it cannot be a ‘distributive princi-
ple’ as characterized here. 
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to all human beings would be intolerant and would show a lack of respect for oth-
er cultures and political traditions (see Macedo, 2004). Furthermore, the idea that
we should not tolerate deviations from liberal rights in non-liberal yet decent peo-
ples assumes that the internal political life of decent peoples is violent and oppres-
sive, but Rawls’ text does not support this assumption (see Freeman, 2007b). Finally,
even if we disagree with Rawls’ account of human rights and the very short list of
what he calls ‘human rights proper’, we should be able to recognize that: a) Rawls’
list is by his own admission incomplete (and hence could be further extended; see
Reidy, 2006); and b) his account of human rights is geared to provide the necessary
requirements for on-going social cooperation, not desiderata for how to structure
a liberal society (Freeman, 2007c). 
Assessing the critical literature, one is surprised by the level of polarization that
the debate has reached. In short, I believe, we find ourselves navigating two implausible
conceptual waters. On the one hand, many of Rawls’ critics believe that his LP is not
only flawed but also inconsistent with his broader political philosophy. On the oth-
er hand, Rawls’ defenders seem to argue that LP is not only a good approximation
of what international morality requires of us but that it also poses no real disconti-
nuity problem with regards to Rawls’ account of Justice as Fairness within domes-
tic political society. Both outlooks seem conceptually unattractive: we are asked ei-
ther to believe that Rawls was not careful enough when drafting LP, not even to fore-
see the implications of his own domestic account of justice for international relations;
or to simply endorse LP, as if there were no shifts of particular significance between
Rawls’ domestic and international theories. 
Two main discontinuities 
While it is difficult to summarize all the existing differences between Rawls’ domestic
and international theories of justice (see Brown, 2002), we can point out two cen-
tral features of LP that create a conceptual gap between Rawls’ theories (see Wenar,
2001; idem., 2006). 
The first difference concerns the adoption, by Rawls, of peoples as the main unit
of analysis for his international theory. The contrast with Rawls’ domestic theory is
sharp. The focus on individuals is a crucial part of Justice as Fairness. The main rea-
son for retrieving the contractarian tradition as a strong alternative to utilitarian-
ism was ultimately based on the idea that the latter, as Rawls famously argued, ‘does
not take the differences between persons seriously’ (TJ: 27). (For an in-depth anal-
ysis of this issue see: Pogge, 1989, part III; idem., 1992; idem., 2005; Kuper, 2000;
Beitz, 1979; for a different approach see Wenar, 2001). 
As a matter of textual analysis, one could reasonably argue that the principles
of justice for the basic structure of society and the principles of justice between peo-
ples have always had a different genealogy. In fact as early as TJ (see section 58)
Rawls acknowledges these structural differences; his prescriptions for the ‘law of
nations’ are, on this point, entirely consistent with his later development of a ‘Law
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of Peoples’. however, we should be clear that what requires explanation does not
concern, strictly speaking, the differences between TJ and LP. We should focus in-
stead on the extent to which the idea of justice seems to be developed in different
ways for two different political contexts, namely the domestic in TJ and the inter-
national in LP. 
Furthermore, while it is true that as early as TJRawls acknowledges differences
between domestic and international contexts, there still is a crucial distinction be-
tween TJ’s version of international justice and the one Rawls offers in LP. The law
of nations presented in TJ does not contain, among other things, decent peoples. The
basic idea there (i.e. in TJ) is that individual rights and prerogatives are dealt with
domestically by liberal states and their (liberal) domestic conceptions of justice. In
this view, a law of nations which mentioned individuals directly might be seen as re-
dundant, as the (liberal) entitlements of individuals are guaranteed through their
membership in different liberal political communities. But in LP, with the advent of
decent peoples, even when justice has reached its appropriate normative goals (i.e.
when all peoples are well-ordered and comply with the 8 principles of LP), we sim-
ply have no certainty that individual rights and prerogatives as understood in lib-
eral societies are secured: the ideal picture of LP is not one in which all persons, al-
beit in different and culturally specific ways, are guaranteed the rights of free and
equal democratic citizens where they happen to be. 
Even if we were to reject this point as inconclusive, there is still the problem posed
by a seeming discontinuity when it comes to one of the most basic elemnts of Rawls’
work. From the outset of TJ the main task that Rawls sets for himself is to provide a
systematic alternative to the tradition of Utilitarian thinking. Utilitarianism’s fun-
damental problem, as Rawls famously argued, is that by extending to social choice
principles that seem intuitively best fit for individual deliberation – that is, by per-
mitting gains (in terms of utility) for some to balance losses by others – Utilitarian-
ism unjustly neglects to ‘take seriously the distinction between persons’ (TJ: 24). Thus,
even acknowledging structural differences between domestic and international jus-
tice, one has to admit that to shift the unit of analysis from individuals to collective
entities requires a robust justificatory refinement, given the conceptual boundaries
implicitly set by providing an alternative to a theory that does not take seriously the
differences between persons.
The second important difference between Rawls’ domestic and international the-
ory concerns distributive equality. A strong concern with inequality has always been
central to Rawls’ theory of distributive justice. Such concern is expressed in domestic
society by the adoption, most prominently, of the famous difference principle. Ac-
cording to the difference principle, inequalities (in the distribution of what Rawls
‘primary goods’) are justified in society only insofar as they can be seen to advance
the prospects of the least fortunate members to the social compact (TJ: part I). In
contrast, LP only develops an account of international economic obligations that is
based on a DOA. Leaving to a side the issue of whether the DOA is a duty of chari-
ty or of justice (see Freeman, 2007b; Valentini, 2011b), it is relatively clear that it
is not an egalitarian principle of distribution. The DOA reflects the desire to provide
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for each member of the Society of Peoples to an adequate standard.3 The DOA is suf-
ficientarian, not egalitarian, in nature. It demands that each society be provided with
the essentials material, political and cultural grounds of collective political auton-
omy – and the latter are not set by Rawls comparatively.
Rawls discusses the DOA as one case of nonideal theory. According to Rawls, cer-
tain societies (burdened societies), ‘while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack
the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often,
the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered’ (LP: 106). And,
according to Rawls, well-ordered peoples have a duty towards these burdened so-
cieties to assist them. yet he does not believe that principles of distributive justice
are the right instrument to do this, as they lack ‘a defined goal, aim, or cut-off point,
beyond which aid may cease’ (LP: 16). In a just Society of Peoples, as Rawls ideal-
ly sees it, peoples are not concerned with inequality in the same way as persons are
concerned with it domestically. In the domestic case, according to Rawls (see also
Scanlon 2003; O’neill, 2008; 2010), we are concerned not with inequality as such
but with its consequences. Such consequences must not prevent the least advantaged
members of society from acting as full citizens by obstructing the effective exercise
of their rights. In the Society of Peoples, such requirement, Rawls maintains, is sat-
isfied whenever all members are well-ordered internally (that is, when the DOA is
fulfilled). Further, excessive inequalities in the domestic case can bring about the
perception of unequal moral worth among different citizens and hence degrade the
self-respect of the least advantaged persons. In the international case, once the DOA
is satisfied, varying levels of wealth among citizens of different societies is not a jus-
tified cause for diminished self-respect. Once all members of the Society of Peoples
are well-ordered, each people ‘adjusts the significance and importance of the wealth
of its own society for itself’ (LP: 114).
The goal of the book
The two main differences between Rawls’ domestic and international theories high-
lighted above require some form of explanation. According to Rawls’ critics these dif-
ferences are the main evidence for Rawls’ incoherence. In contrast, for most of those
more sympathetic to Rawls’ overall project, those differences seem to require no sys-
tematic treatment. The goal of this book is to find a middle course between these al-
ternatives. Rawls’ LP is not without fault. But to discover what its limits really are
from a conceptual point of view we need to put forward a coherent reconstruction
of Rawls’ work that is at least able to explain his attempt to provide an account of
international justice. In this book I will show that Rawls’ law of peoples is a coher-
ent and defensible extension of his own political philosophy. The coherence of Rawls’
3. More precisely, the DOA is put in place to ensure that there are no peoples who are unable
to become well-ordered and abide by the law of peoples for what we could call ‘extenuating
circumstances’. 
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work will be based on the development of the idea that basic social and political ar-
rangements require a shared and mutually acceptable form of justification. 
The idea of a shared and mutually acceptable justification of basic social and po-
litical arrangements, I will claim, can capture one of the most important commitments
in Rawlsian political philosophy, namely the commitment to public justification. Rawls’
domestic and international theories are guided by the desire to provide a public jus-
tification of the political order. In turn, by investigating the nature of the idea of pub-
lic justification, many of the alleged inconsistencies in Rawls’ work, I believe, can be
explained. Public justification, as Rawls himself declares in Justice as Fairness: A Re-
statement (henceforth JAFR: 27), is not simply a deductive exercise. Rather, public
justification starts from the public political culture of a political society and tries to
make the shape of basic social and political institutions transparent to its citizens.
Once we have grasped this aspect of public justification it also becomes clear that,
given the changing nature of political contexts and traditions, it is the idea of pub-
lic justification itself that requires the adoption of different forms of political orga-
nization according to the milieu for which the public justification is constructed. 
If that is correct, then, it is not surprising that Rawls refused to extend the con-
tent of justice as fairness to global politics. The global public political culture is not
liberal democratic (see Wenar, 2006). It is thus hard to imagine that the public jus-
tification of the global political order could be provided by a liberal democratic con-
ception of justice. On the other hand, one of the most enduring aspects of the glob-
al public political culture is that persons tend to think of themselves as members of
political communities. This explains why, when constructing a conception of justice
for global politics, persons would want to give meaning and protection to their po-
litical membership by ensuring the freedom and independence of the political groups
to which they belong. In other words, it is the very idea of public justification, and
the fact that it should start from the public political culture, that explains the pres-
ence and relevance of political communities in LP. 
Acknowledging the centrality of peoples in the global public political culture is
also important in understanding why distributive equality is less crucial at the glob-
al level. Distributive principles concern the distribution of resources that are supposed
to be of value to the agents to which they are to be distributed to. yet the agents of
LP, peoples, are only interested in their freedom and independence and not in the
realization of some unspecified collective conception of the good (see Wenar, 2006).
In Rawls’ view, economic resources are not the central feature of a people’s politi-
cal autonomy. For Rawls, and provided political communities respect each other, it
is the quality of the political culture and of the virtues of its citizens that determine
the political autonomy of a people, not the natural and economic resources to which
it might have access through an egalitarian distributive principle. 
Finally, appreciating the coherence of Rawls’ work is also instrumental in defending
LPwhen it comes to one of the most controversial aspects of the theory, namely its
view of international economic assistance. Many of his critics have argued that Rawls’
views international economic obligations are incoherent and implausible. I disagree.
In the final chapter of the book I address a number of arguments that have been put
maffettone.qxp_Academy  22/02/17  15:46  Pagina 20
21
forward to demonstrate the alleged limits of Rawls’ work, and show that none is con-
vincing. Beyond the detail of such arguments, though, lies a broader point that I be-
lieve is worth emphasizing. The negative reaction to Rawls’ work on the shape of and
justification for international economic assistance has been, once again, often premised
on some form of ‘background incoherence’ thesis. For instance, when discussing Rawls’
treatment of international economic assistance, the default option for those who wish
to criticize the Rawlsian position seems to be that the DOA, as Rawls develops it, is
not enough to capture the types of distributive obligations we have at the global lev-
el. however, this line of argument is intuitively compelling only if one assumes, to
some extent at least, that certain aspects of Justice as Fairness (such as, for exam-
ple, the difference principle) should be extended to global politics. Put differently,
it seems that the general tone of the literature attacking LP’s treatment of interna-
tional economic justice is, once again, premised on the idea that LP, by not extend-
ing the standard liberal egalitarian toolkit to global politics, fails to accomplish its
mission. I believe, as I have explained in this section, that the opposite is true. 
4. OUTLInE OF ThE BOOK
The book begins by considering one of the most original solutions to LP’s ‘coherence
problem’, based on a methodological reconstruction of the Rawlsian enterprise (see
James, 2005). What I refer to as the ‘methodological interpretation’ is founded on
Rawls’ (alleged) career-long concern with the construction of principles of justice
for existing practices. In this picture it is the differing natures of international rela-
tions and domestic social cooperation that explains the discontinuity between LP and
the rest of the Rawlsian enterprise. In essence, according to the methodological in-
terpretation, by applying the same method (that of constructing justice for existing
practices) in two different cases (the domestic and the international), Rawls develops
a coherent set of principles for two different domains. Chapter 1 of this book rejects
the methodological interpretation, showing how it can provide only a superficial ex-
planation for the continuity of LPwithin the Rawlsian framework. The methodological
interpretation can show the coherence of Rawls’ domestic and international theo-
ry, but it is unable to justify the very element that explains this coherence: why Rawls
is committed to the method of ‘practice-dependence’ (see Sangiovanni, 2008). Since
the latter is controversial and has significant moral implications, what kind of argument
beyond methodological preference can justify its outcomes? 
Given the methodological interpretation’s failure to solve the interpretive puz-
zle I have highlighted above, we need to put forward an alternative reading of LP.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the basis for a fully coherent interpretation of LP as part
of the Rawlsian enterprise and of (or at least an understanding of) the liberal tra-
dition. Chapter 2 examines the notion of public justification and how it has been de-
veloped in different ways within the Rawlsian paradigm. Public justification of the
political order is based on the idea of respect for persons and is not a purely epistemic
notion of justification. It requires shared premises, yet in a liberal democracy, giv-
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en the fact of reasonable pluralism, the shared premises that are required to give con-
tent to the idea of public justification cannot be grounded in comprehensive doctrines.
Instead, the shared premises for public justification are to be found in the public po-
litical culture of the political context for which public justification is developed. The
chapter ends by claiming that although Rawls’ thinking about public justification was
mainly developed to face the internal problems of liberal democratic institutions, the
method of looking for a public justification of the political order is still valid when
we assess nonliberal political traditions and contexts. Moreover, the chapter stress-
es that it is the very nature of public justification, and specifically its reliance on the
public political culture, that explains why the content of public justification should
change according to the context in which such justification is carried out. 
Using the elaboration of the idea of public justification as a starting point, chap-
ter 3 argues against a purely cosmopolitan egalitarian development of Justice as Fair-
ness. The public justification of the global order depends on the global public political
culture. yet the global public political culture is not a liberal egalitarian one (here
I follow Wenar, 2006). The global public political culture does not contain the ideas
of citizens as free and equal, or of the world as a fair scheme of social cooperation.
In other words, the global public political culture cannot be interpreted as includ-
ing the main elements of liberal democratic citizenship. The chapter also provides
a more positive argument. It claims that it is precisely by looking at what is in the
global public political culture that we can explain the main discontinuities between
LP and Rawls’ domestic theory of justice. The global public political culture is essentially
internationalist in nature; this is why we have peoples rather than persons as the main
unit of analysis in LP. In the same way, the fact that the law of peoples is not an egal-
itarian theory of international relations depends on how Rawls interprets the idea
of peoples’ interests. Since, according to Rawls, peoples are not interested in acquiring
more resources, they are not really concerned with inequality. By highlighting the
link between Rawls’ law of peoples and public justification, we are also able to ful-
ly show the continuity of LPwith the liberal tradition. LP aims at the public justifi-
cation of the international order, a goal which in itself is based on the idea of respect
for persons. Thus, the chapter claims, LP can be pictured as a form of moral cos-
mopolitanism which only uses peoples as unit of analysis without forsaking persons
as unit of (moral) concern.
In chapter 4, the book takes a closer look at Rawls’ DOA. The general reaction
to the DOA has been by and large very critical. The critics have complained that the
DOA ‘is not enough’ – in other words, that it is not sufficient to portray the content
and extent of international distributive obligations. The chapter surveys a number
of critical arguments concerning the DOA, and finds them all wanting. Most im-
portantly, the chapter highlights the paradoxical nature of the critical attention that
the DOA has received. Rawls’ critics have often pictured LP as being premised on the
idea that levels of economic growth and development are endogenously determined,
but they have not then fully appreciated the potential consequences of this idea. If
levels of economic growth and development depend on the internal institutional struc-
tures of peoples, then it is precisely those internal institutional structures that will
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have to be altered by those committed to the DOA in order to rescue burdened so-
cieties from their fate. This idea exposes the real problem faced by Rawls’ DOA. Tak-
en at face value, the DOA is either too demanding practically, or paternalistic, as it
places the international community under an obligation to essentially transform the
political culture of what Rawls calls burdened societies. This seems a much more am-
bitious and controversial enterprise than many have appreciated. In conclusion, the
chapter suggests a possible modification of the DOA in order to mitigate these con-
cerns. I propose the division of burdened societies into two categories – those in which
human rights are respected and those in which they are not – and to gear the DOA
to reflect the latter distinction.
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Chapter 1 
Constructing Justice for Existing Practices?
The Law of Peoples is a peculiar book, one in which continuity with existing politi-
cal structures and the attempt to imagine a morally progressive international order
are both at home. The tensions between these two dimensions of Rawls’ international
theory are deeply rooted in his broader philosophical project. his attempt to understand
political philosophy as the construction of a Realistic Utopia (LP: 4), signals his pre-
occupation, even in ideal theory, with the political world we presently inhabit. 
But how far can we push this line of reasoning before the Rawlsian enterprise
will become morally untenable from a liberal point of view? And how far can we seek
a balance between continuity and change in the political world before conceptual
coherence is forsaken? In this chapter I address one attempt to provide a coherent
reading of Rawls’ work along these lines. In ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Prac-
tice: Rawls and the Status Quo’ (2005a), Aaron James puts forward an original and
controversial interpretation of Rawls’ overall philosophical project. James’s inter-
pretation invites us to rethink the relationship between first principles of justice and
the practices that such principles are meant to regulate. According to James, Rawls
is constructing justice for existing practices; first principles of justice and Rawls’ orig-
inal position reasoning are therefore guided, even in ideal theory, by the interpre-
tation of existing political structures. Rawls’ philosophical project is not guided by
a traditional liberal desire to justify social and political arrangements to those who
are subject to them, but rather by his methodological commitment to constructivism.
For Rawls, ‘the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that
thing’ (TJ: 25). This explains why, for instance, LP imagines an original position in-
habited by representatives of peoples rather than persons. It is the nature of the prac-
tice of international relations itself that leads Rawls to picture global justice as jus-
tice between corporate agents. 
James’s interpretation of Rawls’ work tries to resolve many of the tensions that
I have mentioned in the introduction. First, it features powerful tools to explain the
discontinuities between Rawls’ international and domestic theories. Second, by por-
traying Rawls’ work as, even in ideal theory, grounded in existing social and polit-
ical practices, it formalizes Rawls’ attempt to formulate principles that are related
to the political world as we see it. 
And yet, for all its merits, James’s interpretation of Rawls’ work is ultimately un-
sustainable. James explains Rawls’ work through the lens of a methodological com-
mitment to construct principles of justice for existing practices, but he is unable to
maffettone.qxp_Academy  22/02/17  15:46  Pagina 25
26 coNsTRucTiNg JusTice FoR exisTiNg PRacTices?
explain why Rawls would have to adopt such methodological commitment. By aban-
doning the centrality of one of the core aspects of Rawlsian liberalism – the desire
to justify social and political arrangements to those who are subject to them – James’s
interpretation is structurally incomplete. While it is able to picture Rawls’ work as
coherent, it does not explain such coherence in a way that is (ex-ante) morally mo-
tivated and (ex-post) morally defensible. By forsaking Rawls’ focus on the justification
of social and political arrangements to individuals,4 it deprives Rawls’ political phi-
losophy of its central organizing moral ideal. Following James, LP is redeemed as a
coherent application of Rawls’ overall philosophical project, but the price we pay is
that its content seems morally incompatible with one of the foundations of Rawlsian
liberalism.
In the first section of this chapter I start by providing a general overview of James’s
interpretation of Rawls’ work (I.1). I continue by explaining the link between James’s
work and the Dworkinian idea of ‘constructive interpretation’ (I.2), and how this read-
ing of Rawls contains the conceptual tools to explain the discontinuities between Rawls’
domestic and international theories (I.3). I then go on to take a second look at James’s
explanation of Rawls’ choice of peoples as the basic unit of analysis (II.1). I show that
this is unsustainable because: a) it draws on a selective reading of Rawls’ text (II.2);
and b) it fails to provide any moral argument that could justify the method that James
attributes to Rawls (II.3). Finally, I claim that to state that James’s interpretation is
unsustainable does not entail that there is no relevant place for existing practices in
Rawls’ political philosophy; rather, it simply implies that to find such a place we need
to provide a moral justification for it (II.4). 
1. RAWLS AnD ThE RELATIOnShIP BETWEEn PRACTICES AnD PRInCIPLES
According to Aaron James, LP presents ‘even the most sympathetic reader of John
Rawls’ with a problematic set of arguments and ideas (2005a: 300). We might have
thought that one the most significant accomplishments of Rawls’ philosophical en-
terprise was to revive a tradition of thought based on the moral justification of so-
cial and political arrangements to ‘free and equal persons’. And yet, James goes on
to say, Rawls seems to provide us with no argument, in LP, that would justify his choice
of peoples as the main actors in his theory of international politics. Individuals, once
the core of Rawls’ domestic doctrine, seem to have faded in the background; peo-
ples, a form of corporate agent, now stand centre-stage. 
It would be plausible to imagine pragmatic reasons that would lead anyone to
endorse the type of international order we currently have simply for the sake of po-
litical stability. yet Rawls’ peoples are there, so to speak, from the beginning: we start
4. here I use ‘the justification of social and political arrangements’ as the basic tenet of Rawls’
liberalism. I am aware that this represents a huge simplification and that the expression can
refer to a great variety of circumstances. I provide further comments concerning this issue in
the next chapter. 
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with ideal theory and in ideal theory we find peoples, not persons. We are then, James
continues, faced with two broad exegetical options. One simply accepts that Rawls
was unable to foresee the implications of his own work; LP should have been a ‘cos-
mopolitan law of persons’, as Andrew Kuper puts it (2000), but Rawls was unable
to proceed correctly from his domestic theory of justice through to his normative the-
ory of international law and practice. This, according to James, is too uncharitable.
The other exegetical option is to look at Rawls’ work more broadly and try to find a
different unifying theme. If the justification of social and political arrangements to
individuals cannot be the main thread of Rawls’ work, then what can?
1.1. A different interpretation of Rawls’ work 
In ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo’, Aaron James
advances a distinctive interpretation of Rawls’ overall philosophical project.5
James’s reading of Rawls is based on a methodological revision of the relationship
between existing practices and principles of justice. As Andrea Sangiovanni aptly put
it, while it is uncontroversial that existing practices and institutions set limits and
constraints to the application of principles of justice to the real world, it is far less
evident what role, if any, such practices and institutions should play in the very jus-
tification of first principles of justice (Sangiovanni, 2008). One way to articulate the
place of existing practices in the formulation of first principles of justice is to put for-
ward what Sangiovanni calls the ‘practice-dependence thesis’, namely:
Practice-dependence Thesis: The content, scope, and justification of a conception
of justice depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception
is intended to govern. 
(Sangiovanni, 2008: 2)6
5. The purpose of James’s interpretation of Rawls is to explain Rawls’ methodology when he con-
structs principles of justice. he does not aim at justifying the content of Rawls’ position. In a
similar way, while James’s interpretation requires him to see the law of peoples as a coher-
ent application of Rawls’ method in a different context, James does not seek to endorse Rawls’
conclusions in LP. It must be acknowledged that James does not set himself the task of explaining
the discontinuities between Rawls’ domestic and international theory such as we have pre-
sented them in the introduction. yet in order for his interpretation to be successful it is plau-
sible to set the standards of its explanatory power accordingly. If this book has illuminated
two major differences between Rawls’ domestic and international theory, it is not too much
to ask that an interpretation of Rawls that claims to see a deeper form of continuity in his work
should be at least able to provide a defensible explanation for such shifts.
6. There are important differences between James’s interpretation of the Rawlsian enterprise
and Sangiovanni’s understanding of practice-dependence. In this chapter I have employed San-
giovanni’s general statement of the practice-dependence book insofar as it is the clearest for-
mulation available in the literature. Whether or not the arguments presented in this chapter
apply to Sangiovanni’s preferred understanding of practice-dependence is not discussed, or
suggested in this chapter.
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The practice-dependence thesis relies on the idea that the very content, scope and
justification of any conception of justice will depend on the underlying object that
the conception is intended to regulate. This means, concretely, that if we take prac-
tices A, B, C and so on, the appropriate conceptions of justice for such practices (JA,
JB, JC, etc.) will, in some way, depend on the characteristics of A, B and C. 
yet to say that conceptions of justice ‘depend’ on the practices they are meant
to regulate is not enough to understand the relationship between the content, scope
and justification of JA, JB and JC and A, B and C. how can we shift from this meta-
theoretical point (concerning the relationship between first principles of justice and
social practices) to a more exact understanding of the relationship between a spe-
cific practice and a specific conception of justice, within a Rawlsian framework? here,
James provides one of his most significant contributions: the elaboration of what
he calls a method of construction. This can be summarized, in James’s words, as fol-
lows:
(1) Identify an existing social practice, including its point, or the goods it is meant
to realize. Assume circumstances favourable to its continuance;
(2) Identify the practice’s participants. Assume general compliance with its terms;
(3) Design a suitable original position. That is:
a. Represent each full participant in the practice as appropriately 
motivated, by an interest in the goods the practice is meant to create;
b. Draw a veil of ignorance, behind which (i) all parties have the same infor-
mation, and (ii) no one has knowledge of the facts that would undermine the
fairness of an agreement on terms for distribution of the relevant goods;
(4) Determine which terms of organization such parties would choose (among a list
of candidate principles). Treat these terms as necessary conditions for the prac-
tice’s being justly organized, that is, as principles of social justice.
(James, 2005a: 282)
As we have stated, to say that a principle of justice depends on the practices it is meant
to regulate does not clarify the nature of the relationship between the two. James’s
method of construction provides a clearer picture of such relationship insofar as it
represents the mechanics of the original position as the constructive procedure that
mediates between existing social practices and their normative assessment from the
point of view of justice. however, James’s insight has a ‘cost’: ‘On this characterization
of Rawls’ method, original position reasoning has no authority as such; it must be
grounded in independent judgments about what social practices exist and what kinds
of agents participate in them’ (2005a: 301). Put differently, original position reasoning
is not (or more exactly, not exclusively) a device to generate the justification of prin-
ciples of justice to ‘free’ and ‘equal’ persons. Rather, its shape and the validity of its
outcomes will depend on the types of practices that we address. In different contexts
(and LP is a critical example here), different agents might be more directly relevant
and the meaning of ‘free’ and ‘equal’ will have to be adjusted accordingly. This is why,
for instance, we have persons domestically when we address the basic structure of
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a closed social system, and peoples internationally when we address the basic struc-
ture of international relations. 
In sum, James’s interpretation of Rawls’ work abandons the centrality of the jus-
tification of social and political arrangements to individuals and replaces it with a
methodological commitment to the construction of principles of justice based upon
existing practices. Such principles are the result of original position reasoning. But,
crucially, original position reasoning is not a once-and-for-all established procedure
of construction that can be employed in each and every political context without im-
portant changes. Original position reasoning will reflect, in other words, the underlying
object of interpretation.
1.2. Constructive interpretation and the method of construction
The ‘method of construction’ requires further explanation. For instance, if we look
more closely the first step of the process – namely: ‘Identify an existing social prac-
tice, including its point, or the goods it is meant to realize’ – it is hardly a self-ex-
planatory (or uncontroversial) enterprise. Take the examples of domestic and in-
ternational societies as Rawls understands them. Rawls describes a (liberal) domestic
society as a ‘fair system of cooperation for mutual advantage’ that is meant to pro-
vide and distribute ‘primary goods’ (TJ: 78-81). On the other hand he describes in-
ternational society, or the ‘Society of Peoples’, as mainly characterized by interna-
tional law and practice, and whose basic concern is to ‘create goods of peace, national
autonomy, and to uphold basic domestic justice, and to do so in a way that reflects
mutual societal recognition’ (James, 2005a: 300). now these are far from being neu-
tral descriptions of the practices for which we want to construct principles of justice;
they are morally laden interpretations of such practices. Therefore what we need to
clarify is how, according to James, Rawls is able to put forward such morally laden
interpretations of social practices and how the latter feature in the method of con-
struction.
James’s answer is broadly centred on a specific conception of interpretation, name-
ly constructive interpretation. According to Ronald Dworkin, the interpretive task
is constructive insofar as we gradually build our interpretation in three different stages.
In the first stage we try to identify the object of interpretation; thus, in the case of LP,
the object of interpretation is international society and its institutions as we see them.
In the second stage, we try to identify a purpose for the kind of practice or object we
have identified. By the ‘purpose’ of the object or practice, Dworkin understands some-
thing that is close to what we do when we interpret some form of art or a painting,
that is we try to attribute meaning to it. The kinds of purposes we will identify will
change substantively according to the practice or object of interpretation. To inter-
pret some form of art, for example, one will often pay attention to the kinds of ideas
and feelings the work of art expresses, whereas if we try to interpret a social prac-
tice we will be driven to provide a justification for the way people act and the rea-
sons they give to each other when they uphold the practice. The third and last stage
of constructing interpretation is the critical stage: it is at this point we attempt to de-
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velop some form of interpretive judgment and construct proposals to reform the prac-
tice. Dworkin calls this stage post-interpretive or critical (1986/1998: 61). 
Given the method of construction James has attributed to Rawls, and the three
stages of constructive interpretation we have examined above, we might summarize
the process as follows: 
a) Pre-interpretive and Interpretive stages: Corresponds with stages 1 and 2 of James’
method of construction. here we choose the practice for which we want to construct
a principle of justice. We must come up with an interpretation of, or a moralized in-
terpretation of, the identified practice. This is when our project becomes controversial,
since we are effectively assigning a given meaning to the practice we have chosen.
This is the stage in which, for example, we describe the practice as a form of coop-
eration for the provision of certain goods. At this stage we also characterize the agents
in the practice in a certain way. So in the domestic case we see the citizens of a lib-
eral democracy as free and equal (and we specify our understanding of ‘free’ and
‘equal’). In the international case we depict peoples and their fundamental interests
and traits, stressing, for example, their desire for self-determination, or what it means
to be well-ordered.
b) Post-interpretive or critical stage: here we reach stages 3 and 4 of James’ method
of construction. We set up an original position. We construct such a position via the
moralized interpretation of the practice. To do so we use the conception of the par-
ties developed in stages 1 and 2 and we build appropriate constraints on informa-
tion (the veil of ignorance) that reflect the conception the parties. The final result
of the critical or post-interpretive stage is the conception of justice for the practice
we have considered (the one the parties have selected in the original position).
1.3. Practice-dependence and the shift from domestic to international theory 
We have described the most salient features of James’s interpretation of Rawls’ work.
But James’ interpretation would not be plausible if it did not contain (at least implicitly)
the tools to explain the two main discontinuities between Rawls’ domestic and in-
ternational theories I have outlined in the introduction. Below, I provide a brief out-
line of such explanations. here I follow James in elucidating Rawls’ shift of the unit
of analysis (from persons to peoples). I then go on to develop a putative explanation
of LP’s non-egalitarian content based on the idea of practice-dependence. 
First recall Rawls’ definition of practice ‘… as a sort of technical term meaning any
form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penal-
ties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As examples one
may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of prop-
erty’ (TJ: 47). If we think of the domestic case as a form of social practice, we can see
how society would be understood as a form of social organization in which these rules
are institutionalized in what Rawls calls the basic structure. Crucially, in the domestic
case, it seems plausible to imagine that the choice of starting with individuals is de-
termined by the fact that the social practice we have in mind assigns roles, offices and
positions, primarily to individuals (James, 2005a: 283). To refer now to international
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relations as a form of practice in the same way as with domestic society, we can say
that, at least in some relevant sense, the primary focus on peoples is not totally mis-
guided. Reasoning by simple analogy, we can come to see that roles and offices (but
also penalties and defences) are, prima facie, assigned to political communities. 
In the same way, considering the centrality of the original position in Rawls’ con-
structivism, we can say that the nature of the parties – that is, peoples – can some-
how work towards explaining their choice (or lack thereof) of principles of distributive
justice. In a just Society of Peoples, as Rawls ideally sees it, peoples are not concerned
with inequality in the same way as persons are concerned with it domestically. In
the domestic sphere we are concerned not with inequality as such but with its con-
sequences. Such consequences must not prevent the least advantaged members of
society from acting as full citizens through the effective exercise of their rights. In
the Society of Peoples, such requirement, Rawls maintains, is satisfied whenever all
members are well-ordered internally (that is, when the DOA is fulfilled). Further,
excessive inequalities in the domestic case can bring about the perception of unequal
moral worth among different citizens and hence degrade the self-respect of the least
advantaged persons. In the international case, once the DOA is satisfied, differing
levels of wealth among citizens of different societies is not a justified cause for di-
minished self-respect. Once all members of the Society of Peoples are well-ordered,
each people ‘adjusts the significance and importance of the wealth of its own soci-
ety for itself’ (LP: 114). In short, it’s the very nature of the parties that explains their
rejection of the egalitarian content of Rawls’ domestic articulation of justice as fair-
ness. In turn, the nature of the parties depends on our interpretation of the practice
of international relations and the types of features that members of the international
community must possess in order to make Rawls’ realistic utopia possible (see also
the introduction).
In sum, James’s interpretation restores the coherence between Rawls’ different
theories of justice. The major substantive discontinuities between Rawls’ domestic
theory and his LP are the result of the application of the same methodological view-
point to different initial circumstances. Existing practices partially determine the na-
ture of the principles of justice that are meant to regulate them. The practices that
justice is meant to regulate at the domestic and international levels are strikingly dif-
ferent. As a result, the principles that will be best fit to regulate the practices will be
radically different too. James’s interpretation is able to portray Rawls’ work as co-
herent and animated by a common thread, but is it possible to defend this picture
of Rawls’ coherence from a moral point of view? Conceptual coherence is a good start-
ing point, but unless we are able to defend such coherence from a moral point of view,
our interpretation of Rawls will still be inadequate. 
2. LP AnD PRACTICE-DEPEnDEnCE
In this section I show how James’s interpretation of Rawls is unsustainable. I begin
by taking a closer look at his explanation of Rawls’ decision to select peoples as the
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basic unit of analysis. In essence, I point out that depicting Rawls as ‘constructing
justice for existing practices’ appears to be untenable if we cannot provide any moral
justification for the controversial results that such method implies. While I focus on
Rawls’ choice of peoples as the unit of analysis in LP, the basic argument can be ex-
tended to question the general interpretive approach provided by James. I should
stress that, eventually, my aim is not to argue that existing social and political prac-
tices play no role in Rawls’ political philosophy. Rather, my claim is that we need to
make Rawls’ choice of method compatible with his broadly liberal preoccupation with
the justification of social and political arrangements to all persons. 
2.1 From persons to peoples, according to James
In what follows I will focus on Rawls’ choice of peoples as the main unit of analysis
for LP. There are four distinct reasons to do so. First, since we are addressing James’s
interpretation of Rawls, and since James deals more explicitly with the differences
between the domestic and the international original positions, there are good ex-
egetical reasons to consider the choice of unit of analysis as pivotal to our discussion.
Second, given the moral implications of such choice (see below), we need to ensure
that what explains it is sound. Third, although the two main discontinuities between
Rawls’ domestic and international theory outlined above (and in the introduction)
are both relevant, we can argue that if James’s interpretation is unable to take into
account and explain the first and perhaps most important discontinuity, then that
casts serious doubts over its overall architecture. Fourth, the basic point made re-
garding the shift from persons to peoples can be reiterated in arguments concern-
ing the scope of egalitarianism. 
According to James:
Seeing Rawls as beginning from existing practices helps to explain how he could
focus on persons in the domestic context and peoples in the global setting. he
takes each context to require quite different judgments about what social prac-
tices exist and which agents participate in them… In these terms, his focus on
individuals in A Theory of Justice reflects his judgment that major domestic in-
stitutions assign offices and roles chiefly to individual persons. In the same way,
his attention to whole societies in The Law of Peoples reflects his judgment that
‘international law and practice’ constitutes the basic structure of global society,
and the participants in these practices are not individuals as such, but societies
and their government representatives. 
(James, 2005a: 283–4)
In essence, as we have seen above James is claiming that Rawls’ reasons for opting
for a collective unit of analysis in LP are mainly interpretive. In this picture, faced
with ‘international law and practice’, Rawls selects peoples as his starting point in
order to more plausibly reflect the nature of the practice that his principles are meant
to address. Since, at the international level, the types of relationships that we wit-
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ness are mostly ones that pertain to intergovernmental interactions, there seems to
be good reason to believe that the principles that should guide such relationships
will be addressed to, and meant for, the very agents that play the biggest part in them. 
What are the implications of changing the unit of analysis? First and most straight-
forwardly, given the method of construction we have examined in part I of this chap-
ter, the nature of the original position changes dramatically. In LP’s international orig-
inal position(s) only peoples are represented. As a consequence the types of reasons
that are hypothetically presented in the original position for the Society of Peoples
will be addressed to (the representatives of) peoples, not persons. In the same way,
the types of principles that will emerge from this hypothetical thought experiment
will be justifiable to peoples (rather than persons). Such principles will reflect the way
in which peoples see their mutual undertakings. As a by-product it will also be clear
that the principles of LP, at least in this interpretation, would be necessarily silent
when it comes to the justification of social and political arrangements to persons.
As James states, Rawls ‘could have offered reasons why, in the global context, we owe
to individuals only what we owe to the societies of which they are members’. And
yet, according to James, ‘Rawls provides no such argumentation’ (James, 2005a: 280).
2.2 Textual support
Any interpretation of a philosophical work will rest upon two broad pillars. The first
is textual support: a necessary condition for claiming that an interpretation is valid
is that it must be able to draw support from the texts that it addresses. The second
is interpretive charity: the explanatory power of any interpretation will depend not
only on its textual support but also on whether we are able to look more favourably
upon the author’s arguments than existing available alternatives. As James ac-
knowledges, ‘the plausibility of seeing Rawls as reasoning from existing practices de-
pends in part on whether we can cast such reasoning in a favorable light’ (James, 2005a:
285, emphasis added). 
here I comment on two specific instances in which James tries to draw textual
support for his interpretation, demonstrating that his way of using Rawls’ text is too
narrow. This can be extended to other instances when Rawls’ text seems to point us
towards James’s reading. I then go on to consider the issue of interpretive charity.
I show that if we follow James’s interpretation, we cannot cast Rawls’ LP in a favourable
light. 
Rawls’ commitment to a given methodological outlook (namely, practice-de-
pendence) can be supported by textual evidence. For instance, James quotes the fol-
lowing passage from Rawls’ Collected Papers:
In justice as fairness the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are
not suitable as fully general principles: they do not apply to all subjects, not to
churches and universities, or to the basic structure of all societies, or to the law
of peoples.… It is the distinct structure of the social framework, and the purpose
and role of its various parts and how they fit together, that explains why there
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are different principles for different kinds of subjects. 
(Rawls, Collected Papers [CP]: 532–3; quoted in James, 2005a: 283) 
But this type of quote is misleading. It only presents one side of the story. For instance,
it does not seem to pay attention to the fact that, while there is some form of inde-
pendence attached to the correct regulative principles for different types of subjects,
there are also important constraints that political principles place on the content of
principles for different practices within the basic structure of society. It is true that
Justice as Fairness does not address, for example, the interactions between members
of the Catholic Church; but it is also true that we deem such independence moral-
ly acceptable because we know that what the Catholic Church can do to its congre-
gation is constrained by the principles of justice for the basic structure of society. The
Catholic Church might have its own ways of dealing with its members, but in a free
society it cannot burn heretics. 
This line of reasoning, I believe, shows why it is misleading to treat Rawls’ law
of peoples in the same way as practices within a basic structure. While there clear-
ly is an order of priority when we think of different social practices within the ba-
sic structure of a given social system (non-basic social institutions must respect the
constraints set by principles of justice), such order of priority is not well defined for
a law of peoples. While, from a conceptual point of view, we start by constructing
principles of justice for a closed and self-contained social system, it is also true that
the principles of LP define the acceptable boundaries for the types of conceptions
of justice that all well-ordered peoples can adopt. For example, Rawls writes that: 
In justice as fairness the question of justice between peoples is postponed until
we have an account of political justice for a well-ordered democratic society. Ob-
serve, though, that beginning with the justice of the basic structure does not im-
ply that we cannot revise our account for a democratic society (domestic justice)
in view of what justice between peoples turns out to require. The two parts of a
more complete political conception… can be adjusted to each other in the course
of working them out. 
(JAFR: 13–14)
This tells us that we cannot simply equate the principles for LP to principles for so-
cial institutions inside a given basic structure. Because what makes the latter acceptable
(what we can call their ‘dependent status’) is precisely the feature we are missing
in the case of LP. Principles for the organization of non-basic social institutions do-
mestically are constrained by a prior set of normative requirements that are moral-
ly justifiable to all persons. The principles of LP are not. In sum, while there is tex-
tual support to indicate that Rawls was committed to the relative autonomy of so-
cial practices, it would be misleading to conclude that such autonomy is always grant-
ed independent of the context in which we operate.
James also makes reference to the idea that, for Rawls, the correct principle for
something depends on the nature of that thing. But, even then, looking at the con-
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text in which Rawls makes this remark in TJ, the centrality of Rawls’ methodologi-
cal commitment is less than clear-cut. Take the example of utilitarianism. Rawls ar-
gues, in TJ, that classical utilitarianism applies criteria that are fit for individual de-
liberation to social choice and in so doing does not take seriously the distinction be-
tween persons. Classical utilitarianism thus violates a basic methodological com-
mitment that Rawls sees as central to his view, namely that ‘the correct regulative
principle of choice for anything depends on the nature of that thing, and that the
plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of
human societies’ (TJ: 25). now, clearly, this reading of what is wrong with classical
utilitarianism is very much in line with practice-dependence. It is simply the result
of our interpretive methodology, one that is grounded on the appraisal of the object
to which principles of justice apply, that we reject the idea of shifting basic princi-
ples (such as the principle of maximizing utility) from one context to another (that
is, from personal to collective decision-making). 
however, even in this case, it is hardly convincing that this is all that Rawls meant
when he argued that classical utilitarianism does not take the distinction between
persons seriously. In the same section of TJ, Rawls writes that the lack of attention
to the distinctiveness of persons is in contrast with our considered convictions and
a good deal of our philosophical tradition. Furthermore, the fact that systems of so-
cial cooperation are made up of a ‘plurality of distinct persons with separate ends’
seems relevant only if, to some extent, we have already accepted the importance, from
a moral point of view, of such distinct systems of ends. And this, in turn, seems to
square more readily with our (liberal) considered convictions – namely the desire
to justify social and political arrangements to all persons affected by them. Once again,
while the methodological point is clearly relevant, we cannot isolate it from the broad-
er moral theory that provides a fuller justification for the methodological point it-
self.
2.3 Interpretive charity
Let us turn to the issue of interpretive charity. Can we cast a favourable light on LP
if we follow James’s interpretation? not really. Why? In a nutshell, because it is un-
clear how the methodological commitment to practice-dependence that James at-
tributes to Rawls can be explained and defended.7 If a given ‘method of construc-
tion’ has relevant moral implications (in the case of LP, among other things, the fact
that the principles of justice for LP do not provide justification for social and polit-
ical arrangements to persons), how can we justify such implications without any ref-
erence to substantive moral arguments? Why should Rawls adopt practice-depen-
dence? Once he has adopted it, what type of justification can he provide (beyond the
7. Let me reiterate that my focus is on James’s interpretation of Rawls and his view of practice-
dependence. Other authors and different views concerning practice-dependence might not
be subject to this problem, or not in the same way (see Sangiovanni, 2008; Ronzoni, 2010;
Valentini, 2011b).
maffettone.qxp_Academy  22/02/17  15:46  Pagina 35
36 coNsTRucTiNg JusTice FoR exisTiNg PRacTices?
statement of consistency) that, having led to controversial moral conclusions, the
method itself is sound?8 What kind of reasons can possibly motivate the adoption
of the method in the first place? If we follow James, none of the answers to these
questions are available to Rawls.
Let me provide two examples. The first concerns the rejection of what we can call
cosmopolitan distributive principles in LP. If we select the relevant agents for orig-
inal position reasoning according to James’s practice-dependent reading of Rawls,
the reasons that led us to select such agents (i.e. peoples) rather than others (i.e. per-
sons understood as all human beings) would be methodological. The choice of peo-
ples would follow directly from the interpretation of a social practice. But the fact
that we chose to follow an interpretive methodology in the first place would not be
explained or backed by a moral argument. On the other hand, the choice of relevant
agents does have important consequences for the outcome of the original position.
For instance, it entails the fact that a ‘global difference principle’ that distributes re-
sources between persons cannot be a valid principle for LP. In fact the methodological
choice has even stronger consequences. It tells us that no principle of justice that ad-
dresses individuals directly can be a valid principle for LP. In this picture, any form of
distributive cosmopolitanism becomes a ‘no-go area’ simply for methodological rea-
sons.9 For the sake of argument, let us bracket the counterintuitive implications that
this has for some cosmopolitan liberals. What remains striking, though, is that sim-
ply by adopting a given method we are able to completely disregard an entire set of
principles of justice as even potentially valid. But how can we do this without pro-
viding a moral argument to that effect?
The second example concerns the way in which we imagine the original position
as a justificatory device. If we follow James, we are unable to see how the original po-
sition can provide us with any guidance when we try to justify principles of justice. here,
I am not arguing that, according to James, Rawls provides no argument for the con-
tent of the eight principles of LP that he puts forward. What I want to question is what
we can call the ‘input parameters’ of the original position. The original position is, in
Rawls’ view, a ‘device of representation’ to model and systematize some our most firm-
ly held considered judgments. One such judgment is that individuals are independent
moral agents with distinct systems of ends. On the other hand, according to James,
we start by assuming that, for largely methodological reasons, we can ‘package’ indi-
viduals in collectives, and do so without offering them any form of direct justification. 
8. note that, so far, we have used the example of Rawls’ choice of unit of analysis. But our crit-
icism can be readily extended to incorporate the other major discontinuity between Rawls’
domestic and international theory. Rawls’ decision to construct an anti-egalitarian theory of
international justice has relevant moral implications. If, following James, we picture it as the
outcome of a methodological choice we will face exactly the same problem as with Rawls’ choice
of unit of analysis: if our methodological orientation has substantive moral consequences, how
can we justify our methodological choice in the first place?
9. I have greatly benefited from Valentini’s discussion of this particular problem (see Valentini,
2011b).
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Is this plausible? Clearly, we can revise our considered judgments as part of the
broader process of reflective equilibrium. But what seems difficult to explain is why
we should start by feeding into original position reasoning assumptions that do not
match our considered judgments. What seems to be unusual in this case is the fact
that we start original position reasoning by not displaying, to the best of our knowl-
edge, one of our most firmly held considered judgments. In the progressive search
for reflective equilibrium, the original position serves us to map our moral sense and,
in Rawls’ words, ‘to provide guidance where guidance is needed’. But the orientat-
ing role of original position reasoning seems to presuppose, in order to function cor-
rectly, that we start from something we deem, if not true, at least as less controver-
sial than available alternatives. Does this require that Rawls construct a global orig-
inal position? no, not necessarily. But it does entail that he provide a morally sub-
stantive reason that can be addressed to each and every individual in order not to
do so. 
Overall, the impression we get is that by adopting at face value James’s inter-
pretation of Rawls, we are forsaking central elements Rawls’ political philosophy in
favour of a methodological standpoint that cannot justify its own implications. James’s
interpretation of Rawls restores the coherence between Rawls’ domestic and inter-
national theories, but it is simply incapable of providing a reconstruction of Rawls’
work that is morally defensible. Rawls is one the champions of twentieth-century lib-
eralism. yet, by accepting James’s practice-dependent interpretation of his work, we
are asked to abandon the liberal aspiration to justify social and political arrangements
to individuals. Furthermore, we are asked to comply with this loss for methodological
reasons – reasons, that is, that seem to have no connection whatsoever to the moral
standing of persons. James’s interpretation of Rawls seems to argue that once we ac-
cept his practice-dependent reading of Rawls’ work, the justifiability of social and
political arrangements to persons as moral agents is simply a contingent feature of
western political societies.10 In this view, the fate of individuals appears to be sec-
ondary and hostage to the domain of activity we are considering. It is hard to imag-
ine that this is the conclusion we want to draw when trying to explain the content
and structure of LP.
2.4 Practice-dependence: ‘how’ or ‘why’?
Let me conclude this chapter by offering what I think is an important clarification
as to what my goal has been so far. The point I have being trying to make in my crit-
10. But here, James could rightly point out that one of the lessons of PLseems to direct us along
this path. Isn’t Rawls’ contention that justice as fairness is precisely something culturally con-
tingent? This will be a central topic of the next chapter, but we can immediately state that if
we draw a distinction between the ‘content’ of justice as fairness and the justifiability of so-
cial and political arrangements to individuals, things are less clear cut. If, as Rawls believes,
‘justification is addressed to others’, it might be the case that in different contexts, and for dif-
ferent persons, what makes a social practice justifiable will change (see part III in the next chap-
ter and chapter 3 for further elaboration). 
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ical examination of practice-dependence is that we need to separate two important
types of question: ‘how’ and ‘why’. ‘how’ questions are properly questions of
method. James’s work, and other accounts of practice-dependence in the literature
(see for example Sangiovanni, 2008), tend to focus on these. The ‘how’ question asks
the following: how can we get from existing practices to the content, scope and jus-
tification of the principles that apply to them? In order to do so, most accounts of
practice-dependence feature a ‘conception of interpretation’ and specify different ways
of getting from existing practices to first principles of justice (so, for example, James’s
view relied on Dworkinian constructive interpretation and original position reasoning,
see Part I of this chapter). Instead, practice-dependence views are rather less out-
spoken about the other type of question, one that, intuitively, is antecedent ‘how’:
‘why’. The ‘why’ question asks the following: What kind of moral arguments can sup-
port the adoption of a given methodological commitment?Without a clear answer to
the ‘why’ question, the conclusions adopted as a result of practice-dependence are
not morally defensible. They are not necessarily wrong, either, but as I have tried to
show, they are at best incomplete.
note that the point I have made is not that Rawls believes that existing social and
political practices are irrelevant when we want to provide the content, scope and jus-
tification of first principles of justice. There is good textual evidence that he believed
political philosophy to be grounded in ‘the world as we see it or not at all’, to para-
phrase Rawls himself. But the deeper question that remains unanswered once we
have conceded that much is, quite simply, why? What remains to be seen is why facts
(such as those concerning the features of existing practices) should matter at all when
we provide content, scope and justification to first principles of justice. I have inti-
mated that it seems unlikely that the answer to this question can simply be method-
ological. In other words, it seems unlikely that the reasons that led Rawls to ground
the content, scope and justification of his principles of justice in existing practices
can simply be one of method. Ultimately, the crucial point is whether we believe that
it is the ‘method’ that drives the adoption of certain principles of justice (and the re-
jection of others), or independent moral arguments that push us to adopt a given
methodological orientation, such as practice-dependence. It seems intuitively
more plausible, in my view, to believe that moral arguments, not simply methodological
ones, must be presented when moral conclusions are reached.
COnCLUSIOn
In this chapter I have explained and then criticized one of the most original inter-
pretations of Rawls’ work that has appeared in the past few years. James’s inter-
pretation sees the continuity of Rawls’ work through a commitment to practice-de-
pendence. Practice-dependence is the idea that principles of justice depend, for their
content, scope and justification, on the nature of the practices they address. In turn,
this explains why Rawls’ international and domestic theories are so starkly differ-
ent in the agents they see as relevant and the conclusions that they reach. If Rawls,
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as James maintains, is constructing justice for existing practices, the differences be-
tween the domestic and the international in Rawls are mainly explained by the fact
that the two practices he addresses have a different nature, point and purpose. While
this reading provides a conceptually coherent reconstruction of Rawls’ work, I have
maintained that it is unable to explain its very foundations. 
In order to do so I have challenged the textual support that James provides for
his reading. Rawls’ methodological remarks on the normative independence of dif-
ferent types of practices (such as institutions within the basic structure) and on how
to match principles and practices (when he comments on the inadequacy of utili-
tarianism) are all premised on broader moral arguments. The first is premised on
the constraints that non-basic institutions must respect within the basic structure,
and the second on the moral relevance of individuals. In turn, these remarks high-
lighted the main problem with a purely methodological interpretation of the con-
tinuity of Rawls’ work, namely: why should Rawls be committed to the method that
James attributes to him? Since the methodological commitment has important moral
consequences, there is simply no way of escaping the conclusion that it requires a
moral justification. 
In the following chapter, I will suggest a reading of the Rawlsian enterprise as
a search for public justification. The latter reading will provide both the basis for a
fuller interpretation of the continuity of Rawls’ work and will place the relevance of
existing practices within a framework based on the liberal idea of respect for per-
sons expressed by a commitment to a shared and mutually acceptable justification
of social and political arrangements to them. 
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Chapter 2 
Rawlsian Liberalism and Public Justification
This chapter has two main goals. One is to provide a reconstruction of Rawls’ work
based on the liberal idea that basic social and political arrangements should be jus-
tified to those who live under them. This reconstruction has itself two distinct func-
tions within the architecture of the chapter: it provides some background to the Rawl-
sian corpus prior to the publication of LP and more specifically on how it evolved from
TJ to PL; and it highlights the centrality of the justification of social and political ar-
rangements to individuals, an aspect of Rawls’ thought on which I have insisted in
the previous chapter. The second objective of the chapter is to set out in greater de-
tail the idea that best captures the Rawlsian commitment to the justification of ba-
sic social and political institutions, namely the idea of public justification. 
In parts 1 and 2 of the chapter 1 present Rawls’ domestic political philosophy as
being defined by the search for a shared and mutually acceptable basis for the jus-
tification of the political order. In TJ, Rawls developed the idea of the social contract
and, through the original position, provided one of the most compelling accounts
of political and distributive justice in modern liberal theory. yet TJ also put forward
a peculiar and idealistic picture of how a society could ‘hang together’. A society ef-
fectively regulated by justice as fairness is a well-ordered society, a society in which
stability is always stability for the right reasons. A well-ordered society that is sta-
ble for the right reasons is a society in which there is a moral consensus upon mat-
ters of basic justice and in which citizens have a shared and mutually acceptable stand-
point from which to justify basic social and socio-political arrangements to one an-
other. 
Unfortunately, the idealistic picture of moral consensus and stability for the right
reasons provided by TJwas based on citizens’ shared belief in a Kantian conception
of their moral nature. And, according to the Rawls ofPL, this was clearly an implausible
assumption. Imagining persons to be united by the same comprehensive conception
of liberalism is simply implausible given the results produced by human reason in
the context of free institutions that TJ itself recommends. Justice as Fairness, seen
as a comprehensive conception of justice, is incapable of generating its own support,
and so is incapable of being stable for the right reasons even under the most favourable
circumstances one can imagine: the fact that citizens endorse it as the normative cri-
terion ordering the basic structure of their society. In order to renew his commitment
to a shared and mutually acceptable basis for the justification of basic social and po-
litical institutions, Rawls developed a new series of ideas that, paraphrasing PL, ‘were
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not needed before’. Justice as Fairness becomes a political conception of justice, and
stability for the right reasons is based on an overlapping consensus. The Rawls of PL
also addressed the issue of the legitimate use of political power. In TJ issues concerning
the legitimate use of political power are not developed at any length. Instead, in PL,
Rawls stresses that the nature of political power is always coercive and that the cit-
izens of a liberal democracy might be faced with (bounded) disagreement on the right,
not simply the good. In order to address these issues Rawls developed a conception
of political legitimacy. Even when it comes to political legitimacy, the basic idea con-
veyed by Rawlsian political philosophy is that we should always look for a shared and
mutually acceptable set of reasons that justify the use of the collective power of the
citizens over one another. 
Part 3 takes up the second objective of the chapter, to further investigate Rawls’
attempt to find a shared and mutually acceptable justification of the basic social and
political institutions of society. I claim that such goal (of finding a shared and mu-
tually acceptable justification) can be effectively captured by the idea of public jus-
tification, and subsequently expand five features of the idea of public justification
itself: a) its grounds; b) the notion of justification it employs; c) its method; d) its
scope; and e) its relationship with the analysis of existing practices. In articulating
what I see as the main features of the idea of public justification, this chapter also
provides the trait d’union between chapter 1 and chapter 3 of the book. In the first
chapter I criticized the interpretation of Rawls’ work provided by Aaron James. I have
maintained that his view of Rawls makes it impossible to portray the latter as a lib-
eral committed to the justification of social and political arrangements to individ-
uals, because it does not provide a sustainable interpretation of Rawls’ commitment
to the importance of existing social forms. In part 3 of this chapter I show that it is
precisely when we take Rawls’ commitment to public justification seriously that we
understand why existing practices matter in his philosophical framework. Part 3 also
addresses the scope of the idea of public justification. LP extends some of the toolk-
it of PL to international society, yet, as many liberal cosmopolitans claim, it might
be perceived as doing so only imperfectly or reluctantly (if at all). In the final sec-
tion of the chapter, I argue that public justification has universal reach. But, crucially,
I claim that it is only the method of public justification that is universal, not its con-
tent. By setting out the distinction between the content and the scope of public jus-
tification I set the stage for chapter 3’s critical examination of liberal cosmopolitan
attempts to extend Justice as Fairness to global politics.
Before starting my exposition, allow me one caveat and one clarification. The
caveat is that this chapter sets forth a reconstruction of Rawls’ passage from TJ to
PL, but does not provide a sustained argument about that reconstruction being the
most accurate one. (For a different view, see Weithman, 2010.)11 My aim in this chap-
11. I will not address in any detail the alternative view of Rawls’ political turn offered by Weith-
man (2010). According to Weithman, the essential task of the political turn is to provide a dif-
ferent solution to the collective action problems posed by large-scale political societies and
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ter is simply to highlight one component of this story, namely the continued atten-
tion in the Rawlsian corpus to the idea of finding a shared and mutually acceptable
justification for basic social and political arrangements.12 The clarification I would
like to make regards the way in which I present the progression of ideas in the chap-
ter. Conceptually, the correct way of presenting one’s results would be to start with
the conclusions one wishes to draw and to use the body of the text in order to pro-
vide ‘evidence’ for the desired conclusion – in this case, the elaboration of the idea
of public justification. however, the notion of public justification itself relies on the
development of Rawls’ ideas. A more reconstructive approach, one that starts from
the elements of Rawls’ work and then explains the meaning of the idea of public jus-
tification is, in my view, more fruitful. 
1. TJ AnD ThE PROBLEM OF STABILITy
TJ is often praised for the argumentative strength and the intuitive moral appeal of
the conception of justice that it presents. yet, the most idealistic element of TJ is to
be found in the basic idea of how a society should ‘hang together’. This is, using Rawls’
terminology, the idea of a well-ordered society. A well-ordered society achieves what
Rawls calls stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is not driven
by political compromise, nor obtained through the coercive use of political power.
to provide such solution without imagining what he refers to as a hobbesian sovereign (2010:
7). Rawls, then, is looking for an account of stability that is ‘inherent’ rather than ‘imposed’
(2011: 44ff). Weithman also contrasts his reconstruction with what he calls the ‘basic view’
(2010: ch. 2). Finally, he rejects the idea, which I develop in section III, that Rawls’ liberal-
ism is guided by respect for persons (2010: ch. 11). I agree with Weithman that the basic view
is wrong: the political turn is motivated by the problem of stability. I am less sure that the ba-
sic view as Weithman describes it is as popular as he maintains (see for example Cohen, 1994,
and Freeman, 2007c, for authoritative understandings that do not correspond with the ba-
sic view). I am also unconvinced by the idea that inherent stability and respect for persons are
not compatible. In the end, the good of inherent stability is not simply practical, but also deeply
moral. My claim, then, is that the idea of inherent stability can be one effective way of expressing
the relationship between citizens and political institutions. I see no reason to reject the claim
that the appreciation of this state of affairs presupposes some idea that persons are to be re-
spected and that this entails them being owed a justification for basic social and political ar-
rangements.
12. Furthermore, even if the reader is not entirely convinced by my account here I believe the over-
all argument of the book remains valid. The book deals with the continuity of Rawls’ domestic
and international theory. Strictly speaking, whether there is a strong form of continuity be-
tween TJ and PL is not a problem I must necessarily resolve, or at least not a problem that forms
part of the enquiry I am conducting. If we can assume that, at least in Rawls’ eyes, PL and suc-
cessive writings represent his final statement on the content and justification of his domes-
tic theory of justice, then the coherence of Rawls’ domestic and international theories is not
premised on the continuity between TJ and PL. For a view that denies the continuity between
TJ and PL, see Ackerman (1994).
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Rather, it entails a deep form of social unity: it is based (as we will see below) on ev-
eryone possessing the same comprehensive conception of justice based on the val-
ue of autonomy. This moral consensus on a conception of justice also implies that
a fundamental aspect of TJ is that citizens of a well-ordered society have a shared
and mutually acceptable standpoint from which to judge and justify the shape of their
basic social and political institutions to one another. This, at least in TJ, is Rawls’ ar-
gument. 
however, as we shall see, the idea of reasonable pluralism creates problems for
this happy picture. If we take reasonable pluralism seriously, the fact that all should
support the same (comprehensive) conception of justice is an unreasonable ideal.
It is unreasonable, because even in the best of foreseeable conditions it cannot sus-
tain itself. What makes social unity of the type Rawls imagines in TJ a worthy ideal
– that is, the fact that it is achieved in a context in which the basic freedoms of the
democratic tradition are protected (see Cohen, 1994) – also makes it unlikely that
such social unity will persist. By stressing the themes of a well-ordered society, of
stability for the right reasons, and of normative consensus, I hope to show that the
idea of a shared basis for the justification of social and political arrangements is part
of Rawls’ philosophical enterprise from the start. 
1.1 TJ and the well-ordered society
According to many, TJ presents an attractive ideal of society as a form of social co-
operation between free and equal persons. It secures the basic rights and liberties
familiar from constitutional tradition and gives them priority over the claims of the
general good. It provides a defence of equality of opportunity that shows how the
initial starting points we have in the social world are morally arbitrary and should
not determine the likelihood of our success in life. It defends a vision of economic
inequalities that are justifiable only if they are to improve the lot of those who fare
the worst and in so doing presents a vision of economic efficiency that is not based
on individual greed but on reciprocity and solidarity. no doubt these are consider-
able achievements. But perhaps Rawls’ work, even in TJ, provides a more encompassing
and even more attractive moral ideal. 
Rawls’ TJ projects a vision of society in which the personal freedoms of all in-
dividuals are not simply defended against the possibility of coercive intervention
by the collective, but are founded on the reasoned agreement of all free and equal
persons that participate in social cooperation. The normative ideal that Rawls pre-
sents in TJ does not limit itself to the content of the principles of justice but extends
to the way in which we imagine the society governed by those principles. A soci-
ety that adopts Justice as Fairness is not simply ‘regulated’ by it, but structured ac-
cording to its principles in a very peculiar sense. According to Rawls, principles of
justice specify fair terms of social cooperation. Social cooperation is not ‘merely so-
cially coordinated activity… social cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules
and procedures which those cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their con-
duct’ (JAFR: 6). 
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The society imagined in TJ is ‘effectively regulated by a public conception of jus-
tice’. According to Rawls this means that it is a well-ordered society. To be termed
‘well-ordered’ conveys three essential elements for Rawls. First, it is a society in which
‘everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same13… conception
of justice… moreover, this knowledge is mutually recognized: that is, people know
everything they would know if their acceptance of those principles were a matter
of public agreement’ ( JAFR: 8). Second, the basic structure complies with the con-
ception of justice that is publicly known. Third, ‘citizens have a normally effective
sense of justice, that is, one that enables them to understand and apply the publicly
recognized principles of justice’ (JAFR: 9). Eventually, according to Rawls, ‘in a well-
ordered society… the public conception of justice provides a mutually recognized
point of view from which citizens can adjudicate their claims of political right on their
political institutions or against one another’ ( JAFR: 9).
The ideal of social cooperation presented by Rawls entails a deep form of nor-
mative consensus14 between all participants to social cooperation. normative con-
sensus is not simply agreement on the shape the basic structure should have, but also
on the reasons that lead each and every person to believe that Justice as Fairness is
the best way to organize social cooperation between free and equal citizens. 
Why does Rawls emphasize this ideal of normative consensus?15 A normative con-
sensus concerning fundamental moral and political ideals is important and desirable
for at least four discrete reasons. First, the stability of a society’s allegiance to a con-
ception of right and the conformity of its institutions to such conception is greatly
enhanced by the presence of a normative consensus on matters of basic justice. Sec-
ond, ‘assuming that norms of justice are not motivationally inert, consensus on them
increases social trust and harmony, supports social peace, simplifies decision-mak-
ing, reduces monitoring and enforcement costs… and… reduces alienation from pub-
lic choices because citizens embrace the norms and ideals that guide those choic-
es’ (Cohen, 1994: 1516). Third, moral consensus on basic principles of political moral-
ity makes the reconciliation of individual plurality with social unity possible. It helps
create a society in which the personal freedom and autonomy of citizens is not un-
derstood as being in opposition to social and political institutions, but grounded in
their continued existence. Fourth, when a moral consensus on matters of basic jus-
tice is achieved, a basic form of mutual respect is possible. When moral consensus
is reached, ‘each offers as reasons for a decision only considerations that others who
are subject to political power take as reasons, and state power is exercised only with-
in the bounds set by these reasons’ (Cohen, 1994: 1517). 
13. here in the text of JAFRRawls includes, crucially, the term ‘political’, which already incorporates
the solution to the problem addressed in PL. For reasons of presentation I omit the term. This
should not substantially change the nature of a well-ordered society as viewed in TJ. 
14. here I follow Joshua Cohen’s review of PL (Cohen, 1994).
15. In this part of the chapter I follow Joshua Cohen’s treatment of what he calls the internal prob-
lem of TJ.
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In sum, a well-ordered society, one that achieves stability for the right reasons,
is based on the willing support of its members and their social unity is, in turn, based
on the fact that they share the same (in TJ, comprehensive) justification for the con-
ception of right that orders their political community. Such a well-ordered society
that is stable for the right reasons presents a case of moral consensus on matters of
basic justice where citizens have a shared and mutually acceptable standpoint from
which to justify the shape of basic social and political arrangements to one anoth-
er. 
1.2 A problem of stability?
While normative consensus clearly is (at least for Rawls) a desirable feature for a po-
litical society, we must be careful in declaring, ipso facto, that any route toward such
consensus is acceptable. All of the virtues of consensus we have laid out in the pre-
vious paragraph take for granted something important: that the consensus we are
dealing with is not reached through manipulation, inculcation or force (see Cohen,
1994). Social trust and mutual respect between citizens should not be the histori-
cal result of the use of political power. At least, this is not the means by which Rawls
believes, from a normative point view, a desirable and lasting consensus on matters
of basic justice should obtain in a liberal democratic society. Only under conditions
that make individual and collective deliberation possible can a normative consen-
sus be called ‘free’ and not a form of imposed uniformity (see Cohen, 1994). And this
is where we can start to understand the main problem that Justice as Fairness will
face. If consensus is to be achieved in the correct way, we know that it must come
about in conditions of free personal and collective deliberation. Such conditions, in
order to be even partially realized in society, require the protection of certain basic
associative and expressive liberties. But, in turn, such liberties are historically associated
with pluralism concerning moral, religious, and philosophical views. So, the prob-
lem Rawls needs to address is whether, in a context of pluralism created by the pro-
tection of basic associative and expressive liberties, normative consensus on justice
can be achieved and be stable. 
Rawls’ initial solution is presented in part III of TJ. According to Rawls, a con-
ception of justice is stable if, once it has been adopted as a regulative ideal for the
basic structure, it can come to generate its own support. Stability for the right rea-
sons comes about when ‘the forces that support it are primarily its members’ moral
motivation and their sense of justice’ (Freeman, 2007c: 244). Rawls’ initial case for
the stability of the society regulated by justice as fairness is based on two main ar-
guments. First, that in the society regulated by Justice as Fairness those who live un-
der it can come to develop, by a gradual process of moral learning, a desire to sup-
port just institutions. This argument is meant to show that there is nothing in hu-
man nature that makes the stability of Justice as Fairness impossible. Second, Rawls
tries to show that to support just institutions is not only in line with what human na-
ture allows but also part of what is rationally desirable for persons: the development
of their sense of justice is thus congruent, to use Rawls’ famous term, with their good. 
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now, in a context of pluralism – that is, the type of context that emerges once
basic expressive and associative liberties are protected – both arguments seem to face
significant challenges. I will focus here on those faced by the second argument for
stability – that is, for congruence.
One of the basic arguments for congruence maintains that, as free persons, to
act according to principles of justice and to express our human nature are one and
the same thing. What Rawls maintains, and his argument for congruence is meant
to show, is that a conception of right and justice (the same, in fact, for all persons
in society) can take centre-stage in persons’ motivational set and that it can be a reg-
ulative ideal even for individuals with differing conceptions of the good. But how
can that be possible? here Rawls states that to act according to a conception of right
and justice means to express our nature as autonomous moral agents. 
In short, what needs to obtain for the society of justice as fairness to be stable
along the lines presented in part III of TJ is that:
members of a well-ordered society will develop a conception of their nature as
free beings, will regard the expression of that free nature in their own conduct
as a fundamental good, and will understand… that such expression requires act-
ing from the principles of justice that would be chosen in the original position,
giving those principles a special regulative role.
(Cohen, 1994: 1519)
This would happen, ideally, because persons come to realize that to act according
to principles chosen in the original position is basically the same thing as to act from
rational principles that we have given to ourselves. In the original position we are
represented as free moral persons, so to act from principles chosen in the original
position is basically to vindicate our nature as those free moral persons. 
Clearly, however, the fact that our representation in the original position expresses
our moral nature as free beings is a matter upon which persons are bound to disagree.
Persons will reasonably (to use a term we will explain later in greater detail) disagree
that the original position expresses our nature as free beings. They will also reasonably
disagree that, as a matter of fact, our nature must be understood to have such moral
content. Lastly, persons will reasonably disagree that the respect for such nature should
always have a regulative role. 
This creates a problem, because it means, among other things, that even in the
best of foreseeable conditions – that is, even if society adopts Justice as Fairness as
its conception of justice – that very same society will not be able to remain stable for
the right reasons. Persons who live under free institutions come to have different con-
ceptions of their moral nature, both its content and its regulative force, and hence
the case for the stability of justice as fairness cannot be based on the congruence ar-
gument: we cannot assume that to act from principles of justice expressing ‘our’ na-
ture as free moral beings is part of ‘our’ rational good. If stability for the right rea-
sons cannot be achieved, what are the consequences for the society of TJ? Stability
for the right reasons requires for Rawls, at least in TJ, a deep form of consensus on
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both the conception of justice that orders society’s basic structure and the (com-
prehensive) reasons that lead citizens to enduringly support such a conception. This
consensus is deep because it requires that all members of society possess the same
sense of justice based on the Kantian ideal of autonomy. In TJ the ideal of public jus-
tification is realizable only by assuming a very strong common ground between cit-
izens. 
here, I believe that the relevance of the idea of a shared and mutually accept-
able basis for the justification of basic social and political arrangements can be ful-
ly perceived if we analyse how Rawls reacted to this problem in part III of TJ. The
common ground citizens are supposed to share in TJ is a very Kantian one and res-
onates strongly with the modern liberal tradition. It could have been easy for Rawls
to accept, perhaps, that the ideal of a well-ordered society that is stable for the right
reasons should be side-stepped, and that the idea of finding a shared and mutual-
ly acceptable basis for the justification of the political order should be forsaken and
replaced by a (comprehensive) liberal justification based on the values of moral au-
tonomy as expressed by a Kantian interpretation of Justice as Fairness. Instead, in
PL, Rawls addressed the issue of pluralism more deeply. he argued that a well-or-
dered liberal society stable for the right reasons is not possible if we are committed
to a comprehensive conception of liberalism. In so doing, he traded what he saw as
the most compelling justification of a conception of justice for a modern liberal, with
one that was capable of successfully gaining the willing support of all reasonable cit-
izens of a liberal democracy. By this means, in my view, Rawls clearly signalled an
order of priority for his political philosophy. 
2. A nEW ACCOUnT OF ThE ShARED BASES OF JUSTIFICATIOn16
In PL, Rawls takes up the problem of the stability of Justice as Fairness and devel-
ops a new way of understanding stability for the right reasons. A central element of
this strategy is to transform Justice as Fairness into a political conception and to imag-
ine a different form of social unity, one based on overlapping consensus. PL also deals
more explicitly with the issue of coercion. In TJ, the word ‘coercion’ does not appear
in the book’s analytical index. In fact, Rawls is at great pains to imagine why coer-
cive political power might be needed, if at all, given that all share one and the same
sense of justice ‘all the way down’. In PL, on the other hand, the issue of political pow-
16. For reasons of space, I cannot here address the issue of the validity of the account of public
justification that is implicit in Rawls’ political turn. A number of important concerns have been
raised about this account (see for example Barry, 1995; Raz, 1990), but I do not see how they
impinge upon the interpretive task of reconstructing the continuity of Rawls’ domestic and
international theories of justice. They might, perhaps, affect our evaluation of the liberal cos-
mopolitan alternative to Rawls’ view. But, as we will see in the next three chapters, not all the
arguments that are meant to reject such view are premised on accepting the content of the
arguments offered by my reconstruction of the political turn in Rawls’ work.
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er, which, according to Rawls, is always coercive power, takes a much more promi-
nent role. If the problem of stability in TJwas linked to the appreciation of reason-
able pluralism concerning the good, one could add that the issue of legitimacy aris-
es from Rawls’ acknowledgment of the coercive nature of political power and the pos-
sibility of (bounded) disagreement on the right itself. If this is correct, one of the cen-
tral issues of PL becomes this: in a context of (reasonable) pluralism, how can we
use the collective power of the state, which in a democratic polity is power equally
shared by all citizens, to settle and enforce the laws that regulate citizens’ conduct?
For Rawls, the answer to this question concerns the issue of political legitimacy. In
short, in PL Rawls is looking for a sounder basis for the stability of a liberal society
and for an account of the legitimate exercise of state power. 
Even in PL, I believe, the issue of finding a shared and mutually acceptable ba-
sis for the justification of basic social and political arrangements is crucial. The idea
of stability for the right reasons based on overlapping consensus is simply the trans-
position of the goal of finding a shared, mutually acceptable justification for basic
social and political arrangements in a context in which citizens are seen as being more
divided on fundamental moral, philosophical and religious issues. In the same way,
the test of reasonable acceptability for the use of political power signals the fact that
even when we vote (as we cannot reach full consensus), or use the power of the state
to enforce the terms of social cooperation (as the state claims this ultimate form of
power in a political community), we should always aim for political power to be used
according to a shared and mutually acceptable set of reasons. 
2.1 Stability and reasonable pluralism
In order to fully appreciate the nature of Rawls’ proposed solution to TJ’s problems with
stability we need to introduce a new family of ideas that, as Rawls himself has it, were
not needed before. We must provide a more detailed account of the idea of pluralism,
and to describe, at least superficially, what Rawls takes to be the context of his enquiry
in PL. According to Rawls, the ‘political culture of democratic society is characterized…
by three general facts’ (PL: 36).17 First, in a democratic society there will be an enduring
pluralism of what he calls reasonable comprehensive doctrines (more on this below).
Second, Rawls believes that the oppressive use of state power is required in order to
eliminate such pluralism. Third, the continuity in time of a democratic regime, one
not divided by doctrinal strife and hostility between its citizens, requires that a sub-
stantial majority of the latter are prepared to support it freely and willingly. 
What is a comprehensive doctrine? What makes pluralism reasonable? Accord-
ing to Rawls a doctrine is comprehensive when ‘it includes conceptions of what is
of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character that are to
inform much of our nonpolitical conduct (in the limit our life as a whole)’ (PL: 175).
In a free society, over time, different and incompatible comprehensive doctrines will
17. Rawls assumes that such facts hold (see PL: 36).
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develop: this is the fact of pluralism. What is more, such pluralism is, in Rawls’ view,
not a mere accident nor something to be regretted. It is instead simply the product
of human reason under free institutions and generates conceptions of what is of val-
ue in life which are not simply incompatible but also reasonable. Reasonable pluralism
and pluralism as such are not the same thing. The fact that persons tend to disagree
because, for instance, they represent different class interests, is not what Rawls means
by reasonable pluralism. The latter describes disagreement concerning fundamen-
tal moral, philosophical and religious ideas which stems from what Rawls calls the
burdens of judgment. Rawls holds that: a) citizens of a liberal democracy are rea-
sonable when, among other things, they recognize the burdens of judgment; and b)
that reasonable comprehensive doctrines are comprehensive doctrines held by rea-
sonable citizens. The fact of reasonable pluralism is, then, characterized as the de-
velopment and endurance of different and irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive
doctrines under free institutions.
how can citizens (seen as free and equal, reasonable and rational) who disagree
on fundamental moral, philosophical and religious questions come to support one
and the same conception of justice for their society? This is the problem of stabili-
ty18 highlighted above. We know that TJ’s account of stability is, according to Rawls’
own view, unsuccessful. It cannot fully take into account the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism. So how can Rawls proceed to solve this problem?
Rawls’ reply requires the elaboration of what he calls a political conception of
justice. A political conception is political in a very peculiar sense. According to Rawls
a conception of justice is political when: a) it is freestanding, that is it can be pre-
sented without presupposing the endorsement of any particular comprehensive doc-
trine; b) it is restricted to the domain of the political (it applies to the basic struc-
ture of society); c) its main ideas are drawn from the public political culture of so-
ciety. All three features of a political conception of justice are meant to reduce the
scope of disagreement between citizens. Its freestanding nature implies that persons
believing in different reasonable comprehensive doctrines can support the political
conception without forsaking their non-public reasons. The restriction to the basic
structure implies that the political conception does not address the private and as-
sociational life of citizens (it does not dictate their conduct in those domains, but it
does of course constrain their associational lives). The fact that its main ideas are
drawn from the public political culture assumes that such ideas are widely available
18. More precisely, as we have seen above, the problem of stability ‘involves two questions: the first
is whether people who grow up under just institutions… acquire a normally sufficient sense of
justice so that they generally comply with those institutions. The second question is whether in
view of the general facts that characterize a democracy’s public political culture, and in partic-
ular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping
consensus’ (PL: 141). This presentation of the problem of stability is the same as in TJ, but in PL,
Rawls’ reply to these two questions has shifted: he provides a different account of moral psychology
and replaces the idea of congruence with the idea of an overlapping consensus. In this book we
have dealt mainly with the second part of the problem of stability – one reason being that the
congruence argument makes the deficiencies of TJ’s account of stability more apparent.
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and shared as they represent ideas implicit in a common political tradition for all cit-
izens. In light of these new ideas, Rawls states that justice as fairness – more precisely,
the way in which it is presented in TJ – is (an element of) a comprehensive doctrine. 
Many conceptions of justice can be political in Rawls’ sense. But only a subset of
them can also be liberal (see PL: 5–6). All liberal political conceptions share three
basic features. Firstly they specify a list of basic rights, liberties and opportunities
that are familiar from the history of constitutional democracy. Rawls does not pro-
vide a complete list, but central to these features of a constitutional regime are the
associative and expressive liberties that make a normative consensus on justice both
desirable and difficult: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and association,
freedom of occupation and so on. Secondly, all liberal conceptions must specify an
‘assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially
with respect to claims of the general good and of perfectionist values’ (PL: 5). Third-
ly, all liberal political conceptions must specify adequate measures to ensure that all
can make effective use of their basic rights, liberties and opportunities, and that those
are not simply formal. But, as Rawls goes on to say, ‘[t]hese elements can be understood
in different ways so that there are many variants of liberalism’ (PL: 5). Among lib-
eral political conceptions of justice, Justice as Fairness expresses a particularly egal-
itarian form of liberal conception. It does so because: a) it protects the fair value of
the political liberties; b) it promotes fair, and not simply formal, equality of oppor-
tunity; and c) because it endorses the difference principle. 
having introduced the idea of a liberal political conception of justice we can now
provide Rawls’ answer to the question of stability. A well-ordered liberal democratic
society can be stable for the right reasons if all citizens, divided by their reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines, can come to support the same political conception of justice from
within their own framework of reasons. If this occurs, then an overlapping consensus
on justice obtains. An overlapping consensus is not a compromise between existing rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines in society. Rawls is clear that that would make it ‘po-
litical in the wrong way’. Rather, Rawls believes that by first developing a political con-
ception of justice (with all the features that are meant to narrow down disagreement)
and only then conjecturing whether the conception can gain the support of a sufficient
number of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, we can arrive at a political (moral)
consensus on matters of basic justice. In sum, the ideas of a political conception of jus-
tice and of overlapping consensus reframe Rawls’ search for a shared and mutually ac-
ceptable basis for the justification of basic social and political arrangements in light
of his appreciation of the problem of stability created by reasonable pluralism. 
2.2 From stability to legitimacy 
In TJ, Rawls deals with the coercive power of the state, much like hobbes, as a prob-
lem of assurance. his remarks feature in section 42 of TJ and are linked to the idea
of public goods (TJ: 236–7). There he writes that ‘[t]he need for the enforcement
of rules by the state will exist even when everyone is moved by the same sense of jus-
tice. The characteristic features of essential public goods necessitate collective agree-
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ments, and firm assurance must be given to all that they will be honoured’ (TJ: 236).
Although in a well-ordered society the level of sanctions will be ‘mild’ and they ‘may
never be applied’, Rawls maintains that ‘the existence of such devices [i.e. coercive
power] is a normal condition of human life even in this case’ (TJ: 237). In a large-
scale community, mutual trust can never develop to the point at which enforcement
is completely unnecessary (TJ: 237). 
In PL, the fact of reasonable pluralism entails that persons will not share the same
sense of justice in the same way as Rawls imagined they would in TJ. The best we
can hope for is that all will agree on the same liberal political conception of justice
and some (non-comprehensive) elements of its justification. But here things get more
complicated. Rawls, as we have seen, presents Justice as Fairness as one particularly
egalitarian liberal political conception. yet there is more than one liberal political
conception. As long as a liberal political conception meets the three standards pro-
vided above, it is a reasonable conception of justice for a liberal democratic society.
however, if that is correct, then persons who endorse different liberal political con-
ceptions of justice might, and perhaps realistically will, ‘disagree about what
counts as just within a liberal framework’ (Estlund, 1996: 6). 
Although Rawls finds Justice as Fairness to be the best account of justice for a
liberal democratic society, other forms of political liberalism are also reasonable in-
terpretations of what justice requires in a liberal regime. But, if liberals disagree about
what counts as the most reasonable liberal political conception to regulate their so-
ciety, how can they settle those disagreements? how can society’s basic structure be
coherently organized? If consensus on a political conception of justice can only be
conjectured rather than taken for granted, then, what kind of basis can we provide
to support the implementation of any such political conception? Making political lib-
eralism compatible with disagreement about justice requires uncovering some deep-
er form of consensus about the bases according to which the exercise of political pow-
er should be conducted. Persons who endorse different political liberalisms ‘agree
that citizens share in political power as free and equal’. In essence, Rawls’ answer is
that they agree about a conception of political legitimacy (Estlund, 1996: 6).
A conception of political legitimacy, for Rawls, is a conception of the proper use
of political power. By legitimacy, following Jonathan Quong, I refer to ‘a complex moral
right’ or ‘the moral power of one agent to impose duties on another agent, and also
to a right of the former agent to use some degree of coercion to enforce those du-
ties’ (Quong, 2011: 108). According to Rawls, in a liberal democratic regime, the po-
litical relationship between citizens has two special features. One is that we enter it
by birth and leave it only by death: ‘Political society is closed: we come to be with-
in it and we do not, and indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily’ (PL: 136).19 Sec-
ondly, and more relevantly here:
19. This is of course an abstraction. Rawls comments that ‘the appropriateness of this assump-
tion rests in part on the fact… that the right of emigration does not make the acceptance of
political authority voluntary in the way that freedom of thought and liberty of conscience make
the acceptance of ecclesiastical authority voluntary’ (PL: 136). 
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political power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanc-
tions… this power is regularly imposed on citizens… some of whom may not ac-
cept the reasons widely said to justify the general structure of political author-
ity… or when they do accept that structure, they may not regard as justified many
of the statutes enacted by the legislature to which they are subject. 
(PL: 136)
While overlapping consensus is possible, Rawls cannot guarantee that all members
of society will agree on the very same conception of justice (nor that there will be
agreement on how to interpret the same conception of justice in all relevant cases).
Many conceptions of justice are reasonable even from a liberal point of view. But this
creates a problem. We know that citizens are free and equal, reasonable and ratio-
nal. We also know that they hold different and incompatible reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. Furthermore, we know that they can still disagree on which interpreta-
tion of liberal justice is the most appropriate for their society. yet we recognize that
even when disagreement is reasonable, society cannot function by way of unanim-
ity and requires a single shared system of laws.20 So the question arises: on which
bases can we coerce other citizens in a liberal democracy? According to Rawls, the
answer is contained in what he calls the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’:
our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accor-
dance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals ac-
ceptable to their common human reason.
(PL: 137)
Rawls’ liberal principle of legitimacy provides a standard for the use of political pow-
er in a liberal democracy. It provides citizens of a liberal democratic polity with a shared
and mutually acceptable standard for the justification of the use of their collective
political power and expresses the need to make sure that this power, which according
20. This requirement need not be understood simply as a practical one, though of course it would
be practically unsound to require unanimity on justice as a necessary condition for the legit-
imacy of a state. As Quong notes (2011: 135), we can imagine persons to be under a natural
duty of justice, and we can further imagine that citizens are evenly divided on the question,
for example, of what is the most just system of property laws. Imagine further that the state
decides to enforce one among the different (yet reasonable) system of property laws that only
a subset of the citizens believe to be the correct or just one. If all those who do not share the
state’s action also believed that the state was acting without legitimacy then they would have
grounds for resistance; at the very least, the system of property law proposed by the state would
be unlikely to be sustainable in the long run (no laws can survive on coercion only). This would
then create a difficult situation in which, by claiming that an unjust law is also ipso facto il-
legitimate, no system of property is established thus making the prospect of meeting the nat-
ural duty of justice even more remote than if what many perceived to be an unjust system of
property was accepted.
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to Rawls is the power of all citizens (in which they share equally) as a corporate body,
can only be exercised correctly if those who are coerced can reasonably be expect-
ed to accept the reasons they are offered for such coercion. In other words, the use
of coercive political power in a liberal democracy must follow what Rawls calls the
criterion of reciprocity. The latter states that ‘our exercise of political power is prop-
er only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action
may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions’ (PL:
XLIV). Legitimacy, in this framework, is a much weaker standard than justice. Le-
gitimacy only provides the bounds within which political conceptions of justice must
fall for citizens to be under a duty to follow the law. Certain laws and policies will
not be considered fully just by some citizens, but provided they fall within the bounds
set by legitimacy, they are nonetheless legitimate and can command our respect.
3. ThE IDEA OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATIOn
Thus far in this chapter I have shown that one of the most enduring commitments
of Rawls’ political philosophy has been to find a shared and mutually acceptable jus-
tification for basic social and political institutions (and, in PL, for the justification
of the use of collective political power). In this final part of the chapter I want to say
more about the Rawlsian justificatory commitment. I believe that the commitment
to a shared and mutually acceptable justification for basic social and political ar-
rangements can be expressed effectively as a commitment to public justification. In
what follows, I analyse the idea of public justification in greater detail and specify
five of its central features: its grounds (3.1); the notion of justification that it uses
(3.2); its method (3.3); its scope (3.4); and its relationship with existing practices
(3.5). Explaining these features of public justification will provide both a clarifica-
tion of the idea itself and the foundations for exploring why and how such idea mat-
ters for understanding LP.
3.1 The grounds of public justification
Liberalism takes the moral standing of each and every individual seriously: it em-
bodies an ideal of respect for persons (see Larmore, 1994; idem., 1996; idem., 1999;
but also Ackerman, 1994).21 In recent years, many authors have argued that the com-
mitment to respect for persons and their standing implies that all persons are owed
21. This claim is, in my view, general enough to be applied to most forms of liberalism and most
liberal authors. nonetheless it is beyond the remit of this book to try to justify this idea: we
cannot here address the basis of respect for persons in liberal theory. If the reader feels un-
comfortable with the extrapolation, he can perhaps accept it as an interpretive claim about
Rawlsian liberalism; though reducing the generality of my contention this would not great-
ly affect the role it is meant to play in the book: both Rawls and the majority of his cosmopolitan
critics seem to accept the premise of respect for persons. here I say ‘respect’ and not ‘equal
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a justification for at least the most basic features of the political order.22 As Rawls him-
self stated, ‘to respect another as a moral person is to try to understand his aims and
interests from his standpoint and to present him with considerations that enable him
to accept the constraints on his conduct’ (TJ: 338). This is the defining feature of what
has been labelled ‘justificatory liberalism’ (see Gaus, 1996; Eberle, 2002: 51). 
Some might object that the Rawlsian political turn is often seen as an attempt
to present a freestanding conception of justice which citizens holding different com-
prehensive doctrines will be able to endorse. To premise such freestanding conception
on the idea of respect might seem to be self-defeating, yet for two reasons I do not
believe it to be so. The first, as we have seen in the previous chapter, and as Larmore
himself declares, is because without some moral grounding the very idea of look-
ing for a freestanding conception of justice seems inexplicable. In criticizing Aaron
James’s interpretation of Rawls, one that sees Rawls as ‘starting from existing prac-
tices’, I have lamented the lack of a moral explanation to back the methodological
outlook attributed to Rawls. Similarly, in this chapter I have stressed the longstanding
centrality of the idea of public justification in the Rawlsian corpus and more specif-
ically how it was precisely this commitment that lead Rawls to reformulate his ac-
count of the stability and legitimacy of Justice as Fairness. It therefore begs the ques-
tion to simply assume that the Rawlsian commitment to public justification cannot
be further elucidated or backed by some form of moral consideration. In Larmore’s
words:
we may intelligibly ask why liberalism's response to [reasonable pluralism] should
be a reformulation of its principles. Why should liberalism become political, in
the sense that Rawls and I intend? Why should liberal thinkers not instead dig
in their heels and, observing correctly that no political conception can accom-
modate every point of view, maintain that liberalism stands or falls with a gen-
eral commitment to [a specific comprehensive doctrine]?
(Larmore, 1999: 605)
respect’ because I want to avoid the misunderstanding that ties the idea of respect for persons
to an egalitarian conception of social and political justice (see the conclusion for a short dis-
cussion of this issue). I am here indebted to Carter (2011) for this conceptual clarification.
In the literature it is also commonplace to refer to Stephen Darwall’s distinction between ‘recog-
nition respect’ and ‘appraisal respect’ (see Darwall, 2006). The former is linked to Darwall’s
understanding of dignity and is an attribute of moral personality generally, while the latter
is a form of judgment of a person’s moral character. In terms of Darwall’s terminology, then,
I am here referring to recognition respect. note, though, that I need not also endorse the same
type of justification for what grounds recognition respect as in Darwall’s work.
22. See for instance Jeremy Waldron: ‘liberalism rests on a certain view about the justification of so-
cial arrangements, and that this view helps us to understand some of the differences and some
of the similarities between liberalism and other ideologies… liberals are committed to a conception
of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women, and…
these commitments generate a requirement that all aspects of the social should either be made
acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual’ (Waldron, 1987: 128).
See also Gaus (1996); Bird (1996); Macedo (1990); Forst (2011); and Weithman, 2012).
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The second reason is that to ground Rawls’ political turn on respect for persons is
not the same thing as to ground it in a particular comprehensive doctrine. Respect
is something that can be specified in different ways. Different conceptions of the per-
son inspired by different moral, philosophical and religious doctrines will provide
different grounds to understand why respect matters (see Larmore, 1990: 349). Re-
spect, at least in the way in which it is understood here (see Sangiovanni, 2012, for
a detailed exposition) does not require or presuppose adherence to a particular com-
prehensive doctrine, nor does it specify a particular set of rights and entitlements. 
3.2 The notion of justification employed
With the grounds of public justification in hand, we are now in a position to state
the nature of the idea of justification endorsed by justificatory liberals. As we have
seen, and Rawls is no exception, those committed to justificatory liberalism believe
that respect for persons requires the justification of social and political arrangements
to those who are subject to them. But what does it mean to provide a justification?
What makes something ‘justifiable’ to a person? A traditional view of justification
tends to stress its nature as ‘an essentially philosophical or epistemic enterprise seek-
ing to get it right’ (Chambers, 2010: 893). This search for epistemic correctness –
or, in everyday language, for truth – is a key feature of the traditional account of what
can be labelled ‘rational justification’ (see Eberle, 2002: 61). yet Rawls believes that
the model of rational justification cannot fully express respect for persons.23 As ear-
ly as TJ, Rawls wrote that ‘justification is argument addressed to those who disagree
with us… being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds from what
all parties to the discussion hold in common… mere proof is not justification [since]…
a proof simply displays logical relations between propositions’ (TJ: 508). 
The idea of shared premises is essential to public justification. As Rawls states
in JAFR, ‘[p]ublic justification proceeds from some consensus: from premises all par-
ties in disagreement, assumed to be free and equal and fully capable of reason, may
reasonably be expected to share and freely endorse’ (JAFR: 27). Public justification
is not simply justification according to the most accurate reasons available. Or, to put
it in Rawls’ own words: 
Public justification is not, then, simply valid argument from given premises (though
of course it is that). Valid argument is instructive in setting out the relations be-
tween statements: it joins basic ideas and general statements with one another
and with more particular judgments; it exhibits the overall structure of conceptions
of any kind. By connecting the elements of a conception into an intelligible and
perspicuous whole, it serves as a mode of exposition. But when the premises and
conclusions are not acceptable on due reflection to all parties in a disagreement,
valid argument falls short of public justification. (JAFR: 27) 
23. For a more epistemologically informed account of the necessity of public justification see Gaus
(1996, ch. 8) and Eberle (2002: 61ff). 
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Following Stephen Macedo we can say that public justification has a dual role as it
seeks ‘reflective justification (good reasons), but also… reasons that can be wide-
ly seen to be good by persons such as they are’ (Macedo, 1990: 281). Public justifi-
cation acknowledges the permanent fact of pluralism and recognizes that such plu-
ralism is reasonable given the burdens of judgment. Public justification, then, ‘plays
a representative role: mediating, in effect, between philosophy and the citizenry’ and
in so doing ‘embodies the philosophical impetus toward critical reflection in a qual-
ified form’ (Macedo, 1990: 283). 
3.3 The method of public justification
Public justification has no specific content. In other words, the commitment to pub-
lic justification is not a commitment to any particular policies or to any particular
argument to sustain such particular policies, but rather to the normative constraints
that are attached to the presentation of arguments in favour of one’s views in political
life. According to the idea of public justification, ‘each citizen should so discipline
herself that she supports only those laws for which she enjoys the appropriate kind
of rationale, where what makes a given rationale appropriate is a function, in cru-
cial part, of the acceptability of the that rationale to the members of the public’ (Eber-
le, 2002: 52). 
however, while public justification has no pre-defined content, the constraints
set by the idea of justification developed in the previous section determine a method
for generating such content. As we have seen, epistemic correctness is not the only
element of what makes something ‘justifiable to others’. In a political context, and
given the role of public justification, the epistemic correctness of any argument can-
not be said to be sufficient to require that those to which the argument is addressed
should accept it. If epistemic correctness is not the hallmark of what makes an ar-
gument acceptable, where shall we find the shared premises that can turn our ‘proof’
in a ‘(public) justification’? In a liberal democratic context, no comprehensive doc-
trine can serve as the basis for public justification (Scanlon, 2003). Grounding our
justification of social and political arrangements upon a comprehensive doctrine will
make our reasons unacceptable to those who do not share that same comprehensive
outlook. In order to count as a shared and mutually acceptable basis for the justifi-
cation of basic political arrangements, the reasons we offer cannot simply rely on the
fact that we believe their content to be correct. They also have to be able to reach
across the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that develop in a liberal society. 
In a liberal democratic society, a shared set of beliefs and experiences that could
constitute the basis for the justification of social and political arrangements is hard
to come by. Citizens do not believe in the same comprehensive account of what is
good or of value in life, and so we cannot appeal directly to their non-public reasons
in order to construct public ones. But then, how could we proceed? We need a start-
ing point, a shared set of ideas and values that can constitute the basis for public jus-
tification. Intuitively, when we address a certain group of persons, shared premis-
es that could form the basis of a reasonable argument for the justification of social
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and political arrangements will have to be found in something to which all those af-
fected can substantively relate – something they will understand and that is part of
their system of thought. But if comprehensive doctrines cannot fulfil this role, what
remains is precisely the public political culture of a society, its political tradition as
expressed in major legal texts, institutional practices and the ideas that have been
used to analyse them. The latter is the only reservoir of shared ideas that can indeed
be found. 
According to Rawls the public political culture of a (democratic) society ‘com-
prises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions
of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and
documents that are common knowledge’ (PL, 13–14). yet such texts and traditions
of legal reasoning will undoubtedly not ‘speak for themselves’. They will not provide
clear guidance on the problem in hand. There is no direct and uncontroversial sense
in which the public political culture of a society already contains the principles of
justice that are meant to order its basic structure. In other words, the public politi-
cal culture can only provide a starting point for the process of public justification.
It is, then, the role of philosophy, when it aims at the public justification of the po-
litical order, to interpret these shared premises, and to develop their content into a
(political) conception of justice that is capable of fulfilling its social role in a context
of pluralism.
3.4 The scope of public justification
This type of reasoning can be symmetrically shifted to the case of international jus-
tice; that is, the idea of public justification can be extended beyond the liberal demo-
cratic tradition and can apply to Rawls’ understanding of LP. There are two differ-
ent ways in which such extension can be carried out and it is important to note the
difference between them. The first is to claim that the content of liberal conceptions
of justice should be universally applied to the world at large. Justice as Fairness, or
perhaps some other liberal political conception, should then be adopted as a way to
structure global politics (for instance, by claiming that all human beings should en-
joy the same types of liberal democratic rights). This is not what I am suggesting. The
second way, the one I endorse, is instead to affirm that it is the method adopted by
Rawls’ political philosophy (the idea of seeking a public justification for the politi-
cal order) that is more fruitfully universalized and applied beyond the scope of a lib-
eral polity. 
For instance, Rawls imagines that the institutions of a decent but nonliberal so-
ciety will be structured according to a common-good conception of justice (see LP:
64-67). A decent society can be stable for the right reasons and the use of political
power by its government can be pictured as legitimate. A decent society aims at and
in fact does achieve public justification (see chapter 3). Clearly, in such a society the
problem of pluralism might be less acute than in a liberal society and its citizens might
be united by a partially comprehensive doctrine. In such a context, the content of
public justification might itself include elements of a comprehensive or partially com-
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prehensive doctrine. It will include them because its public political culture, its main
legal texts and their traditions of interpretation will also include elements of that com-
prehensive or partially comprehensive doctrine as well. yet, in the same decent so-
ciety, the main elements associated with the liberal tradition are not widely shared
and so cannot plausibly constitute the starting point for the public justification of
the political order.
Some might retort that for Rawls the idea of public reasoning is ‘characteristic
of a democratic people’ (see PL: 213, quoted in Freeman, 2007b: 220). Freeman goes
on to state that ‘the mere fact that people in a society commonly accept and reason
in terms of some common religion or other comprehensive doctrine does not make
that doctrine part of public reason’ (Freeman, 2007b: 220). Even if one were to agree
with Freeman, the arguments presented here are not framed in terms of public rea-
son, but rather in terms of public justification. As Vallier and D’Agostino (2012) cor-
rectly argue, public justification is the genus while public reason is the species. Pub-
lic justification provides a vision of a political society that is stable for the right rea-
sons and in which political power is legitimately used. The idea of public justifica-
tion itself has greater reach than liberal democratic institutions. yet the type of val-
ues and ideas that can fulfil the requirement of public justification will vary according
to the political context.24
Take the example of the Society of Peoples. In LP, stability is always stability for
the right reasons and not a modus vivendi. Rawls’ hope is that those who grow un-
der (reasonably) just institutions (in this case the just institutions of a law of peo-
ples) will support them through the development of a sense of justice and ‘a reasoned
allegiance to those institutions sufficient to render them stable’ (PL: 142). Reasoned
allegiance is not compromise dictated by power, nor is it agreement dictated by tem-
porary coincidence of pre-determined material interests. In the Society of Peoples
all well-ordered peoples endorse the law of peoples as their shared conception of jus-
tice that serves the end of regulating their mutual relations. In affirming the prin-
ciples of LP, well-ordered peoples do not believe that such law is merely the best op-
tion for them as dictated by the furthering of their interests or required by the pre-
sent distribution of power. Rather, their allegiance is of a moral nature. Well-ordered
peoples endorse the content of LP. They believe that the principles of LP constitute
a conception of fair cooperation that both liberal and decent peoples can affirm in
light of their own reasons, and that it expresses their mutual respect. The eight prin-
24. For instance, Rawls writes that ‘[t]o act reasonably and responsibly, corporate bodies as well
as individuals need some recognized way of reasoning about what is to be done. This holds
for government and its citizens as a corporate body and also for associations such as firms and
labor unions, universities and churches. We say the recognized ways of reasoning of associations
are public with respect to their members, but nonpublic with respect to political society, and so
nonpublic with respect to citizens generally’ (JAFR: 92, emphasis added). This seems to im-
ply both that the publicity condition in the idea of public justification is meaningful even if
not applied to liberal democratic institutions, and that the content of public forms of reasoning
can vary according to the political context to which they apply.
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ciples of LP, in short, constitute a focal point, a shared basis for making mutually ac-
ceptable claims between peoples, and thus provide content to the idea of public jus-
tification between corporate agents at the international level.
The same reasoning applies to legitimacy in the Society of Peoples, in which free
and equal peoples have to agree on the limits of their political autonomy. Establishing
the limits of a people’s political autonomy entails placing restrictions on its conduct
(both external and internal) and making use of political power in order to render these
restrictions effective. This is the nature of the limited sovereignty that Rawls imag-
ines for all well-ordered peoples. The problem arises, then, of how to justify such re-
strictions over the pluralistic constituencies of free and equal peoples. We are there-
fore confronted with essentially the same problem that we have addressed in the lib-
eral democratic context. Or, to put it more accurately, we are confronted with two
different problems with a similar structure, in which the exercise of political pow-
er needs to be publicly justifiable to pluralistic constituencies. Given that the two con-
stituencies are not identical, the solution of the problem will not be identical, but
given that the structure of the problem is similar, then the method of searching for
a public justification remains in place. 
It could be said that Rawls’ own use of the expression ‘public justification’ ties
it to the idea of democratic politics. In fact, Rawls himself declares that ‘the aim of
the idea of public justification is to specify the idea of justification in a way appro-
priate to a political conception of justice for a society characterized, as a democra-
cy is, by reasonable pluralism’ (JAFR: 26). While Rawls develops his terminology by
paying attention to the idea of reasonable disagreement in a liberal democratic poli-
ty, his analysis is not necessarily restricted to the latter. For example, in a decent so-
ciety citizens are seen as decent and rational. ‘Persons are decent when they are ready
to abide by the terms of a decent scheme of social cooperation even at the expense
of their own interests, given that others are also willing to do so’ (see Wenar, 2004:
272). Decent persons do not necessarily agree on all matters of public policy and jus-
tice. A decent society might be less divided on moral, philosophical and religious ques-
tions than a liberal one, but is not a homogenous and monolithic whole. A decent
society will be ordered according to a common good conception of justice and such
conception will, as its name suggests, take into consideration, by definition, the good
of all citizens. not only is a decent society attuned to the good of all citizens, and not
monolithic, but the way in which a decent society treats the dissent of some of its
members is, for Rawls, a central aspect of how we judge the internal legitimacy of
that society. In other words, a decent society tries to offer a shared and mutually ac-
ceptable basis for the justification of basic social and political arrangements to its cit-
izens by ordering its basic structure according to a common good conception of jus-
tice that takes the interests of all into consideration. In the same way, a decent so-
ciety does not use political power every time it meets disagreement and dissent. Thus,
even a decent society admits pluralism and sees its internal legitimacy as based on
the (albeit partial) recognition that such pluralism cannot be simply met with the
use of state power. 
maffettone.qxp_Academy  22/02/17  15:46  Pagina 60
61
3.5 Public justification and existing practices
Understanding the grounds, method and scope of public justification also helps to
explain the relevance of existing practices for achieving public justification. It is pre-
cisely the idea of taking respect for persons seriously that provides the basic justi-
fication for the relevance of the public political culture of society. In a (justificato-
ry) liberal framework, one whose self-understanding is orientated towards the goal
of public justification, political tradition is the only starting point for the stability
and legitimacy of the political order. Putting the argument in a more open form we
have: 
a) (justificatory) liberalism starts with the idea of respect for persons (although it
leaves open what grounds such respect or what system of entitlements is entailed
by it);
b) a requirement of respect for persons is that a justification must be provided for
the political order to all who live under it;
c) however, given (reasonable) pluralism, the notion of justification employed is
one that requires shared accessible premises; 
d) this in turn entails that starting points (such as comprehensive doctrines in a lib-
eral democratic framework, or liberal rights in a decent society), which are not
widely shared, cannot be valid starting points;
e) the only other available alternative is the public political culture of society, this
being the only available reservoir of shared premises for the public justification
of the political order.
The argument laid out this way also has an important, though often underap-
preciated, consequence: 
f) achieving public justification requires the adoption of different ideas according
to the changing nature of the political tradition of a given political context.
I believe we can now also provide a general answer to the central question we raised
in the last chapter (see chapter 1, part 2). Why should existing practices and insti-
tutions play any role when we construct the content, scope and justification of prin-
ciples of justice that are meant to regulate such practices? What type of argument,
beyond simple methodological preference, could we put forward in order to justi-
fy our focus on existing social and political structures? As we have just seen, a cen-
tral theme in Rawls’ work is clearly the justifiability of social and political arrange-
ments to each and every person. According to Rawls, public justification is addressed
to others and hence requires shared elements and building blocks. Existing social and
political institutions express the content of the public political culture. They implicitly
contain shared public values. In short, they are the only shared starting point we have.
In this picture, the fact that the content of principles of justice depend on the prac-
tices they are meant to regulate is not simply a methodological claim; it is the one
way we have to tailor the justification of social and political arrangements to the di-
versity of a pluralistic society. The appeal to existing social and political structures
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reflects our desire to justify social and political arrangements to those that are sub-
ject to them. Continuing the argument stated above we can then say that:
g) attention to existing practices is not the result of a pragmatic compromise with re-
ality, nor of a methodological commitment to the primacy of existing social forms;
rather, it is required for the very practice of public justification, itself based on the
liberal ideal of respect for the moral standing of individuals.
Existing practices are a stepping-stone in the process of public justification. Respect
and its corollary of public justification are themselves relatively empty notions. By
‘empty’ I simply mean that without reference to a specific political tradition they can-
not be action-guiding and they cannot provide us with clear instructions on what we
should or should not do. It is only when we refer to the specific ideas presented by
each political tradition that we can somehow start25 to fill the empty shell of respect
and public justification with the substantive ideas that are part of the public polit-
ical culture of different societies. In a liberal democracy, the content of public jus-
tification depends on the practice of liberal democracy and on its vision of citizens
as free and equal. In a nonliberal and nondemocratic political tradition and for all
political systems generally, the content of public justification will depend on how such
systems interpret the shared fundamental ideas that are part of their political tra-
ditions. 
having grasped the ‘situatedness’ of public justification, one could legitimate-
ly ask: Why should liberals be committed to the importance of the public political
culture in circumstances where such public political culture expresses ideas, values
and principles that do not correlate with acceptable liberal standards? Take the ex-
ample of slavery. Why should a public political culture that permits slavery play any
role in specifying the idea of justice in any given society? We might call this objec-
tion the ‘garbage-in-garbage-out’26 challenge to the role of a public political culture
in the idea of public justification. 
This is a difficult question and an adequate reply would take us too far from the
central concerns of this book. nonetheless, it is possible to provide the general ori-
entation that such reply could take. From the perspective of liberalism as a politi-
cal doctrine aimed at the public justification of the political order, the first norma-
tive task is not to show that freedom, equality, autonomy or democracy are univer-
sal values that should be adopted by all persons and political systems independently
from their historical experience, but rather to define, if there are any, the limits that
all systems of social cooperation must conform to if they are to show their commit-
ment to respect for persons (see Shklar, 1998). As members of a political tradition,
25. here I emphasize ‘start’ because public justification is not simply a mirror for the fundamentals
ideas that are implicit in the public political culture, but instead uses such ideas as shared
premises. 
26. I owe this terminology to Leif Wenar, who provided me with the actual wording in a con-
versation held in April 2012.
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we are certainly committed to the idea that certain ways of organizing the social world
are, in Rawls’ words, ‘good in themselves’ (LP: 111). But the real question we face,
when committed to public justification, is whether certain ways of organizing soci-
ety are so flawed that no idea of respect for persons is even possible within them.
In short, the universality that is claimed by Rawlsian liberalism is premised on avoid-
ing the worst rather than requiring the best. Looking at it a different way, while it is
impossible to state what respect for persons requires without referring to the spe-
cific political circumstances in which persons live, it is perhaps easier to imagine so-
cial and political arrangements that clearly do not respect each and every person and
that cannot plausibly form the basis for a public justification of the political order. 
Of course, to precisely state where the line (between acceptable and non-acceptable
systems of social cooperation) should be drawn is certainly a hard task, and one that
is likely to depend, at least in practical terms, on judgment rather than ‘theory’ alone. 
COnCLUSIOn
One of the great ideals in both TJ and PL was the attempt to achieve a political so-
ciety in which citizens have a common set of principles and ideas to make their ba-
sic institutions justifiable to one another. Rawlsian liberalism has always been marked
by this search for a shared and mutually acceptable justification of basic social and
political arrangements. If we were to capture the thrust of this commitment to the
justification of a basic structure (and, from PL onwards, of collective political pow-
er), we could depict it, as I claimed above, as a commitment to public justification.
The idea of public justification is a central element of Rawls’ political philosophy, and
in the final section of the chapter I highlighted several important features of it. One
of the most relevant for our purposes is that public justification starts from shared
premises, and is not simply the result of a deductive exercise from immutable ideas
of person and society. An important consequence of this dependence on shared premis-
es is that these may, and most probably will, vary according to the political tradition
that one is addressing. These reflections clearly provide a way of relativizing the va-
lidity of Justice as Fairness to one particular tradition. Justice as Fairness starts from
the basic ideas that are implicit in the public political culture of a liberal democrat-
ic society. By interpreting and systematizing these ideas, it constructs a conception
of justice that is capable of attracting the willing support of its members and providing
a public justification of the political order. yet when the method of searching for a
public justification of political society is based on different premises – that is, when
the public political culture from which start is not liberal democratic – the content
of public justification is unlikely to yield the same results. As we will see in the next
chapter, it is precisely this type of reasoning which can explain why certain cos-
mopolitan extensions of Rawls’ theory are inadequate, and why by paying attention
to Rawls’ idea of public justification we can explain the continuity of LPwith the rest
of his work. 
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Chapter 3 
Rawlsian Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples 
In the previous chapter I argued that both TJ and PLwere, among other things, at-
tempts to construct public justifications for the political order. Chapter 2 also con-
cluded that the very idea of public justification is based on a different account of jus-
tification, one that did not rest on purely epistemic reasons. Public justification re-
quires shared premises and those premises can only be found in the public political
culture for which the public justification is constructed. The latter idea clearly rel-
ativizes the extent to which the content of liberal values is applicable beyond the scope
of liberal institutions. Portraying liberalism as a two-level moral and political doc-
trine, we can say that the standard content of liberal conceptions of justice (i.e. the
standard account of liberal rights) is closely linked to liberal institutions. On the oth-
er hand, what remains universal, or at least what claims universality, in the liberal
moral doctrine, is the goal of public justification. Looking at LP from the perspec-
tive of this division – between what is universal about liberalism and what is not –
best captures its main ideas. 
The chapter begins by showing how a direct extension of Justice as Fairness to
the realm of global politics would be implausible (part 1). On the other hand, if we
take Rawls’ commitment to public justification seriously, we can explain the two main
discontinuities between Rawls’ domestic and international theory (part 2). The fact
that Rawls considers peoples as the basic unit of analysis stems from the idea that
the global public political culture is not equipped to provide enough guidance on the
relationships between individuals worldwide. A better and more promising alternative
is to start from peoples and the international public political culture, or, in other words,
the rich tradition of the law of nations. Only by focusing on these features of the glob-
al order can we justify the latter to its members. In turn, once we adopt this perspective
on ‘global justice’ the non-egalitarian nature of LP also becomes more clearly justi-
fiable. Conceptions of justice, at least in the Rawlsian story, are chosen (under ap-
propriate conditions) on the bases of the (normatively relevant) interests of those
to which they apply. Peoples, as moral corporate agents, have no interests in the rel-
ative distribution of income and wealth and so their representatives do not see any
given distribution of resources as intrinsically desirable. 
In parts 3 and 4 I address two significant objections to my interpretation of LP.
The objections provide critical scrutiny on the two controversial elements of LP out-
lined and discussed in part 2. The first concerns the consequences of inequality in
LP, and whether such inequality is really compatible with the political autonomy of
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peoples. Many have argued that since there are no limits to the amount of inequal-
ity LP allows, and given that inequality affects political processes, the basic structure
of the Society of Peoples will be inevitably skewed toward the representation of rich-
er peoples. While this objection is not without merit, I claim that it forgets how Rawls
understands peoples and their interests. Peoples are not interested in acquiring more
wealth and income, and so their propensity to influence to their own advantage the
basic structure of the Society of Peoples is less relevant than it is often claimed. Fur-
thermore, even if we were to accept a different portrait of peoples’ interests (more
acquisitive, say), the only other tool available to neutralize the effects of inequali-
ty on the Society of Peoples – the redistribution of resources between peoples – would
have counterintuitive consequences. 
The second objection contends that even if we can explain the choice of peoples
as the main agents of LP (following my interpretation in part 2), this cannot really
alleviate the impression that Rawls’ theory is committed to some form of value col-
lectivism. My reply is that, properly understood, LP’s commitment to peoples is an
implication of its commitment to public justification: that such commitment is a con-
sequence of respect for persons, and that peoples in LP represent the basic unit of
analysis, not the basic unit of moral concern. Ultimately, I claim, LP should be con-
sidered as a form of moral (as opposed to political and distributive) cosmopolitanism
founded on the idea of providing a shared and mutually acceptable justification of
the global political order to all individuals. 
1. PROBLEMS OF EXTEnSIOn
In this section I show how taking Rawls’ political turn seriously implies rejecting a
straightforward extension of Justice as Fairness to global politics. The argument I
provide is not a logical refutation. Rather, I start from the interpretation of some ma-
jor concepts that are part of the Rawlsian toolkit and show that we cannot directly
extend them to global politics. 
1.1 A global original position? 
LP starts by imagining an international original position where representatives of peo-
ples, behind a veil of ignorance, decide which conception of justice should determine
their mutual undertakings. This starting point, as many have noticed, is controver-
sial. In fact, some of Rawls’ early critics have found his insistence on this two-level
strategy as lacking any principled defence (see Richards, 1982; Barry, 1973; and 1989:
183–9, 234–41; Pogge, 1989; Moellendorf, 2002). Many have argued that, by start-
ing from peoples as corporate agents, Rawls does not even consider the possibility
of a global original position and in so doing takes for granted that some form of in-
ternationalism must be the appropriate conception of justice for global politics. here
I concentrate on Thomas Pogge’s famous attempt to argue in favour of a global orig-
inal position. I do so because Pogge’s treatment of the argument is arguably the best
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in the literature. however, an important caveat should be acknowledged. Pogge’s Re-
alizing Rawls was published in 1989 – that is, previous to the publication of PL, or
of either version of LP. Since my interpretation of LP is based on the continuity of
Rawls’ international theory with, broadly speaking, the whole of Rawls’ political phi-
losophy (thus including aspects of his so-called ‘political turn’), it would seem rather
unfair to criticize Pogge for something that he could not have taken into consider-
ation. I accept this point. The purpose of this section of the chapter is not, then, strict-
ly speaking to criticize Pogge’s view; rather, I use Pogge’s work as an illustration of
how the development of Rawls’ ideas has made straightforward cosmopolitan ex-
tensions of the original position implausible, not necessarily as a critique of Pogge’s
work. 
In Realizing Rawls, Pogge puts forward three possible ways of extending the orig-
inal position to international (or global) politics. The first two employ the original
position device twice: once at the domestic level, and once at the international or
global level. According to what Pogge calls the first reading (R1 in Pogge, 1989: 242),
in the second original position we find representatives of ‘persons’. According to what
Pogge calls the second reading (R2 in Pogge, 1989: 243), we find representatives
of states. Finally, Pogge proposes his own alternative original position (G in Pogge,
1989: 246ff). G is a fully global original position. It is clearly distinct from R2 since
in G we find representatives of persons rather than states. But it is also different from
R1 since it does not presuppose that the original position should be applied twice,
first in domestic societies and then globally. Instead, in G, we start from a global orig-
inal position and then use the framework of original position reasoning in order to
decide which political structures and principles of distribution are more appropri-
ate for global politics. G, in other words, provides a moral baseline from which to
assess the entire international architecture, with its system of states and of international
institutions. 
In arguing for G, Pogge mentions a number of issues that will become central fea-
tures of academic debate concerning LP and global justice more broadly, such as the
arbitrariness of nationality, the extent of permitted inequalities and of how such in-
equalities affect global background justice. Pogge should be given ample credit for
the penetrating nature of his critique. I will try to respond to some of Pogge’s objections
in the following sections of the chapter, but at this juncture it is worth noting how,
when considering LP from the vantage point of Rawls’ political turn, it is the very
idea of imagining a global original position on the model of G that seems problem-
atic. Simply put, the problem with G is that it is a transposition of the original po-
sition to global politics which lives intact the main features of Rawls’ domestic orig-
inal position, and yet, at least from PL onwards, it is increasingly evident that the fea-
tures of the original position that Pogge assumes we can globalize are to be under-
stood as features of liberal democratic institutions. 
Let me provide some examples. how would Rawls design a global original po-
sition? What types of ‘goods’ would representatives of persons be called to assign?
What type of knowledge would be available to representatives of individuals in the
global original position? Original position reasoning is premised on a precise un-
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derstanding of ‘persons’. In Rawls’ domestic theory, persons are seen as free and equal.
As free and equal, persons are said to possess two moral powers: a capacity for a sense
of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good (JAFR: 19). These moral pow-
ers, in TJ, provide the content of moral personality (see TJ: 10–19). yet, at least from
PL onwards, Rawls is clear that the conception of the person that provides the ba-
sis for his theory is not to be considered as a permanent feature of persons qua per-
sons. In other words it is not a way of portraying human beings generally. As Rawls
states, ‘it is important to keep in mind that justice as fairness is a political concep-
tion of justice’, and this implies also that ‘the idea of the person, when specified into
a conception of the person, belongs to a political conception’ and is ‘both normative
and political, not metaphysical or psychological’ (JAFR: 19). According to Rawls, ‘the
conception of the person is worked up from the way citizens are regarded in the pub-
lic political culture of a democratic society’ (JAFR: 19), and hence is emphatically
not a way of confronting the deeper issue of how to characterize human beings gen-
erally. 
The analogous task we face at the global level, then, is to find a political conception
of the person that can be the starting point for conceiving of the idea of global pol-
itics as a form of social cooperation between certain types of political agents. Even
if we were to grant the plausibility of this exercise, there would be no certainty that
the results would be analogous to Rawls’ views in the domestic case. Rawls’ conception
of persons as free and equal is the result of his interpretation of the public political
culture of a liberal democratic society. yet the global public political culture is not
liberal democratic (and, in fact, one might be excused for thinking that it is precisely
the fact that the world is not a Ralwsian liberal polity that seems to drive the reformist
zeal that guides so many cosmopolitans). 
note how the latter problem also has important repercussions for the type of ‘goods’
that representatives of the parties will assign in the original position. In Rawls’ do-
mestic theory, representatives of the parties are required to choose between differ-
ent conceptions of justice that would distribute valuable ‘resources’ (what Rawls calls
primary goods) between individuals. In TJRawls maintained that primary goods are
‘things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants’ (TJ: 79).
But, once again, from PL onwards Rawls clarifies that the content of the list of pri-
mary goods is to be specified in accordance with a conception of citizens in a liber-
al democracy, not of persons generally. Primary goods are suited for ‘the normal cir-
cumstances of human life in a democratic society’ (JAFR: 57–8). They are not things
that it is rational to desire independently from one’s context of life. Rather, they are
‘needed and required by persons seen in light of the political conception of persons,
as citizens who are fully cooperating members of [a democratic] society, and not mere-
ly as human beings apart from any normative conception’ (JAFR: 58). Thus a glob-
al original position would be seem to lack this type of specification: it would not have
a basic ‘currency’, since according to Rawls the latter is mediated by our understanding
of liberal democratic citizenship. 
In this respect the problem for those who wish to globalize the original position
is rather similar to what David Miller has called the ‘metric’ problem (Miller, 2007:
maffettone.qxp_Academy  22/02/17  15:46  Pagina 68
69
62–8). In his National Responsibility and Global JusticeMiller discusses the problem
of extending the idea of equality of opportunity to global politics. The main difficulty
in doing so, according to Miller, is that we would lack the cultural understandings
that are presupposed by the very attempt to delineate what the principle of equal-
ity of opportunity requires in the abstract (2007: 65–6). In a Rawlsian framework
the problem is rather similar. Considering primary goods as a currency that can be
distributed according to principles of justice chosen in the original position, we need
to recognize that the very idea of primary goods is dependent on the institutional
characteristics and the public political culture of a democratic society. 
1.2 The veil of ignorance and the arbitrariness of political membership 
Original position reasoning is also premised on the idea that representatives of the
parties will choose ‘rationally’ under fair deliberative conditions. The veil of igno-
rance is used as a screen for selecting the appropriate type of information that can
help representatives of the parties to determine their choice of principles of justice.
By excluding ‘morally arbitrary’ features of persons, such as social class or ethnici-
ty, the veil of ignorance ensures that the choice of the conception of justice in the
original position is a fair one. Many cosmopolitans often cite Rawls’ veil of ignorance
as one of the most important buttresses to their argument against the internation-
alist picture of the world order. Surely, they maintain, being members of a given po-
litical community cannot be something that is morally relevant about persons. It is
just a further deep form of moral contingency in persons’ lives that persons happen
to belong to a political society. In fact one could go as far as to say that the arbitrariness
of national membership is one of the clarion calls of cosmopolitan egalitarians (see
Pogge, 1989: 247; Caney, 2001: 125; Moellendorf, 2002: 55–6; Tan, 2004: 27–8;
and Tan, 2012: 172ff). The main point is that if we exclude from original position
reasoning, through the veil of ignorance, features of persons’ circumstances that are
arbitrary from a moral point of view (such as race, or social class), then we have no
reason not to exclude national membership or membership of any group for which
individuals cannot be held accountable. In this picture, ‘nationality is just one fur-
ther deep contingency… one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that
are inescapable and present from birth’ (Pogge, 1989: 247). In a global original po-
sition, then, persons would not be represented as belonging to a political commu-
nity. And it is from that vantage point that the political organization of the world or-
der, with or without political communities, would have to be justified, rather than
simply taken for granted.
This argument encounters an important problem. Once again, in order to see it
we need to investigate Rawls’ passage from TJ to PL. Let us imagine that a solution
has been found to the aforementioned issues (the ones discussed above) regarding
a global original position. One might still ask: how should we construct a veil of ig-
norance appropriate to the case in hand? The central question seems to be the fol-
lowing: how would a veil of ignorance for a global original position deal with the
issue of membership in a political community? TJ does not fully develop the basis
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for discriminating between morally relevant and morally irrelevant information avail-
able to the parties (see Cohen, 1994). For instance, it was unclear why representa-
tives of the parties in the original position (in TJ) would be able to know that they
represented persons with certain moral powers but not the types of conceptions of
the good which these persons held. This furthered the impression, in TJ, that the dis-
tinction between what is morally relevant and what is morally irrelevant (again, from
the standpoint of the original position) was the result of the endorsement of a lib-
eral comprehensive outlook. Instead, in PL:
the point of the distinction… is to present a conception of the person that will
play a role in a political conception of justice, and so [Political] Liberalism un-
derscores that the conception of the person is itself political… Thus, irrelevant
should not be understood absolutely, metaphysically, or in terms of a general moral
view, but only as implying that a feature of a person is not important for the pur-
poses of political argument – in particular, not important for political argument
aimed at specifying the requirements of justice for a society in which members
are understood as free and equal. 
(Cohen, 1994: 1523)
however, deciding what is relevant for political argument is clearly not the same as de-
ciding what is morally arbitrary or irrelevant tout court. To understand the difference
between claiming that something is morally irrelevant and that it is irrelevant for
political argument, what is crucial is that the latter requires some form of prior de-
termination of the type of political context being addressed. To claim that something
is ‘irrelevant for political argument’ cannot be established ex-ante. 
Let me try to elaborate. If we refer to the idea of public justification discussed
in the previous chapter, we can recall that respect for persons: a) requires public jus-
tification; b) that public justification requires shared premises; and c) that shared
premises can be found in the public political culture of the political milieu we are
addressing. Taking into account these three features of public justification, and fo-
cusing on the third one, it would not be implausible to a global original position in
which persons are characterized by political membership. A conception of the per-
son is a central aspect of the process of public justification as it provides the basic
understanding of who are the relevant addressees. A globally plausible conception
of the person, one that builds upon the global public political culture, would thus,
I claim, recognize that membership in political communities is a defining feature of
how the vast majority of persons globally understand themselves. note that I am not
claiming that representatives of the parties in the global original position would know
the specific political membership of those they represent. Rather the point is that
the existence of such memberships as such could in the first place be a general fea-
ture of how we see the parties’ features and interests. For example, we could say that
we view them as reasonable, rational and as having an interest in political membership
without specifying the actual characteristics of their real-life affiliation to a given po-
litical community (see LP: 30–5). 
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Once again, it is instructive to compare this line of reasoning with Miller’s ar-
guments concerning the moral arbitrariness of nationality (2007: 33ff). According
to Miller, national membership is clearly arbitrary insofar as it is not generally un-
derstood as being a chosen trait of persons, but it does generate special obligations
and therefore can have a role in determining persons’ entitlements. Membership in
a political community can thus be arbitrary but not morally irrelevant. This is so for
Miller because not every un-chosen trait of persons should, ipso facto, be excluded
from having an influence on said person’s entitlements (Miller’s specific example refers
to physical disability). In the same way, we can say that the distinction between what
is relevant for political argument and what is not, need not rely on whether the el-
ement under scrutiny is a chosen trait or not. It will instead depend on whether, giv-
en the political conception of the person we can plausibly decipher from the glob-
al public political culture (if there is one), that element can be part of that culture
or not: if being member of a political community is something that characterizes per-
sons in the global public political culture then there is no reason to exclude this type
of information from a global original position. 
I want to conclude my discussion with a revealing quote from Rawls’ 1993 arti-
cle ‘The Law of Peoples’: 
the law of peoples might have been worked out by starting with an all-inclusive
original position with representatives of all the individual persons of the world.
In this case the question of whether there are to be separate societies, and of the
relation between them, will be settled by the parties behind a veil of ignorance.
Offhand it is not clear why proceeding this way should lead to different results
than, as I have done, proceeding from different societies outward. All things con-
sidered, one might reach the same law of peoples in either case. The difficulty
with an all-inclusive, or global, original position is that its use of liberal ideas is
much more troublesome, for in this case we are treating all persons, of their so-
ciety and culture, as individuals who are free and equal, and as reasonable and
rational, and so according to liberal conceptions. This makes the basis of the law
of peoples too narrow.
(CP: 549–50)
At first sight, one might be puzzled by the idea that a global original position would
yield the same results as the two (international) original positions in LP. yet we should
not forget that the conception of the parties in the domestic original position (in both
TJ and PL) is framed under the assumption that society is closed and self-contained.
Their representatives (of the parties) thus cannot show any interest in the self-de-
termination of their political community and of their ways of life as a whole, sim-
ply because they already take for granted that these goods are a given. The point,
then, is that in a global original position the assumption that societies exist and are
self-determining breaks down, as it is precisely the matter of the type of political or-
ganization for global politics that the global original position tries to establish. If we
want to plausibly delineate persons’ interests we cannot exclude the idea that liv-
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ing in a self-determining political community forms part of their fundamental po-
litical interests. In fact, we can conjecture that such interest is already latently pre-
sent in the domestic original position in TJ and simply required no discussion giv-
en that it was taken for granted. not only would a global original position yield sim-
ilar results as the two international original positions in LP, but it would also be un-
sustainable given the account of toleration provided by LP. As I have insisted in the
preceding few pages, certain ways of conceiving of persons is characteristic of citi-
zens in a liberal democracy, and we cannot assume that we can extend such un-
derstandings to the world at large. 
1.3 A global difference principle?
It would appear that we can definitively put to rest the idea of a global original po-
sition. Some liberal cosmopolitans, however, might remind us that even if we can-
not construct a global original position, there remains the substantive problem of
distributive justice. The global order, they claim, is much like a domestic basic struc-
ture; it determines how the burdens and benefits of global cooperation are distributed
and profoundly affects the life prospects of individuals. This position has found pop-
ularity among cosmopolitan liberals, perhaps the paradigmatic statement of this point
of view being Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations (1979/1999),
with similar accounts in works by Allen Buchanan (2000) and Thomas Pogge (1989;
1994). The main idea shared by these writers is, at heart, rather simple: if there is
a global basic structure, then we need a global conception of distributive justice in
order to assess its effects on the life of individuals worldwide. But Rawls fails to com-
mit to the idea that there is a global basic structure, and thus fails to acknowledge
that LP or any international theory developed from within Justice as Fairness requires
a conception of global distributive justice. not only that, but since Rawls’ preferred
solution to the problem of distributive justice at home includes the difference prin-
ciple, one could further imagine that even at the global level, given the existence of
a global basic structure, a global difference principle is the most appropriate response
to the problem in hand.
Is the idea of a global basic structure sufficient to contend that Rawls should have
prescribed a global difference principle? I think not, but the reasons that can lead
us to this conclusion should not, in my view, be focused on empirical debates con-
cerning the relevance of global institutional structures. Part of the intellectual dis-
pute between those who have argued for and against a globalized difference prin-
ciple has focused on whether there is a global basic structure in the first place (see
Freeman, 2007b; heath, 2002; Meckled-Garcia, 2008). Unfortunately for those who
are more sympathetic to Rawls’ position, not even conclusive proof that there is no
such thing as a global basic structure would be enough to put liberal cosmopolitan
critics to rest. And for one essential reason: a basic structure cannot be an existence
condition for a conception of distributive justice. As writers such as Arash Abizadeh
(2007) and Miriam Ronzoni (2009) have shown, the idea that principles of distributive
justice require a basic structure to be applicable is not sustainable. The fact that we
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need a basic structure to trigger obligations of distributive justice exposes the very
idea of justice to a status-quo bias. Problems of distributive justice arise whether or
not we have a basic structure in place: how to distribute the benefits and burdens
of social cooperation is a meaningful question even if we do not have the same type
of institutional structure described by Rawls in his domestic theory. In fact, the best
reply to the (hypothetical) observation that there is no global basic structure is sim-
ply that we should create one, and ensure it is organized according to the correct prin-
ciples of distributive justice. 
Does this mean that those sympathetic to Rawls’ LP have no argument against
the liberal cosmopolitan idea that we should accept a globalized difference princi-
ple? not quite. The difficulty of the liberal cosmopolitan position can be grasped if
we return to Rawls’ political turn. I have claimed above that the idea of a basic struc-
ture cannot be considered as an existence condition for principles of distributive jus-
tice. So, even if we can demonstrate that there is no global basic structure, liberal
cosmopolitans can always claim that there should be one and that it should be or-
ganized according to their preferred conception of global distributive justice – for
example, a globalized difference principle. yet what this reply does not seem to ap-
preciate is the problematic nature of creating a global basic structure in the first place.
It is not enough to simply state that we should create ‘a’ global basic structure if we
lack one. Those who seem to favour this solution will also have to tell us how they
imagine such a structure. Furthermore they will also have to explain why, once this
newly created global basic structure is in place, it should feature a globalized ver-
sion of the difference principle. These two issues cannot be simply resolved by main-
taining that a global basic structure and its associated conception of global distributive
justice would have to mirror what we normally see as justified within liberal democ-
racies. The difference principle is part of a liberal political conception of justice. And
as we have seen in the previous chapter, the content of liberal political conceptions
of justice is something that is appropriate for liberal democracies, not for political
systems generally. 
More broadly, liberal cosmopolitans, perhaps inspired by Rawls’ political turn,
should also consider that the philosophical task of Rawlsian liberalism is not exhausted
by simply proposing a principle of distributive justice. One has also to examine its
stability and whether its enforcement could be legitimate. And on neither count would
a global liberal conception of justice containing a global difference principle fare well.
For Rawls, in any political domain, stability is always stability for the right reasons.
A society, of whatever kind, can never be a just society if its members are simply co-
erced into obedience. But reasonable pluralism makes an achievement of this sta-
bility very difficult. Rawls addresses the issue of stability first in a liberal democratic
society. he assumes that such society is closed and self-contained. his solution, for
a liberal society, to the problem of stability is to develop the idea of a political con-
ception of justice. A political conception of justice has three main characteristics: a)
it is a conception for the basic structure of society; b) it is freestanding; and c) its main
ideas are drawn from the public political culture of the society. All three features,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, serve the purpose of narrowing the terms
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of disagreement between persons when it comes to the conception of right that will
structure their society. Once a political conception of justice is developed, we then
ask: Can it support an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines?
If an overlapping consensus is at least possible, then the idea that society is stable
for the right reasons is at least possible. In other words, given favourable conditions,
the idea of stability for the right reasons is not a self-defeating one. 
The first task of those who wish to extend the content of Rawls’ ideas concern-
ing distributive justice to global politics, then, is to elaborate the content of a polit-
ical conception of justice so that the latter can be presented in a global original po-
sition as one of the available options for representatives of the parties. (here I leave
aside the aforementioned difficulties in even imagining a global original position.)
A crucial component of a political conception of justice, in order to be properly po-
litical, is that it must draw from ideas that are implicit in the public political culture
of society. But here we face a startling problem: which society? We cannot simply
assume that the liberal political tradition is better than all others. We cannot sim-
ply maintain that the appropriate political tradition, by reference to which we must
construct a political conception of justice, is a liberal one. And how can a political
conception of global justice taken from ideas that are implicit in a type of public po-
litical culture that represents only a subset of the persons of the world be the focus
of a global overlapping consensus? 
Looking at the same issue from the perspective of legitimacy, the problems faced
by a cosmopolitan conception of global distributive justice are analogous. Accord-
ing to Rawls, the idea of legitimacy is linked to the idea of the proper use of coer-
cive political power. The question for Rawls is always: how can we use political pow-
er in a way that is reasonably acceptable by those on the receiving end? however,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, reasonable acceptability is not a descrip-
tion of perfectly impartial and impersonal reasons whose content is completely in-
dependent from the persons that are addressed. So, as with justice, we face the same
problem here: what types of agents are we addressing when constructing a conception
of the proper use of political power at the global level? Can a liberal conception of
the use of political power between citizens of a liberal democracy be appropriate?
how are we to satisfy the criterion of reasonable acceptability? Rawls is clear that
justice and legitimacy share the same building blocks: their content must make ref-
erence to ideas that are implicit in the public political culture of society. But then,
once again, we face the same problem: Which society? Which public political cul-
ture? 
The point is not that these questions have no definite answers. Ultimately one
could simply say: ‘global society’, the ‘global public political culture’. But, while cor-
rect, this reply obscures the type of problem we are highlighting here: even if we ap-
pealed to a ‘global society’ and to a ‘global public political culture’ their contents would
not plausibly be considered to incorporate or perfectly mirror liberal ideas. The glob-
al public political culture does not seem to feature an idea of persons as free and equal
citizens, nor an idea of the world as a single fair scheme of social cooperation. Fur-
thermore, when we look at the relationships between persons and the institutions
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that they live in, the global public political culture will not be plausibly based on some
version of democratic equality. But these are precisely the elements that seem to mo-
tivate the adoption of the difference principle domestically. Therefore, even if we ap-
ply the same method that Rawls seems to recommend to deal with reasonable plu-
ralism domestically, we are unlikely to get to the same conclusions in the global con-
text. 
2. EXPLAInInG LP’S COnTROVERSIAL FEATURES
In the previous part of this chapter I have shown that by trying to directly apply the
content of Rawls’ basic ideas to international society we are bound to encounter some
insurmountable problems. The content of Rawls’ ideas, at least if considered from
the vantage point of PL, are not plausibly ‘globalized’. They are meant to address ques-
tions that are internal to a liberal democratic society, not to the way in which per-
sons relate to each other at the global level. yet, crucially, this does not mean that
Rawls’ ideas cannot be fruitfully applied beyond the bounds of a liberal democrat-
ic polity. Rather, the more modest suggestion made above is that given the link that
Rawls’ ideas have to the political context for which they are elaborated, changing
the political context of reference will also change the content of the ideas. In this part
of the chapter, by analyzing the two major discontinuities between Rawls’ domes-
tic and international theories presented in the introduction, I purport to show pre-
cisely that. By thinking about the global political context and its associated public
political culture, we can see how the search for a political conception of justice, its
stability and its legitimacy, lead Rawls to a non-egalitarian law of peoples rather than
to a global liberal and egalitarian law of persons. 
2.1 Recalling the discontinuities between Rawls’ two theories of justice
In the introduction we referred to two axes of discontinuity in Rawls’ work. One of
the main goals of this book is to provide an explanation for these apparent incon-
gruences between Rawls’ domestic and international theories. To briefly restate these
two elements of discontinuity:
L1. The Loss of Individualism: The focus on individuals is a crucial part of TJ. The whole
idea of retrieving the contractarian tradition as a strong alternative to utilitar-
ianism was ultimately based on the idea that the latter, as Rawls has famously
argued, ‘does not take the differences between persons seriously’ (TJ: 27). (For
an in-depth analysis of this issue see Pogge, 1989: part III; idem., 1992; idem.,
2004; Kuper, 2000; Beitz, 1979.) 
L2. The Loss of Egalitarianism: A strong egalitarian concern has always been central
to Rawls’ theory of distributive justice. Such concern is expressed in domestic
society by (among other things) the adoption of the difference principle. According
to the difference principle, inequalities are justified in society only insofar as they
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can be seen to advance the prospects of the least fortunate members to the so-
cial compact (TJ: part I). (For criticism of this specific point see Pogge, 2004; Beitz,
2000.)
2.2 From persons to peoples
PLintroduced the idea of reasonable pluralism. This required a revision of the account
of stability in a liberal well-ordered society and the elaboration of a proper criteri-
on for the use of coercive political power. Reasonable disagreement on fundamen-
tal moral, philosophical and religious doctrines imposes a constraint on how: a) we
construct our conceptions of justice; b) we picture their stability; and c) we justify
their enforcement. The basic point that emerged from our analysis is that, in order
to respect the nature of these constraints, we can only build on fundamental ideas
that are already latent in the public political culture. 
yet, the global public political culture does not contain strong elements stating
that individuals are part of it as primary subjects, nor does it provide enough elements
to state that it sees them as the bearer of reciprocal obligations (simply as individ-
uals).27 Even when texts such as human rights covenants and declarations express
a concern for individuals, they do so as a way of providing a benchmark for how po-
27. What constitutes part of the global public political culture is, of course, bound to be con-
troversial. In the domestic case, when assessing the particular domain of a liberal democratic
polity, the one that Rawls’ work addresses more extensively, we have greater confidence in
identifying the constitution and its traditions of interpretation as the central part of the pub-
lic political culture for a particular liberal democratic polity. At the global level, at least com-
paratively, we are probably less confident on demarcating these boundaries. nonetheless there
is some evidence that the Charter of the United nations (available at http://www.un.org/en/
documents/charter/) and the Universal Declaration of human Rights (available at http://
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml) would form the bedrock of any plausible in-
dividuation of the global public political culture. In the same way while the tradition of in-
terpretation of these two documents has slowly evolved and is perhaps less shared compared
to some foundational questions tied to the rights of liberal democratic citizenship we can plau-
sibly claim that at least 4 principles seem to be consistently located at the heart of these two
documents: 1) the end of colonial rule as a legitimate form of political relationship between
different political communities; 2) the limited nature of state power over its citizenry and
the link between the legitimacy of state rule and the respect for basic human rights; 3) some
form of political control by the people over their government; 4) a basic presumption against
outside interference in the political life of members. More principles could be mentioned,
but these seem the most relevant ones to substantiate the core of the argument in this part
of the book. Two further remarks are in order. First, these principles are widely recognized
to be conflicting unless some form of attempt to further specify their content is provided (the
most classic case being the conflict between human rights protection and political inde-
pendence). It is thus clear that to start from the global public political culture cannot sim-
ply mean to mirror its contents. To do so would be accept normative gridlock. Second, note
that individuals are a central concern in these documents. The latter is something that the
book never denies. The point is not whether there is concern for individuals but in what ca-
pacity individuals are seen and consequently such concern expressed. 
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litical communities should treat their own members, not to characterize the recip-
rocal obligations of individuals worldwide (see Wenar, 2001: 62). Globally, persons
do not picture each other as free and equal members of a world political communi-
ty, and it would be fundamentally wrong to force them to do so. 
Furthermore, in the global public political culture the diversity of persons’ com-
prehensive doctrines, with their baggage of irreconcilable beliefs about the nature
of the good life, is even more radical than within a single society. Furthermore, in
the global public political culture we find fewer indications from which we can draw
our basic ideas for a political conception of justice, and the traditions of interpretation
of its main texts are less expansive and developed. In other words, the ‘circumstances
of global stability and legitimacy’ present Rawlsian political philosophy with a more
difficult test: what keeps us apart is stronger (global pluralism), and what can po-
tentially bring us together (global public political culture) is weaker. This is true, es-
pecially if we believe that one of the fundamental roles of a public political culture
is to provide guidance on how individuals regard each other and what fair cooper-
ation means between them, again, as individuals (see Wenar, 2006). To put it yet an-
other way, the global public political culture is ‘weaker’ when we analyse it from the
perspective of national public political cultures, with their ideas on how citizens in-
dividually are the primary benchmark or unit of analysis. 
Instead, what the global public political culture does contain is a great number
of ideas concerning how political communities should deal with each other. In oth-
er words, the global public political culture is better equipped if we interpret and read
it using a different unit of analysis: political communities. In Wenar’s words:
The global public political culture contains few ideas about how persons living
in different societies should relate directly to one another. however, the global
public political culture contains a wealth of ideas concerning how Peoples ought
to relate to one another. The principles governing relations among the members
of liberal and decent societies must therefore be principles regulating conduct
not among persons, but among Peoples.
(Wenar, 2004: 273)
This fundamental shift in the unit of analysis provides us with a richer starting point
on which to draw, and more material for a legitimate and stable law of peoples,
notwithstanding the acuteness of global pluralism (L1). In order to proceed in a way
that is compatible with the insights provided by Rawls in PL, our unit of analysis must
change from persons to corporate agents (L1). The natural choice, in internation-
al relations, would be states. But Rawls believes that the history of the Westphalian
system disqualifies the term and makes it unusable for a moral conception of in-
ternational law and practice. he elaborates the idea of peoples: corporate agents with
a moral nature and limited powers of sovereignty.
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2.3 Equality in a realistic utopia
Thus far we have only explained the idea that peoples should be the basic unit of anal-
ysis in LP. But why should peoples, as free and equal moral corporate agents, not se-
lect an egalitarian distribution of income and wealth in the original position of the
Society of Peoples? An important element of original position reasoning is that its
ability to provide a determinate choice in favour of a given set of principles (the prin-
ciples of justice) is dependent, beyond the vision of agents as free and equal, on the
depiction of their interests (what Rawls calls a thin conception of the good; see TJ:
347–50). Persons have a fundamental interest in being able to further their conception
of the good life. Their representatives in the original position know this and the de-
sire to acquire more income and wealth (and other primary goods) relies on the as-
sumption that, when one’s intent is to pursue a self-chosen path of life, the more means
available the better. 
In the global arena we have peoples, and the main tenets of a law of peoples will
provide the content of the fair terms of cooperation among them. Peoples see each
other as free and equal, but, crucially, their fundamental interests are different (We-
nar, 2001: 66). In the Society of Peoples, peoples as corporate agents do not have
a conception of the good to further. And here lies the crucial distinction (see Wenar,
2006). Agents in the second (and third) original position do not represent individ-
uals, but peoples. yet, as Rawls tells us, peoples do not possess the same fundamental
interests as persons. Most importantly, peoples do not have a (collective) conception
of the good to further, and hence they do not see income and wealth as a means to
that end. Peoples only see income and wealth as a necessary component of their be-
ing well-ordered (hence the reason that they agree to a duty of assistance, see chap-
ter 5 for a fuller treatment), but once such requirement is reached they lose inter-
est in having more. Equality is a relational criterion; political autonomy, at least in
Rawls’ eyes, is not. Rawls’ duty of assistance ensures that the threshold of resources
necessary for the proper organization of all peoples is reached. In Rawls’ view, un-
favourable circumstances can make an internally well-ordered society unachievable.
Once enough resources can be effectively directed to secure the means for each so-
ciety to be well-ordered, then there simply is no other (justifiable) reason for those
who are part of that society to want more or to ask more from the Society of Peoples. 
2.4 The full picture of LP
In the previous two sections I have explained how the continuity of Rawls’ domes-
tic and international theories could be established. The two major discontinuities be-
tween Rawls’ domestic and international theories are the inevitable result of applying
the same concepts Rawls developed in his domestic theory of justice in a context where
the public political culture is different and where the agents themselves have very
different (normative) interests. In this section I show how addressing Rawls’ inter-
national theory from the same standpoint also provides, at least implicitly, all the
answers to the main questions that LP addresses and that we have so far discussed.
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These are questions concerning the stability of the Society of Peoples and its bases,
the political conception on which that stability is grounded, and the account of le-
gitimacy that it entails. 
LP and its eight principles are a conception of justice for the basic structure of
the Society of Peoples. LP does not seem to address the issues of stability and legit-
imacy directly, but its deeper structure – the way in which it is organized around peo-
ples and their mutual undertakings – can be better understood if we see it as reflecting
Rawls’ domestic theory of justice, and in particular, the development of his ideas in
PL. Since Rawls does not provide a clear picture of how we should link LP and PL,
much of this section will be based on a more constructive approach to the interpretation
of his work. Such interpretation will show the continuity between PL and LP and, in
so doing, will shed considerable light on some of the apparent inconsistencies that
many critics have highlighted. 
PL, as we have seen, deals with two overarching issues: stability and legitima-
cy. It provides appropriate solutions to two questions: 1) how can a liberal society
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism be stable (for the right reasons) in the
long run given that its members believe in different incompatible yet reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines?; and b) how can the coercive power of the state be legitimately
used given that such power, in a liberal democracy, is the equal power of the citizens
as a corporate body? By now we should be at least partially familiar with Rawls’ an-
swers to these two questions (see chapter 2, part 2). 
PL is also based on what we can call two underlying assumptions. Firstly, Rawls
assumed that political society is closed. The political relationship between citizens
of a domestic society is based on the assumption that we enter such society by birth
and we can exit only by death. The other assumption that works in the background
of PL concerns the type of society Rawls is addressing. PL assumes that its principles
and arguments are valid for a liberal democratic society. Such society is seen as a fair
scheme of cooperation between citizens as free and equal, reasonable and rational
and as characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. If we relax28 both assumptions,
Rawls’ theory needs to deal with two distinct sets of issues. The first concerns the
scope of international toleration: how can we articulate appropriate moral limits for
the way in which all societies, both liberal and nonliberal, can be politically orga-
nized? The second concerns the relation between different peoples: how can we de-
termine the content and justification of a moral conception that can regulate the mu-
tual undertakings of peoples? In terms of justice, legitimacy and stability we then
face six (related) questions:
Q1.What is an appropriate conception of justice for a well-ordered Society of Peoples?
Q2.What conception of justice for the Society of Peoples can be stable (for the right
reasons) over time given the great diversity of comprehensive doctrines and po-
litical traditions in international society?
28. I use the term ‘relax’ as it is often used in differential calculus where it refers to the progres-
sive questioning of the validity of a given proposition.
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Q3.What conception of legitimacy can justify the use of coercive political power be-
tween the members of the Society of Peoples in a way that is consistent with the
self-conception of, and thus reasonably acceptable to, those on the receiving end
of such coercive power?
Q4.What type of conceptions of justice is most appropriate for peoples whose po-
litical tradition is not liberal and whose political tradition is not marked by free
institutions?
Q5.What is the appropriate notion of stability for a nonliberal society?
Q6.When is political power legitimately used in societies who are not liberal demo-
cratic?
Rawls’ answers to these questions can all be found in LP. The eight principles of LP
are the appropriate conception of justice for a Society of well-ordered peoples (Q1).
Its principles reflect the core of the public political culture from the second half of
the twentieth century. The public political culture of international relations in the
Un era expresses the desire to provide a normative basis for two important phenomena.
One is the idea of decolonization. The political autonomy and the right to self-de-
termination of peoples, both forming the backbone of Rawls’ eight principles of LP,
are part of the material that translates the political consensus on the injustice of colo-
nial domination into a moral consensus on the political independence of political com-
munities. The second part of the post-WWII consensus rests on the idea of human
rights. The Un system embodies (albeit imperfectly) the idea that absolute
sovereignty (in its internal dimension) is unacceptable: states, or any other group,
do not have a free hand when it comes to dealing with their constituencies. Although
Rawls’ list of human rights and his rationale for protecting them is debatable, hu-
man rights are squarely in place in LP. 
Since the eight principles of LP are drawn from the public political culture of in-
ternational society, its precepts can, hypothetically, be adopted by all well-ordered
peoples. In a Society of Peoples, the principles of LP can be the locus of an overlap-
ping consensus in which all peoples endorse their shared law from within their own
framework of reasons (Q2). In fact, by imagining two international original positions
(one populated only by liberal peoples and the other with decent well-ordered peo-
ples) Rawls conjectures that all would agree to the same principles of justice to reg-
ulate their mutual undertakings. The Society of Peoples can be well-ordered and sta-
ble for the right reasons because its law does not impose a single moral, philosoph-
ical or religious tradition. In the same way, in the Society of Peoples, the coercive
power of free and equal peoples is only used according to ideas that all peoples as
free and equal, decent or liberal can reasonably accept, as these principles do not
presuppose any moral, philosophical or religious tradition to be decisive in their jus-
tification (Q3) (see Wenar, 2001). 
All types of societies, in order to be plausibly legitimate in the eyes of their cit-
izens, must be organized around four universal requirements of political legitima-
cy (Q6). Such requirements specify the idea of decency: a) a decent society secures
human rights (albeit the minimal list that Rawls calls human rights proper); b) be-
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yond the respect of human rights all societies must make sure that their laws impose
bona fide legal duties; c) the citizens of a decent society must be given a meaning-
ful role in political decision-making (but democracy is not required); and d) its pub-
lic officials must sincerely believe that when they create and enforce the laws of their
society, they are in fact doing so according to what Rawls calls a common-good idea
of justice (see Wenar, 2001). 
no society, in order to be well-ordered, can be based on command by force. At
the very least, a decent society requires its basic structure to be organized by a com-
mon good conception of justice (Q4). A common good conception of justice is in place
if the first two criteria of decency hold. If basic human rights are respected and if the
legal system only imposes bona fide duties and obligations, then we can maintain
that the interests of all citizens are at least taken into consideration and their con-
tinued allegiance to their society is not the result of threat or manipulation. A com-
mon good conception of justice is a conception of justice that is not necessarily po-
litical in Rawls’ domestic sense. Decent peoples do not possess a political tradition
of free institutions so the problem of stability in their own societies is not as diffi-
cult to solve as in liberal ones. In a decent society, we can conjecture, all citizens can
be reunited under the same comprehensive or partially comprehensive philosoph-
ical doctrine. Insofar as this is true, some form of overlapping consensus can be more
readily available (Q5) as it can draw on what liberal societies would regard as com-
prehensive or partially comprehensive reasons. Thus, in a decent society, stability
for the right reasons, albeit different from its liberal democratic equivalent, is pos-
sible. 
The universal requirements of decency and the idea of a common good conception
of justice are minimal requirements. They provide absolute constraints on what po-
litical communities can do to their citizens and how they should be organized in or-
der to elicit the citizens’ enduring support. Such requirements specify the bounds
of toleration. But beyond toleration, political communities must lay down more ex-
tensively the types of principles, reasons and ideals that will provide a fuller justi-
fication for the organization of their basic structures (see Wenar, 2001). As politi-
cal traditions differ, so will the principles, ideals and reasons that give content to pub-
lic justification.
3. ThE FIRST OBJECTIOn: ThE EFFECTS OF InEQUALITy
In this section I wish to deal with a different objection to LP. The objection I will dis-
cuss below does not state that Rawls’ LP is incoherent; rather that it is unable to achieve
the goals it sets for itself. As we have seen, in LP peoples are not interested in acquiring
more resources. This explains why they do not see egalitarian principles of justice
as appropriate in the second original position. yet peoples are clearly interested in
their self-determination. The basic criticism of LP that many thus levelled (even those
most sympathetic to LP; see Miller, 2006; 2007) is that, given the inequalities that
are likely to develop in the Society of Peoples, there is no way to guarantee that the
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eight principles of LP, if taken at face value, can guarantee the self-determination
of peoples. If differences in wealth and income can affect political institutions do-
mestically, the critics maintain, surely they will have the same effects in the inter-
national arena. The best reply to the latter objection is in my view twofold. First, we
can go back to the interpretation of LPwe have provided in parts II and III of this chap-
ter and note that given an accurate representation of peoples’ interests (as Rawls un-
derstands them), the problem we face in the Society of Peoples is less acute than is
maintained by its critics. Second, given the internationalist outlook embraced by LP,
the real problem with what we can call the ‘effects of inequality objection’ is that the
only credible alternative to Rawls’ solution yields counterintuitive results. 
3.1 Equality in LP
As Rawls acknowledges in JAFR, ‘[t]here are many kinds of equality and many rea-
sons for being concerned with it’ (JAFR: 130). First and foremost, large inequalities
in wealth and income can seem especially pernicious in a context riven with pover-
ty, destitution and sickness. It seems morally objectionable that some may starve when
others can thrive. It seems morally objectionable because extreme inequality
means, concretely, that those who are perishing could in fact be saved: there are
enough resources, given the extent of inequality, to provide at least some form of re-
lief for those who are faring worse. If, as most believe, human life should be considered
of some intrinsic value, the unnecessary loss of life can seem morally disturbing. Strict-
ly speaking, the idea of equality plays no role in this type of concern for inequality
(see JAFR: 130). The same reasoning, according to Rawls, holds for LP. he states:
‘Similarly, in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty of assistance
is satisfied and all peoples have a working liberal or decent government, there is again
no reason to narrow the gap between the average wealth of different peoples’ (LP:
114). By this Rawls means that in the Society of Peoples, when the duty of assistance
has been fulfilled towards burdened societies, all well-ordered peoples have enough
resources to meet the basic needs of their citizens and to provide adequate means
for them to make intelligent use of their basic rights (be them liberal or decent).
A second reason for being concerned about large inequalities relates, mainly, to
the self-perception of those who are on the ‘wrong’ side of economic wealth. The ba-
sic idea is that, at least when placed in domestic schemes of social cooperation, ex-
cessive differences in income and wealth can produce a sense of diminished self-worth
and self-respect in those who have less. According to Rawls, significant inequalities
in the economic and political domains can often be associated with inequalities in
status and thus ‘encourage those of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and
by others as inferior’ (JAFR: 131). In LPRawls writes that ‘[t]he same would be true
of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples should citizens in one country feel in-
ferior to the citizens of another because of its greater riches’ (LP: 114), but he then
goes on to make an important qualification, adding ‘… provided that those feelings
are justified’ (LP: 114, emphasis in original). According to Rawls that qualification
is crucial to understand why the domestic and international cases are different. In
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essence, Rawls’ view is that in the international case the feelings of inferiority are not
justified, because ‘when the duty of assistance is fulfilled, and each people has its own
liberal or decent government… each people adjusts the significance and importance
of the wealth of its own society for itself. If it is not satisfied it can continue to increase
savings… or… borrow from other members of the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 114).
Finally, we can present two distinct but closely related reasons why certain so-
cial and economic inequalities might be wrong. Presenting them together is not with-
out merit. In essence, they both address the longstanding connection between un-
equal distribution of social and economic resources and unequal distribution of pow-
er in political society. In JAFR, Rawls presents them as distinct issues. The first rea-
son why excessive inequalities might be wrong (when considering the link between
resources and power) is that they might lead to political domination by those who
control more resources. As Rawls states, when social and economic inequalities be-
come large enough, they tend to lead to political inequality (JAFR: 131). 
The second distinct but related political problem created by inequality is that it
can alter the fairness of the public procedures used to regulate the allocation of re-
sources and of political power in a social system. Rawls believes that when it comes
to both markets and political elections, excessive concentrations of resources in few
hands will inevitably lead to the procedures that sustain the market and political pro-
cess to be distorted. To be more specific, Rawls suggests that great concentrations
of wealth will tend to create monopoly power in economic markets (thus making them
less efficient and unfair) and that the same holds for the political process where the
interests of the rich tend to be disproportionally represented (JAFR: 131). 
At first sight it seems strange to equate markets and political elections to pro-
cedures. Markets are often thought of as social institutions and political elections are
seen as events which decide who should control the government. At the same time,
and without denying these characterizations, we can also consider both markets and
political elections as procedures if we see both of them as systems of allocations. Mar-
kets are then described as procedures for the allocation of resources, while politi-
cal elections can be seen as procedures that allocate political power. So when I re-
fer to procedural fairness I refer to the fairness of the procedures for the allocation
of a given good or role. In what follows I also adopt the broader expression ‘politi-
cal fairness’ to convey the idea of procedural fairness in the domain of the political.
As we have just seen, Rawls refers to the fairness of political elections as a case of
procedural fairness. yet the idea of political fairness is broader than the idea of fair-
ness in political elections. Political fairness might also include the fairness of polit-
ical procedures which are not strictly speaking electoral, such as procedures to nom-
inate Supreme Court judges in many democratic countries. More saliently for us, the
idea of political fairness in LP should be understood as the fairness of the political
processes in which peoples participate. Examples of these political processes are the
decision-making processes in international institutions such as the WTO, the IMF,
the World Bank and the Un. 
In LP, as we have seen, there is no provision to prevent material inequality be-
tween peoples becoming significant. On the other hand, as Rawls himself tells us,
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we also know that the fairness of markets and political institutions are generally af-
fected by excessive amounts of inequality in income and wealth. So, in LP, how are
we to get around the problem of the large inequalities likely to develop in the Soci-
ety of Peoples affecting the fairness of the many international institutions and eco-
nomic markets? Looking at international trade negotiations or at the voting struc-
tures of certain international economic institutions, there is a clear sense that their
outcomes is often determined by the bargaining power of the agents involved rather
than by considerations of justice or fairness. What can LP say about these issues? Can
its structure provide guidance to address them? Rawls is clearly aware of this prob-
lem; in LP he writes that ‘[a] third reason for considering the inequalities among peo-
ples concerns the important role of fairness in the political process of the basic struc-
ture of the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 114). Rawls goes on to say that even in the So-
ciety of Peoples fairness plays an important part in the political processes regulat-
ing its basic structure. 
In LPRawls considers what he now calls ‘basic fairness’.29 he states that such fair-
ness will be guaranteed in two ways (LP: 115). First, peoples will be fairly represented
in the second original position as the principles of LP are adopted from behind a veil
of ignorance. Second, given that LP admits the possibility of creating international
institutions, Rawls also maintains that the guidelines for setting up these institutions
should also be chosen behind the veil of ignorance (LP: 115).30 In other words, ac-
cording to Rawls, a concern for procedural fairness in LPwill not translate into a con-
cern for inequality in the Society of Peoples. 
29. Interestingly enough, the symmetry between the ‘comments on equality’ in JAFR and the con-
siderations of the value of equality in LP breaks down at this point. In LP Rawls only pays at-
tention to the idea of procedural fairness and seems to be less concerned with the idea of dom-
ination (see also O’neill, 2008: n22). I would like to offer a conjecture regarding this latter
point before going on to describe Rawls’ treatment of the idea of procedural fairness in the
Society of Peoples. In Rawls’ view, given how peoples are designed, they do not seem to be
plausibly described as aspiring to gain political influence over other peoples, let alone dom-
inating them. In other words, given the general understanding of peoples’ interests, and that
we are describing an ideal theory scenario, peoples do not seem to have the motivational re-
sources to want to dominate other peoples.
30. Rawls deal with the idea of basic fairness in the Society of Peoples in the following passage:
‘Basic Fairness among peoples is given by their being represented equally in the second orig-
inal position with its veil of ignorance. Thus the representatives of peoples will want to pre-
serve the independence of their own society and its equality in relations to others. In the work-
ing of organizations and loose confederations of peoples, inequalities are designed to serve
the many ends that peoples share. In this case the larger and smaller peoples will be ready
to make larger and smaller contributions and to accept proportionally larger and smaller re-
turns. In addition, the parties will formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations,
and will agree to standards of fairness for trade as well as certain provisions for mutual as-
sistance. Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified distributive effects, these
would have to be corrected in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples’ (LOP: 115).
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3.2 The (alleged) problem
Taken at face value Rawls’ arguments might seem insufficient. One can take for grant-
ed that being symmetrically situated in the second original position is a sufficient
guarantee that the latter represents peoples fairly. On the other hand, as many crit-
ics have noted, the contention that basic fairness can be preserved in international
institutions, regimes and organizations is at best underdeveloped. Given that, according
to Rawls, peoples will choose guidelines for their joint undertakings in a fair choice
situation such as the second original position, how are we to make sure, given the
very high level of inequality that is likely to develop in LP, that the guidelines struc-
turing those joint undertakings will remain fair over time? As we have mentioned
above, Rawls’ domestic theory addresses the important connection between inequality
and the fairness of markets and political processes. What seems to be missing from
his international theory, then, is a similar argument. This is a legitimate question;
it is unlikely that we can settle once and for all the design of international institu-
tions: choosing guidelines for their establishment is only an initial step in the long
process of effectively designing those institutions, and what their real implications
are for their members will be in the long run. 
In other words, even if we were to assume that the correct guidelines were adopt-
ed, the formal structure of an institution can never guarantee that it can be insulated
from a background in which differences of wealth and income are large. It is not
enough, for example, to provide equal voting rights in a democracy to make sure that
citizens have equal opportunity to influence the political process. In the same way
it does not seem to be enough, to guarantee basic fairness at the international lev-
el, that, formally speaking, all peoples have equal rights within the statutes of in-
ternational organizations (see Beitz, 2000). These rights would not necessarily trans-
late into real influence. This is precisely what generally happens in formally impeccable
institutions like the WTO: even if all countries have one vote and if all have veto pow-
ers over trade agreements, those agreements overwhelmingly represent the inter-
ests of the US, Europe and Japan (and more recently a few other former develop-
ing countries such as China and Brazil). 
3.3 The first reply: taking peoples’ interests seriously
While these criticisms are not without merit, they still miss their mark. In order to un-
derstand why, let us return to part II of this chapter. The essential point made there,
following Leif Wenar, was that since peoples as moral corporate agents do not have
a conception of the good to further, they are uninterested in the idea of accumulat-
ing further wealth and income. In the domestic case, representatives of the parties
in the original position know that they represent persons with the two moral pow-
ers (i.e. having a sense of justice and the capacity to pursue a conception of the good).
The fact that individuals have a conception of the good to further is crucial in un-
derstanding why their representatives in the domestic original position want to se-
cure the greatest possible amount of primary goods (among which income and wealth)
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for those they represent. The point is that with income and wealth come a greater abil-
ity to realize one’s non-public values. In short, income and wealth are means that, among
other things, allow persons to better pursue their conception of the good in society.
yet, at the level of the second original position, Rawls is quite clear that the same
is not true of (at least liberal) peoples. In fact he writes explicitly that ‘a liberal so-
ciety with a constitutional regime does not, as a liberal society, have a comprehensive
conception of the good. Only the citizens and associations within the civic society
in the domestic case have such conceptions’ (LP: 34, emphasis in original). In this
way, Rawls builds a negative case that moves from what peoples do not have to what
they do not perceive as relevant to further their interests. Peoples do not have a col-
lective conception of the good, so they will not require the means (such as income
and wealth) necessary to further that conception in the Society of Peoples. If this ac-
count is right, then Rawls’ argument about procedural fairness might be salvaged.
As peoples lack any form of interest in acquiring more resources, whatever the lev-
el of inequality in LP, they will not try to influence the way in which international in-
stitutions and regimes are organized. In short, there is simply nothing that peoples can
gain by distorting how international institutions are structured and evolve over time. 
3.4 The second reply: an implausible alternative31
For the sake of argument, let us imagine that Rawls’ solution – that is, imagining peo-
ples as uninterested in acquiring more resources – is not a convincing one. Let us stip-
ulate that, given what we know about human history and in particular the history
of international relations, it is too implausible to imagine that peoples can be com-
pletely uninterested in wealth (see Wenar and Milanovic, 2008). 
Assuming that peoples are interested in acquiring more wealth, and assuming
that procedural fairness cannot be simply formally guaranteed by what Rawls says
in LP, what kind of alternative solution is possible? If inequality affects the fairness
of international markets and international institutions perhaps the most direct way
of ensuring basic fairness is preserved is to redistribute income and wealth. Unfor-
tunately, the very structure of LPmakes this type of solution at best implausible. 
31. An alternative solution would be to deepen the relevance of international institutions and
organizations, making them (at least to some extent) less responsive to the political will of
peoples. In this way, peoples will partially lose their sovereignty in certain important areas
of their social and political life, but their collective agreements would, so it is claimed, at least
reflect some idea of fairness rather than differences in economic power. Behind the veil of
ignorance in the second original position, peoples could institute a system of global gover-
nance that is fairly constructed and with at least some form of independent ability to extract
compliance from its members. There seems to be two problems with this type of solution:
it risks creating a worse problem than the one it seeks to address (see Kukathas, 2006). The
second is that it looks suspiciously similar to a world state, something that Rawls wants to
avoid. More broadly, the point is that if a theory of global justice is premised on the politi-
cal autonomy of peoples, it will then be difficult to argue that such autonomy should be for-
saken in order to protect it.
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Why so? In general when we consider redistribution (of income and wealth) do-
mestically we imagine a scenario in which a certain amount of resources are collected,
for example, by a general system of taxation. The latter channels resources from those
who have more income and wealth to those who have less income and wealth. The
problem with imagining the same type of scenario in the structure provided by LP
is, quite simply, that it provides what are, in my view, counterintuitive results. We
can grasp the implausibility of this solution if we make two preliminary observations.
The first is that the types of inequalities that are likely to affect the process of in-
ternational economic and political fairness are not per-capita income and wealth in-
equality, but rather aggregate income and wealth inequality. This is an important
distinction because it implies that what will cause trouble, so to speak, is not how
rich the citizens of a political community are individually, but how rich they are col-
lectively. Thus, the target or end of redistribution would not be to reduce differences
in per-capita income and wealth, but instead to reduce differences in aggregate in-
come and wealth. The second preliminary remark is that while there is likely to be
a great deal of inequality in LP in terms of income and wealth, there is also likely to
be significant differences in terms of population policies. Different peoples, even if
all well-ordered, will develop in different ways and represent different numbers of
persons; there is no reason to suppose that all peoples will be equal in population
size. If we take into consideration these two preliminary remarks, we can clearly see
why the redistribution principle would work to produce implausible results in the
internationalist framework of Rawls’ theory: it could (and probably would) require
the redistribution of economic resources from peoples who have low per-capita in-
come and wealth but high aggregate income and wealth, to peoples who have low
aggregate income and wealth and high per-capita income and wealth. This, however,
is unacceptable: no one would really advocate redistributing resources from China
to Luxembourg to avoid that the latter is ‘bullied’ in international negotiations.
4. ThE SECOnD OBJECTIOn: PEOPLES AnD VALUE COLLECTIVISM
In this final section I want to definitively put to rest the charge that LP is not com-
mitted to the justification of social and political arrangements to individuals. In part
2 of this chapter I have explained why Rawls chooses peoples instead of persons as
the agents of his international theory. I have stated that the choice of peoples is dic-
tated by Rawls’ analysis of the global public political culture. nonetheless, even if
this explanation is successful, some liberals might still feel uncomfortable with the
overall structure of LP – one in which, apparently, there is no evident preoccupation
with the fate of individuals in global politics. In other words, some might still argue
that even conceding that the global public political culture is made of peoples rather
than persons, this would still somehow commit Rawls to a form of unacceptable val-
ue collectivism. I disagree. In LP, peoples are simply the main unit of analysis, not
the main unit of moral concern. In fact, as I will show below, there are good reasons
to think that LP is a form of moral cosmopolitanism (as opposed to political or dis-
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tributive cosmopolitanism, see held and Maffettone, forthcoming) given that the main
reason for which it recommends a world made up of political communities is pre-
cisely that without such political communities it would be difficult to publicly jus-
tify the global political order to all persons. 
4.1 The value collectivism objection
According to many cosmopolitan liberals perhaps the most important weakness of
LP lies in the relinquishment of what, following Pogge, we can call normative indi-
vidualism. As we have seen, in LP peoples are the main actors of global politics. The
eight principles of LP are principles that address peoples and their mutual obliga-
tions; persons seem not to be directly addressed. For Pogge:
Rawls endorses normative individualism domestically but rejects it internationally.
This is an asymmetry insofar as, in Rawls’ domestic theory, the interests of col-
lectives (associations) are given no independent weight… In his international
theory, by contrast, peoples are recognized as ultimate units of moral concern
and, more remarkably still, individuals are not so recognized. 
(Pogge, 2006: 211, emphasis in original) 
The main problem that many have encountered in reading LP is that, by addressing
peoples rather than persons, it appears to be somehow committed to an implausi-
ble (at least from the liberal point of view) form of ‘value collectivism’. In other words,
LP could invite what we can call the ‘value collectivism’ objection (see Altman and
Wellman, 2009: 37). According to Michael hartney, ‘value collectivism [is the view
that] a collective entity can have value independently of its contribution to the well-
being of individual human beings’ (in Altman and Wellman, 2009: 37). The idea of
value collectivism is problematic insofar as it proposes to attribute value to the life
of a collective entity not on the basis of what it can contribute to the life of individ-
uals but based on further properties of the collective that are not reducible to the prop-
erties of its members.
4.2 Replying to the objection
Before directly responding to the aforementioned objection, allow me a preliminary
remark. Let me start by saying that I believe value collectivism to be an implausible
view. More to the point for our present concern, I believe that there is no reason to
attribute value collectivism to Rawls. But to reject value collectivism, and thus to en-
dorse normative individualism, does not require rejecting the moral significance of
collectives altogether. Within normative individualism there is logical space to de-
fend the moral significance of groups and collective entities. Crudely put, the idea
that groups are important to the well-being (broadly construed) of their members
makes it possible to attribute to such groups moral significance without necessari-
ly endorsing the value collectivist position. For instance, according to some liberal
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nationalists, it is precisely the contribution that nations can and do make to the life
of persons that provides the justification of their moral significance (see Miller, 1995;
Tamir, 1993). In other words, there is a difference between recognizing the moral
significance of a collective and the grounds or justification of such moral significance.
Once this distinction is in place it is then possible to see that what really matters for
normative individualists should not be whether certain collective entities can have
moral significance, but how such moral significance is justified – that is, whether such
moral significance is derivative or dependent on the contribution that the collective
entity can make to the life of individuals. This is instructive as it signals that there
is not much we can conclude simply acknowledging the fact that LP is framed in terms
of peoples rather than persons. What we need to know is ‘why’ LP is framed the way
it is. 
In chapter 1, I have insisted that LP cannot be presented as theory of international
politics that starts with collective agents simply for the sake of methodological con-
siderations. As I have stated there, we need a way of picturing LP that is capable of
justifying its very unit of analysis, namely peoples, as the result of the liberal idea
that social and political arrangements should be justifiable to the persons that are
subject to them. Furthermore, in chapter 2, I have claimed that to start with the pub-
lic political culture of a given political context is the mark of a peculiar liberal strat-
egy, one that is grounded in respect for persons and its associated requirement of
public justification. Finally, in part 2 of this chapter, I have claimed that it is by in-
terpreting the global public political culture that Rawls chooses peoples as the main
unit for his theory. More precisely, following Leif Wenar, I have claimed that the glob-
al public political culture is not able to tell us how individuals should relate to each
other. On the other hand the global public political culture is more robust when it
comes to the mutual undertakings of political communities. I thus concluded that
this is the reason why Rawls decided to start with peoples rather than persons. 
With the three elements of my analysis of LP so far we have, I believe, good rea-
son to picture LP as a form of normative individualism. LP begins with the idea of
respect for persons and its associated requirement of public justification. The only
way in which the requirement of public justification can be carried out is to start from
the public political culture of the political context LP is examining, namely the glob-
al public political culture. The global public political does not refer to the idea of ‘free’
and ‘equal’ citizens, nor does it imagine the persons of the world as engaged in a fair
system of social cooperation. That is to say, the global public political culture can-
not really support the extension of the content of Justice as Fairness to global poli-
tics. not only that, the global public political culture does not seem to provide much
guidance on how persons should relate toward one another. The closest thing we can
find to a sharable characterization of persons at the global level is the idea that per-
sons are members of distinct political societies. As such, they are plausibly attached
to the idea that their political communities are free and independent. Of course, this
will not entail that this freedom and independence are absolute, since in the glob-
al public political culture there is a clear sense that for membership in political com-
munities to be meaningful, certain basic human rights cannot be violated. 
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One way of incorporating these ideas in a conception of justice for global poli-
tics is to use political communities as the basic unit of analysis. Political communi-
ties will have to be pictured as free and independent and their power of sovereign-
ty will have to be limited. We can call these political communities ‘peoples’ (rather
than states) to mark these special features. not only can the choice of peoples as the
basic unit of analysis be able to incorporate the few elements that a sharable con-
ception of the person at the global level would contain, but it can also capture a rich-
er set of obligations that are traditionally seen as part of the domain of international
relations, that is, of relations between political communities. Such obligations per-
tain to the idea of a fair international economic system; for example, to the way in
which major international economic organizations and institutions are framed. Even
more importantly they pertain to the limits and conduct of war between political com-
munities, perhaps one of the most enduring sources of suffering in human history. 
however suggestive (if at all) this interpretation might be, some may remain un-
convinced of the normative individualism of LP. LP, they might claim, does care about
certain fundamental human rights and does pose conditions on the internal legiti-
macy of nonliberal peoples, but it does not do so because it cares about persons as
such. In fact Rawls himself writes, in the concluding pages of LP, that it is concerned
with the justice of societies and not with the well-being of individuals. Rawls imag-
ines two societies both internally satisfying the requirements of justice as fairness,
yet the worst-off in one society are faring better than the worst-off in the other. Ac-
cording to Rawls:
The Law of Peoples is indifferent between the two distributions. The cosmopolitan
view, on the other hand, is not indifferent. It is concerned with the well-being
of individuals, and hence whether the well-being of the globally worst-off per-
son can be improved. What is important to the Law of Peoples is the justice and
stability for the right reasons of liberal and decent societies, living as members
of a Society of well-ordered Peoples.
(LP: 120)
I am going to leave to the next section discussion of whether it is possible to present
LP as a fully cosmopolitan theory. here let me suggest that it is likely, given Rawls’
critical target in the last few pages of LP, that ‘cosmopolitan view’ might simply re-
fer to Pogge and Beitz. In order to properly understand the quote we should also take
note that ‘the well-being of individuals’ and ‘the justice of societies’ are clearly not
in opposition. In fact it would seem rather strange to care about the justice of any
given society unless one also cared, in some way, about the well-being of individu-
als who are part of that society. The good of a just or decent society and the fact that
its justice or decency allow it to be a member in good standing of a Society of well-
ordered Peoples is that the fundamental interests of its members (their human rights
and the internal legitimacy of the political institutions under which they live) are guar-
anteed. no other explanation, it seems to me, is even intelligible. If the goal of Rawls’
realistic utopia is to eliminate the great evils of human history, we might well admit
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that the only reason for caring about such evils is because of the great human suf-
ferings that they produce. In this respect, Rawls is not, in my view, particularly help-
ful in presenting the contrast between the two views as sharply as he does. Rather,
the crucial distinction is once again dictated by how we want to conceive of the well-
being of individuals in the first place. As I have stated above, if we can assume that
in the global public political culture the idea of belonging to a self-determining po-
litical community is an important one, then the way in which we understand the well-
being of individuals should also take into consideration this fact. To live in one’s own
just or decent society is a great good for Rawls – perhaps even a greater one than hav-
ing more resources or primary goods at one’s disposal. 
4.3 LP and cosmopolitanism
Rawls should have avoided presenting the contrast between his LP and the cos-
mopolitan view so sharply. And not only that: there are in fact good reasons to pic-
ture LP itself as a (moral) liberal cosmopolitan view. Perhaps the most influential
statement of cosmopolitan liberalism in recent decades has been Pogge’s ‘Cos-
mopolitanism and Sovereignty’ (1992). There Pogge maintained that all cos-
mopolitan positions share three basic elements. First, individualism: any form of cos-
mopolitanism takes human beings as the basic unit of moral concern. Other groups
such as nations and states, and here we can add ‘peoples’, can only indirectly be units
of concern. Second, generality: all human beings are units of moral concern, not a
specific subset of them. Third, universality: the special concern for human beings has
global force (Pogge, 1992: 48–9). 
What is striking about Pogge’s position is that there seems to be no reason to be-
lieve that LP is not a cosmopolitan theory. In fact I believe that seeing LP through the
interpretive lens provided thus far actually requires recognizing LP as a cosmopoli-
tan theory (at least if we adopt the Poggean definition). Rawls’ LP is crucially con-
cerned with the justification of social and political arrangements to individuals and
so it is clearly a theory that sees human beings as the ultimate unit of moral concern.
LP is also general and universal, since it applies to all human beings and the scope
of LP is global in reach.
Furthermore, Pogge makes a distinction that is particularly striking, at least giv-
en the wording he uses to introduce it. he distinguishes between moral and legal cos-
mopolitanism and defines their difference as follows:
Legal cosmopolitanism is committed to a concrete political ideal of a global or-
der under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are
fellow citizens of a universal republic. Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all per-
sons stand in certain moral relations to one another: we are required to respect
one another's status as ultimate units of moral concern – a requirement that imposes
limits upon our conduct and, in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional
schemes. This view is more abstract, and in this sense weaker than, legal cos-
mopolitanism: though compatible with the latter, it is also compatible with oth-
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er patterns of human interaction, for example, with a system of autonomous states
and even with a plurality of self-contained communities.
(Pogge, 1992: 49, emphasis added)
What is striking about Pogge’s distinction between legal and moral cosmopoli-
tanism is how very few theorists have focused on one vital way that the two might
be at odds with each other. If a (legal) liberal cosmopolitan order cannot be appro-
priately justified to all persons or human beings, as Rawls seems to think, then the
limits we have to observe in ‘constructing institutional schemes’ at the global level
are precisely the ones that LPwants to signal by focusing on peoples. LP provides one
interpretation of moral cosmopolitanism that is in line with the liberal tradition. It
states that social and political arrangements are to be justified to those who live un-
der them. But, if we adopt the interpretation of Rawls’ LP presented in this chapter,
it seems clear that Rawls develops his LP in the way he does (that is, with peoples
rather than persons) precisely because he is concerned about the justification of so-
cial and political arrangements to persons. Peoples, and their use in LP, are not the
basic unit of moral concern for global politics. The fundamental point is that with-
out using peoples as the basic unit of analysis, Rawls believes that we cannot construct
an adequate public justification of social and political arrangements to persons at the
global level. LP thus provides, albeit implicitly, an argument concerning which in-
stitutional schemes, at the global level, can meet the justificatory requirements im-
posed by its understanding of moral cosmopolitanism. 
COnCLUSIOn
In this chapter, I have extended the account of the continuity of Rawls’ work to LP.
I have claimed that a purely cosmopolitan extension of the content of Rawls’ ideas
to global politics would be impossible. In their content, all the main ideas in Rawls’
justice as fairness address liberal democratic institutions. I have also shown that by
taking seriously the method employed by Rawls, rather than the content of his ideas,
we can explain the two major discontinuities between Rawls’ domestic and inter-
national theories. Finally, I have demonstrated that LP provides all the relevant an-
swers to the main questions that arise when we try to construct the appropriate con-
ceptions of justice, stability and legitimacy for the Society of Peoples. In the final two
sections of the chapter I addressed two important objections to the coherence and
cogency of LP. The first alleged that LP could not guarantee the political autonomy
of peoples as it provides no specified limit to international inequality. The second
alleged that even if we could explain Rawls’ choice of peoples as the agents of his
theory, this choice was still based on some form of value collectivism. These objec-
tions mirror, and contest, the explanation of the two main discontinuities between
Rawls’ domestic and international theories that I provided in section II of the chap-
ter. In both cases I have argued that the objections fail. The objection concerning the
limits to international inequality is based on a misunderstanding of peoples’ inter-
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ests; peoples are interested in their political autonomy and the justice of their in-
stitutions, not in the accumulation of wealth. Furthermore, even considering a dif-
ferent account of peoples’ interests, the idea of international redistribution itself her-
alds counterintuitive consequences. To the second objection I have replied by show-
ing that peoples are only the main unit of analysis for LP, not its main unit of moral
concern. 
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Chapter 4 
Rawls’ Duty of Assistance: A Defence and Re-Elaboration32
InTRODUCTIOn
In the previous three chapters I have presented a sympathetic interpretation of Rawls’
law of peoples. I have, time and again, insisted on its continuity with the framework
Rawls developed in his domestic political philosophy and with the main liberal idea
of respect for persons and of the justification of social and political arrangements to
all. I have explained why Rawls is not a global egalitarian, yet can still be considered
a cosmopolitan thinker. In this chapter I analyse Rawls’ duty of assistance (DOA),
which is the core of his project of international economic justice.33 As I hope to have
shown, there is every reason to believe that Rawls was correct in not extending his
egalitarianism beyond borders. however, even if the latter argument is sound, that
does not guarantee that his position on international economic justice is sustainable.
Only a more detailed exposition of the merits (and faults) of the DOA can support
the claim that LP provides a sound understanding of our economic duties at the in-
ternational level. 
While this chapter does not necessarily insist on the coherence of Rawls’ work,
assuming such coherence does have an important impact on how I approach the DOA
itself. Accepting that Rawls should not have extended the difference principle to in-
ternational politics helps us to remove from our conceptual horizon the idea that LP
should have simply ‘done more’ when it comes to international distributive justice.
This is important, I will argue, because it is precisely this attitude towards Rawls’ treat-
ment of international distributive obligations that has prevented many commenta-
tors, sympathetic and not, from seeing what is really problematic about the DOA.
It is fair to say that Rawls’ treatment of international distributive obligations in
LP did not receive a warm welcome by the liberal philosophical community. Many
were baffled by Rawls’ dubious empirical generalizations concerning the wealth of
nations and the sources of their prosperity (Beitz, 2000). Others were disappoint-
32. This chapter is a revised version of a paper forthcoming in Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics.
33. As we will see, the DOA (that is, its content and interpretation) does not really share much
with the idea of economic justice per se, at least if the latter is understood to require or con-
centrate on the transfer of resources. The DOA is, in this respect, a very political duty, focused
as it is on the character of institutions. I retain the terminology of international economic jus-
tice in order to not lose contact with the debates that have surrounded LP on this specific point. 
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ed by the idea that distributive justice at the international level was to be recon-
ceptualised as a duty of assistance (hereafter DOA) to burdened societies (Pogge,
2004). Still others argued that if justice is the first virtue of social, political and eco-
nomic institutions, and since there are many such institutions at the international
level, then surely we should apply our ideas concerning distributive justice beyond
the state (Buchanan, 2000).34
A general feature of the aforementioned reactions is the idea that LP provides
an undemanding and underwhelming characterisation of our international obligations.
It does not provide a rich enough sense of the international or global obligations of
justice that peoples have towards each other; the DOA is not a duty of justice but should
be one;35 the DOA attributes to the poor responsibility for their own fate, not, as it
should, the world order; the DOA does not cater to the many unjust inequalities of
wealth and power that plague the global economy. The default option, if one wish-
es to criticise Rawls, seems to be that he is not asking his theory to do as much as it
should. More than finding these allegations unconvincing, I find them strikingly off
the mark: the real weakness of Rawls’ account of our international economic duties
is that it asks those who have to perform them to do too much, not too little. 
The nature of this problem can be grasped if we look at LP from a slightly ‘high-
er’ vantage point. Essentially, Rawls’ critics complain that he often depicts a world
in which all peoples are responsible for their choices and the outcomes of such choic-
es. Rawls also maintains that some societies, given their social and political culture,
are unable to become responsible for their fates. This might suggest a relatively du-
bious picture, one in which the poor are poor because of their ill judgement, and the
rich are only there to assist them, not to give them what they are owed. But this is
simply a mistaken interpretation of Rawls’ international theory. Perhaps the most
fatal problem with this type of view is that it fails to make a simple connection. If the
basis for how a society fares are domestic social and political institutions, and if (as
34. While the latter has been the predominant critical reaction for a long time, it is also fair to
say that more sympathetic responses have appeared in the literature. Some have argued that
Rawls’ ideas have to be interpreted at the appropriate level of abstraction: they concern ide-
al theory, not the world as we see it (Reidy, 2004; Reidy, 2007; Freeman, 2007). Others have
insisted that if we understand how peoples and their interests are constructed by Rawls in
LP then it becomes clear why wealth is not a priority for them (Wenar, 2004; Wenar, 2006).
35. This issue in particular is less conceptually clear that some have assumed. In general there
is a tendency to believe that the main difference between justice and assistance is the degree
to which a principle is binding. Given that the DOA is part of the eight principles of LP and
that all principles are equally binding, the application of the ‘degree of bindingness’ distinction
is not particularly helpful. It could also be argued that since the eight principles themselves
are a conception of justice for the Society of Peoples, then as the DOA is one of these prin-
ciples it must, ipso facto, be a principle of justice. That is true but it does not clarify the dis-
tinction between a principle of justice and a principle of assistance. Perhaps the best conceptual
distinction is the one provided by Valentini (2011a) claiming that principles of assistance,
among other things, already presuppose a system of just entitlements. That is probably true
for LP, as it is based on the prior legitimacy of well-ordered peoples and their control over
the territories and natural resources that they occupy. 
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Rawls contends) we have a duty to help all societies to become well-ordered and re-
sponsible for their choices, then surely the duty upon already well-ordered peoples
is quite extraordinary: that is, to change, or vigorously shape, the social and polit-
ical institutions of all societies burdened by unfavourable conditions. Very few cos-
mopolitan proposals ask so much of those who are lucky enough to live in a well-
ordered society, and there are good reasons to believe that it would mean, in fact,
asking too much. 
This is, in my view, the most important problem the DOA has to face. however,
the fact that such a problem exists does not mean that no sympathetic solution is avail-
able within the Rawlsian framework. In fact, I believe there is such a solution, though
it requires a partial reframing of the way in which we conceive of the DOA. It calls
for greater concentration on human rights and a more incentive-based solution to
the problem of developing well-ordered institutions. The aim of this essay is thus three-
fold: a) to show that the traditional critiques of Rawls’ DOA are unsound; b) to ex-
pose the real weaknesses of Rawls’ approach; and finally, c) to provide a sympathetic
reconstruction that addresses those weaknesses in a way that is broadly compatible
with the constraints of the overall framework provided by Rawls’ international the-
ory. The structure of the chapter is as follows. I rehearse Rawls’ understanding of the
DOA, its meaning, context and purpose, in part 1. This will serve as a background
to the rest of chapter. In part 2 I examine some of the main critical arguments against
Rawls’ DOA, and find them wanting. In part 3 I explain what is in my view the real
and relatively unexplored challenge posed by the DOA, and in part 4 I sketch what
I take to be a reasonable solution.36
1. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (OR LACK ThEREOF) In LP
In LP, just as in TJ, there is a crucial distinction between what Rawls calls ideal and
nonideal theory. For Rawls, ideal theory assumes that there is full compliance with
the normative principles that regulate the domain under consideration, as well as
favourable conditions for the fulfilment of the obligations that are given by the rel-
evant normative principles. In LP, the DOA is ‘triggered’ when that second assumption
36. I will not take up in any detail the issue of what justifies the DOA, i.e. its presence among the
eight principles of LP. The debate concerning this issue has been recently developed by Rei-
dy (2007), Armstrong (2009) and Williams (2011). In general the literature seems to recog-
nise that the DOA is the result of an assurance problem based on the possibility that a well-
ordered people might become a burdened society through no fault of its own (for example,
as the result of a natural catastrophe). Of course, as Williams rightly notes, this would be a
less than satisfactory explanation for those societies that have always been burdened. In con-
trast, Reidy’s reply to this worry seems to consist in denying that we can empirically attribute
full responsibility to a people for being burdened given the complexity of historical circum-
stances in the nonideal world that would pre-exist the establishment of a just law of peoples
(for example, colonialism and wars of conquest shift responsibilities – but to what extent, and
for how long? And so on).
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characterising ideal theory breaks down.37 On the other hand, in Rawls’ Justice as
Fairness, principles of distributive justice operate in ideal theory, that is, when both
favourable conditions and full compliance obtain. These definitional differences un-
derscore something more substantive: distributive principles should not be conceived
of as forms of redress for existing circumstances in the world as we see it, but oper-
ate in the world as it should be. 
As I have just mentioned, in LPRawls suggest that the DOA is triggered when we
cannot assume favourable conditions for the development of well-ordered institu-
tions (LP: 101). In order to fully capture the DOA’s meaning, the parallel with the
first case of nonideal theory – non-compliance – is instructive. According to Rawls,
‘certain regimes refuse to comply with a reasonable Law of Peoples; these regimes
think a sufficient reason to engage in war is that war advances, or might advance,
the regime’s rational (not reasonable) interests’ (LP: 90). Rawls calls these regimes
‘outlaw states’. Two issues are of importance: why such regimes are unwilling to re-
spect the principles of LP, and what the goal of LP is in sanctioning their behaviour.
For Rawls, the origin of the foreign policy behaviour of a people is strictly domes-
tic. Rawls’ LP goes ‘from the inside out’, so to speak. Thus, in Rawls’ eyes, the best
way of understanding and explaining the problem posed by outlaw states is to ex-
amine their internal political life and see that ‘their fault [lies] in their political tra-
ditions and institutions of law, property and class structure, with their sustaining re-
ligious and moral beliefs and underlying culture. It is these things that shape a so-
ciety’s political will; and they are the elements that must change before a society can
support a reasonable Law of Peoples’ (LP: 106). On the other hand, the goal of LP,
when dealing with non-compliance, is simply to make the world a place in which ‘all
peoples accept and follow the (ideal of the) Law of Peoples’ (LP: 89).
These two elements of nonideal theory – its sources, and what we should do about
it – are accordingly shifted in the case of unfavourable conditions. According to Rawls,
‘[b]urdened societies, while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack the political
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material
and technological resources needed to be well-ordered’ (LP: 106). Just as in the first
case of nonideal theory (i.e. no full compliance), ‘[t]he long-term goal of (relative-
ly) well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened societies, like outlaw states,
into the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 106). But as Rawls tells us, the fact that well-ordered
peoples have a duty of assistance does not entail that the best way to carry out such
37. note that there is a distinction to be made between what we can call ‘general’ and ‘local’ non-
ideal circumstances. The idea of ‘unfavourable conditions’ can be applied, in other words,
to the Society of Peoples at large, or to burdened societies individually: the former would be
a case of general nonideal theory, while the latter is a case of local nonideal theory. Rawls
directly takes up the issue of local nonideal theory since if the Society of Peoples had to deal
with unfavourable conditions for all its members it would be harder to imagine any princi-
ple of assistance towards burdened societies: the DOA presupposes some form of Society of
Peoples to be already functioning. Of course this does not mean that in the real world we are
not in fact facing some form of general nonideal scenario. 
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duty is to establish principles of distributive justice. Such principles, in Rawls’ view,
do not have a definite cut-off point (LP: 106). The DOA is instead expressly thought
of as a response to a concrete problem, namely to allow burdened societies to com-
ply with a reasonable law of peoples. hence, once such objective is achieved, the DOA
is fulfilled.
A further (and often overlooked) feature of the DOA that should be highlight-
ed is the absence of the assumption that ‘burdened societies = poor societies’. Rawls’
classification of peoples is always political in nature and depends on their internal
political structures and foreign policies, not their level of affluence. The same holds
for well-ordered peoples: liberal and decent peoples are not defined or understood
by their aggregate or per-capita income and wealth, but by the nature of their in-
stitutions. The DOA is not a duty to assist the poor (although it might contingently
do so); it is a duty to assist those societies that are incapable of being well-ordered,
either as a liberal or decent people, and which consequently might be unable (giv-
en unfavourable conditions) to follow the precepts of a reasonable Law of Peoples. 
The aim or goal of the DOA is even more clearly stated by Rawls when he con-
trasts his view with what he calls cosmopolitan views. According to Rawls, the ‘fi-
nal political end of society is to become fully just and stable for the right reasons. Once
that end is reached, the Law of Peoples prescribes no further target such as, for ex-
ample, to raise the standard of living beyond what is necessary to sustain those in-
stitutions’ (LP: 119). LP is not primarily concerned with the material well-being of
individuals but with the justice of the societies of which they are members.38 Con-
ceptually, the DOA is not a principle to improve the lot of those who fare worst at the
global level (although, contingently, it might achieve that end); it is a principle that
aims at guaranteeing to all persons that they will live in a well-ordered political com-
munity, and to all political communities that the world in which they interact will
be one where all adopt a reasonable Law of Peoples. 
Rawls also discusses some of the cosmopolitan alternatives to his view in para-
graphs 16.2 and 16.3 (LP: 115–20). Rawls contrasts his LPwith Beitz’s two princi-
ples of global justice – a global principle concerning the redistribution of wealth cre-
ated through natural resources, and a global distributive principle modelled on the
difference principle (LP: 116–17) – and with Pogge’s General Resource Dividend (GRD,
see LP: 119). As a reply to Beitz’s principle concerning the distribution of the ben-
efits derived from natural resources Rawls reiterates his general idea of the sources
of development (both political and economic) by stating that ‘the crucial element
in how a country fares is its political culture and… not the level of its resources’ (LP:
119). According to Rawls, then, the unequal distribution of natural resources has no
clear bearing on his discussion of mutual obligations between peoples. As a reply to
Pogge’s principle Rawls basically maintains that if it has a target – that is, if it is linked
with the satisfaction of persons’ basic needs and human rights – then the difference
38. needless to say, the justice of society deeply affects how individuals ‘fare’. however, there is
no reason to believe that how individuals fare can be reduced to their material well-being. 
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between the GRD and the DOA is marginal. There might be disagreement on how
to set the target, but, as Rawls states, ‘surely there is a point at which a people’s ba-
sic needs (estimated in primary goods) are fulfilled and a people can stand on its own’
(LP: 119). 
Rawls’ reply to Beitz’s second principle of global distributive justice (something
akin to a globalised version of the difference principle) is much more controversial.
Rawls states that Beitz’s principle might seem an attractive solution provided we take
the world as we see it, plagued as it is by injustice, destitution and conflict, as the
referent. however, as was made clear early on in this chapter, for Rawls, principles
of distributive justice are meant to apply in ideal theory. The real question for Rawls,
therefore, is whether, in LP, once all peoples are well-ordered and there are no more
burdened societies, we can still look favourably on the consequences of applying a
principle of global distributive justice between peoples. In Rawls’ eyes, this situation
‘gives what we would… regard as unacceptable results’ (LP: 117).
Why so? As we have seen, Rawls seems to take for granted that the sources of
economic and political development are domestic. In stating his reply to Beitz’s sec-
ond global distributive principle Rawls also lays out what in his view follows from
it. he proposes two comparisons, the first between a society that decides to indus-
trialise and increase its real rate of savings and a society that rather opts for a more
leisurely and pastoral way of life, and the second, between two societies with equal
(and adequate) protection for women’s rights which decide to opt for different pop-
ulation growth policies. In both cases, Rawls assumes that the societies he mentions
are either liberal or well-ordered, and that the relevant starting positions are equal.
In both cases, ex hypothesis, levels of wealth will vary between the two societies com-
pared. however, according to Rawls it would be unfair not to hold peoples with lib-
eral or decent basic structures responsible for their collective choices. And yet this
is exactly what would be implied by a global distributive principle without a target.
In Rawls’ view, Beitz’s second principle is unacceptable because it fails to make room
for peoples’ responsibility for their level of well-being once we can grant that their
institutions are either liberal or decent. 
2. DEBATInG ThE DOA
In what follows I examine two of the most prominent arguments put forward by Rawls’
critics. My provisional conclusion is that they do not really address the core of LP’s
structure. The critics assume that Rawls is imagining a ‘vanished Westphalian order’
(Buchanan, 2000), but Rawls’ argument should be placed at the level of ideal the-
ory, not the world as we see it (see also Reidy, 2004; Reidy, 2007; Freeman, 2007).
Rawls’ critics assume that he entertains the implausible empirical thesis that the sources
of economic growth are wholly domestic. yet Rawls is ambivalent about such an ar-
gument and, furthermore, given the purpose of the DOA, he simply does not need
to claim as much: what is crucial is the more modest conviction that initial endow-
ments of economic resources are not important to become well-ordered. 
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2.1 Two (alleged) empirical assumptions
Perhaps the most common form of critical response to Rawls’ treatment of distributive
justice is that the empirical assumptions needed to support his account in LP are far
from solid (see Buchanan, 2000). Two (alleged) empirical assumptions seem to stand
out in Rawls’ account. The first concerns the way in which we explain a people’s ag-
gregate wealth and level of development. As we have seen above, Rawls seems to rely
on the idea that the latter can be almost entirely explained by domestic institutional
factors. The second empirical assumption upon which Rawls’ theory is (allegedly)
based, and one that seems to be in line with the first, is that peoples are in relative
control of their economic fate and can thus be considered responsible for how they
fare. According to Buchanan, this amounts to stating that Rawls considers peoples
to be both ‘economically self-sufficient and distributionally autonomous’ (2000: 701).
Rawls thus seems to project a vision of the world in which all peoples are responsi-
ble for their present condition and are fully in control of their futures. Taken at face
value these are quite extraordinary claims. First, there is still no consensus among
economists and social scientists on the real causes of economic growth and devel-
opment (see Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 45ff). Second, as many
have pointed out, the relative autonomy of peoples in the world as we see it sounds
more like a cruel joke than a plausible reconstruction of existing international eco-
nomic integration (see Pogge, 2006). 
2.2 The relevance of ideal theory
These arguments are not persuasive. First, they seem not to appreciate the shift be-
tween different domains of enquiry in Rawls’ theory. Rawls’ views concerning the
appropriateness of distributive justice in LP are not premised on an empirical argument.
In order to see why, we need to place the argument in its correct context. Rawls is
arguing against principles of distributive justice between peoples. One of the main
problems he identifies is that these principles of justice work in ideal theory and thus
have no clear target or cut-off point. Within the bounds of ideal theory, we imagine
all relevant subjects to be compliant with LP’s eight principles and we assume that
favourable conditions obtain; therefore, empirical matters will not settle the ques-
tion in hand. Why? Because the world as we see it is emphatically not the one that
the ideal theory of LP imagines, and there is no real conclusion we can draw from
analysing existing practices of international economic integration (see Freeman, 2007:
261ff). For example, when Rawls mentions the idea that peoples can be considered
responsible for some of the collective choices they make, he is not maintaining that
existing political communities will be able to fully control their fate. Rather, he is sim-
ply conjecturing that in the ideal theory of LP, where all peoples are by definition
either liberal or decent, and where all peoples follow the precepts of LP, they could
be considered responsible for their choices (see Brown, 2002). 
Some might wish to maintain that, even if we grant the fact that Rawls’ account
is working within the bounds of ideal theory, he still fails to provide any good rea-
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son for designing the ideal theory of LP in the way he does (see the excellent discussion
in Valentini, 2011b: 85ff). By imagining an ideal theory in which (existing) inter-
national interdependence does not really have a role, Rawls is in fact assuming away
the very nature of the problem that has generated the discussion, and is not providing
a theory that is action-guiding in any relevant sense (Valentini, 2011b: 86). But Rawls’
theory, at least implicitly, does provide such guidance. The international order, Rawls
maintains, could be just if it was populated by liberal and decent societies. So, when
asked what can be done in order to ameliorate the many injustices that plague the
international arena, we do have a Rawlsian answer: we start at home, and hope that
change can penetrate from the inside outwards. It is hard not to agree with Rawls
when he states that ‘[a]ny hope we have of reaching a realistic utopia rests on there
being reasonable liberal constitutional (and decent) regimes sufficiently established
and effective to yield a viable Society of Peoples’ (LP: 29–30). 
As some have pointed out, Rawls’ strategy could be undermined if we thought
that the problems of domestic and international justice were inextricably intertwined
(Valentini, 2011b: 88). yet this is only initially plausible. When we look at the world
as it is, the two problems are clearly linked; but if we imagine a world in which all
political communities were well-ordered in Rawls’ sense, then it would be less than
clear that achieving international justice with a ‘inside to outside’ strategy would be
impossible. To illustrate, consider the following examples. If in all major markets com-
panies were prevented from buying goods tainted by child labour, child labour would
greatly diminish at the global level. If all major market participants, again as a mat-
ter of public policy, refrained from buying natural resources from murderous
regimes, then those regimes’ incentives to violently seize power would be undermined
(see Wenar, 2008). If all major economies and all major international economic or-
ganisations refused to lend to oppressive dictators, then the background conditions
needed to create and accumulate ‘odious debt’ would be undermined. yet, it seems
clear that well-ordered societies would be the type of societies that could aspire to
have these public policies, or perhaps even be required to have them – if not because
of how Rawls explicitly designs them, then because of what we can infer given Rawls’
account of their basic structures and of the virtues of their citizens. 
2.3 The irrelevance of initial endowments
It is also (partially) misguided to identify Rawls’ ‘domestic factors’ argument as an
argument concerning economic growth (strictly speaking). I say ‘partially’ because
Rawls is probably using two different theses concerning the relationship between
domestic institutions and how a country ‘fares’. What I shall call the strong thesis states
that: economic growth and a country’s level of development are fully determined
by the shape of domestic institutions. What I shall call the weak thesis states that:
the initial economic endowments are irrelevant to a society’s prospects of becom-
ing well-ordered. Compounding Rawls’ ambiguity between these two theses there
is also the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. Table 1 schematises these
variations in approach. 
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The four different combinations offered by Table 1 are explored in what follows. I
will claim that the most charitable interpretation of Rawls’ account portrays him as
committed to what I call the weak thesis in ideal theory (A2–B1). 
Let me start with A1–B1 (strong thesis in nonideal theory) – what I take to be
the least plausible interpretation of LP. When, for example, Pogge (2002) speaks of
‘explanatory nationalism’ it is precisely that thesis that he is attacking. But, as we have
seen, Rawls’ enquiry is meant to take place in ideal theory, so it seems illegitimate
to think that, according to Rawls, in the world as we see it, all societies are fully re-
sponsible for their economic fate. In terms of A2–B2 (weak thesis in nonideal the-
ory), from an empirical point of view, the question is hotly debated. Some claim that
geography is a central explanatory feature of a people’s level of economic develop-
ment. Others point out that several countries with relatively low levels of initial eco-
nomic and natural endowments have managed to achieve spectacular levels of eco-
nomic growth over extended periods of time (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
for extensive discussions of different alternatives). What is relevant for the purposes
of our argument, however, is that the debate is orthogonal to the concerns discussed
by LP: what matters for the DOA is institutional development, not per capita or ag-
gregate wealth. 
Rawls sometimes ‘flirts’ with A1–B1 (strong thesis in ideal theory). Discussing
the second guideline of the DOA he states that ‘the causes of the wealth of a people
and the forms it takes lie in their political culture’ (LP: 108), whilst when discussing
equality among peoples he mentions that a people that develops feelings of inferi-
ority given its lack of wealth can, ‘[i]f it is not satisfied’, take further action and ‘con-
tinue to increase savings, or, if that is not feasible, borrow from other members of
the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 114). In both cases Rawls seems to be genuinely com-
mitted to the idea that, at least in ideal theory, the origins of a people’s wealth are
purely domestic. But the latter idea seems irrelevant to the main point Rawls wants
to make. The target or aim of LP is that all societies are well-ordered, not rich, so there
is no purpose in insisting that the sources of economic wealth are purely domestic
(even in an ideal-theory scenario).
Table 1: Different Interpretations of the DOA
sTRoNg Thesis (a1) weak Thesis (a2)
Ideal Theory
(B1)
In a world where most societies fol-
lowed LP, economic growth would
be endogenously determined.
In a world where most societies
followed LP, initial endow-
ments would be irrelevant to
prospects of becoming well-or-
dered.
Nonideal Theory
(B2)
In the world as we see it, economic
growth is fully explained endoge-
nously.
In the world as we see it, initial
economic endowments are irre-
levant to becoming well-orde-
red.
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In the same way, when Rawls presents his two comparisons between peoples that
make different choices and become differently well off, he might be seen to imply
that it is enough for a people to get wealthier just to change a given element of its
public institutions (either its economic policy or its population policy). Once again,
we have to pay attention to what Rawls is arguing. Rawls’ purpose in presenting the
two comparisons is to show that a principle of global distributive justice would be
unacceptable. To do this, he imagines what are, ex hypothesis, two cases in which
levels of wealth can be traced back to changes in public institutions (see also Free-
man, 2007: 291). The point is not that, whatever else might affect a people’s cir-
cumstances, the only factor determining its level of wealth is, for instance, its real
rate of savings. Rather, the point is that, all other things being equal, it is not un-
reasonable to believe that increasing one’s real rate of savings will affect economic
growth. In fact it is precisely in order to deny the possibility of this that one would
have to be committed to the thesis diametrically opposed to the one (wrongly) at-
tributed to Rawls. Or, in other words, one would have to commit to the thesis that
it is impossible to even imagine a controlled scenario in which a domestic factor for
which a people can be considered responsible is capable of producing changes in the
level of the people’s aggregate wealth.
Is there any support for the weak thesis in ideal theory (A2–B1), then? If the cen-
trality of economic growth for LP can be partially challenged by attending to its aims,
the weak thesis can be supported by the theorists Rawls addresses. For instance, when
discussing Beitz’s argument concerning the redistribution of the wealth created by
natural resources in a theory of global distributive justice, Rawls states that, ‘because,
as I have said, the crucial element in how a country fares is its political culture… and
not the level of its resources, the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources
causes no difficulty’ (LP: 117). If we interpret ‘how a country fares’ to signify ‘its
prospects of becoming well-ordered’ then Rawls seems to endorse precisely the weak-
er thesis. And given that Rawls’ analysis is carried out mainly at the level of ideal the-
ory, then, he is probably better portrayed as endorsing the ideal-theory version of
the weak thesis. Whether or not this reflects Rawls’ intentions is, in my view, beside
the point. LP’s argument simply does not ‘need’ more than the ideal-theory version
of the weak thesis. 
Is the ideal-theory version of the weak thesis plausible? It is not uncontroversial,
of course, but it is far from unrealistic. As we have seen, when Rawls is outlining the
idea that peoples will ‘fare’ according to their political cultures and the shape of their
domestic institutions, he is not simply concerned with their level of affluence. Rather,
Rawls is suggesting that a society’s political culture is crucial to understanding whether
it will manage to become well-ordered. This is unsurprising given that being well-
ordered is mainly a political, rather than an economic, criterion. Being well-ordered
is a feature of the basic structure of a society, and not of the per-capita incomes of
persons. But, then, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the shape of political in-
stitutions and the virtues of the citizenry are crucial to understand a people’s chances
of becoming well-ordered. In a nonideal-theory scenario we can imagine innumer-
able instances of wars of aggression and colonisation that might shift this type of re-
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sponsibility from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’. But Rawls’ argument is carried out at the lev-
el of ideal theory. And, in ideal theory, a country’s political culture and the virtues
of its citizens (not its initial set of economic endowments) can be considered as strong
predictors of a country’s prospects of becoming well-ordered. 
3. ThE REAL PROBLEM WITh ThE DOA
In the previous part I analysed two of the main criticisms that have been levelled against
the DOA, and found both unpersuasive. however, this is not to say that the DOA (at
least if it is interpreted in the ways I survey below) is in fact a plausible solution to
the problem Rawls wants to address. In what follows, I will begin by outlining an im-
portant omission in the critical literature on the DOA. If Rawls is really committed
to the idea that the determinants of how a country fares are domestic, then it is pre-
cisely those domestic factors that the DOA will have to address. This is not an abdi-
cation of responsibility but rather an extraordinary commitment on the part of well-
ordered societies. Such commitment is so important that, in fact, it might be pictured
as being problematic both from a practical and moral point of view. The section ends
by discussing an objection to my critique of the DOA. 
Before moving on to the substance of the argument, allow me a caveat about its
standing. There are two issues that we should, as far as possible, try to disentangle.
The first is a substantive problem: what is a plausible normative solution to the prob-
lem posed by burdened societies? The second is an interpretive problem: what is Rawls’
preferred solution to the problem posed by burdened societies? In this section I pre-
sent what I take to be two implausible solutions: one based on the idea of full-blown
institution-building abroad, and one based on the simple provision of advice. Is Rawls
committed to either of the two (implausible) solutions? As I outline in section IV be-
low, Rawls’ text is ambiguous, and both interpretations seem to be buttressed by some
textual support. I present an alternative view, based on human rights, and claim that
my preferred substantive solution is compatible with Rawls’ overall architecture in
LP. If we were to apply the standard of interpretive charity, perhaps, one could claim
that since the solution I propose is taken to be superior, and since it is compatible
with the main elements of the overall text, then it should be taken to be Rawls’ view.
I want to leave this option open, but my main goal is to present, in part 3, two un-
derstandings of the DOA that I see as implausible, and then in part 4 one that I find
more attractive. As I repeat in part 4, I take these to be mainly substantive rather than
interpretive claims.
3.1 The (real) omission
In general, Rawls’ critics come from the so-called (in the global justice literature) cos-
mopolitan camp. The underlying assumption of their critical attention is that the DOA
is simply ‘not enough’ to deal with the problems Rawls wants to address, or that it
completely obliterates a great variety of real-world circumstances that should be nor-
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matively relevant for an account of international ethics. It is not surprising, then, that
very few have considered the opposite problem. The DOA is not something less de-
manding that we settle for because we want to realistically address the world as we
see it. The DOA is in fact exceedingly demanding as a form of international obliga-
tion (see Armstrong, 2009; Williams, 2011). What so many of Rawls’ critics have failed
to appreciate is how much Rawls seems to be asking decent and liberal societies to
do for the sake of burdened societies, not how little. 
To get a better grasp of the aforementioned problem it is useful to recall the kind
of guidelines Rawls provides to implement the DOA. The first is that we should re-
frain from considering a well-ordered society as necessarily a rich one. In turn, ac-
cording to Rawls, this brings out the similarity between the DOA and the principle
of just savings in A Theory of Justice: both stress how wealth is not something that
is required to become well-ordered. If the final aim we set ourselves is to imagine a
world in which all persons can live under liberal or decent institutions, the idea of
permanently increasing or maximising wealth is superfluous as wealth is not real-
ly what determines a society’s prospects of becoming a full member of the Society
of Peoples (LP: 106–7). The second guideline for thinking about the DOA is that, as
we have seen above, the political culture of a burdened society is all-important. As
Rawls says, ‘the crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture,
the political virtues, and civic society of the country, its members’ probity and in-
dustriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much else’ (LP: 108). The third guide-
line that Rawls provides is the target of the DOA. The DOA is not aimed at making
burdened societies wealthier: rather, its ultimate aim is to allow them to become well-
ordered. The target, in other words, is to imagine a world exclusively populated by
well-ordered societies and in which all are able and willing to comply with a reasonable
law of peoples. 
What is striking about the discussion of Rawls’ DOA is how little Rawls’ critics
have picked up on how demanding its goals seem to be. This is all the more striking
as so many have criticised precisely the preconditions of Rawls’ analysis that provide
the basis for understanding the DOA’s demandingness (see section II). According to
his critics, Rawls’ analysis is fallaciously based on the rather precarious idea that,
in the world as we see it, the sources of economic wealth and development are pure-
ly domestic. And, in general, Rawls’ move has been portrayed as a form of abdica-
tion of responsibility (see Pogge, 2002): it is not the world order that inflicts the scourge
of poverty on some of its members; rather, it is the poor’s fault if their condition does
not improve. Section II has, I believe, already detailed good reasons to question the
idea that we can attribute the latter thesis to LP. LP works at the level of ideal the-
ory, and its stance on economic development is plausibly depicted as the more mod-
est idea that, in a society of well-ordered peoples, initial economic endowments are
irrelevant to a society’s prospects of becoming well-ordered. What is nonetheless in-
teresting is that it is precisely by adopting the critical stance expressed by many to-
wards LP that its implications should give us pause. 
In other words, and leaving aside the correctness of their specific interpretive ar-
guments, Rawls’ critics seem unaware of precisely what the type of criticisms they
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make signals about the nature of the DOA. If one really believes that the sources of
economic development and growth are to be found purely in social and political in-
stitutions at the domestic level, and if one is also committed to the idea that there
is a duty to help all societies to become well-ordered, then it is precisely those so-
cial and political institutions that one will have to change (or at least strongly shape)
in order to address the problem. This is far from an abdication of responsibility; in
fact it requires an assumption of responsibility that is much greater than most cos-
mopolitans would be prepared to advocate (see Armstrong, 2009). It entails the idea
that in a world where many of its inhabitants do not live within the bounds of a well-
ordered society, the duty of those who are fortunate enough to live in one is to em-
bark upon collective action for widespread institutional reform across continents.
Surely, this is no mean feat. 
3.2 Resources, information and paternalism
The latter observations, in turn,39 expose three main problems with the DOA. First,
the DOA might turn out to be too demanding from a material point of view. Second,
the DOA seems to require a set of epistemic attributes and capacities that we present-
ly lack. Third, even assuming that the first and second problems can be solved, the
DOA seems to require what many would consider to be an unhealthy dose of intru-
sion in the institutional development of a political society. 
Let us start with the first problem. Conceptually speaking, there seems to be no
guarantee that putting the DOA into practice is even remotely possible. In the ide-
al theory of LPwe have no information concerning how resources are distributed be-
tween well-ordered peoples and burdened societies. Furthermore, as we have stat-
ed on a number of occasions, there is no reason to believe that well-ordered societies
will be rich. In the same way, Rawls explicitly argues in LP that resources are not re-
ally what should matter for a political community. In fact, he even conjectures that
a Millian steady state of zero growth would be an ideal solution to the avoidance of
the development of political cultures based on materialistic values and prey to cap-
italistic ideals. These remarks should alert us to the type of ideal scenario that Rawls
is imagining: a world in which well-ordered peoples do not really care about wealth,
and where its accumulation would not, as a result, be a primary policy objective. This
picture might not be a realistic one (at least not in terms of our current world), but
what is important about it is that it reinforces the suspicion that we have no reason
to believe that well-ordered societies could in principle help the citizens of burdened
ones (at least not if, as I claim, helping them requires the transformation of their in-
39. I should stress that part 3 of the paper does not accept the cosmopolitan critique. Rather it
starts by signalling the irony implied by some of its tenets: the critique itself suggests that the
responsibilities of the Society of Peoples are much greater than many seem to realise. In what
follows, I instead accept what I have called, in part 2 of the chapter, the weak thesis in non-
ideal theory. Thus, formally stated, my argument is that even accepting the weak thesis in non-
ideal theory, two of the most widely held interpretations of the DOA are implausible. 
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stitutions). Of course, Rawls could reply that helping burdened societies is not per
se about transferring resources; but, while resources are not sufficient, they
nonetheless seem necessary. We should not confuse: a) the resources that are nec-
essary to a people to become well-ordered; and b) the resources that are necessary
to change the political culture of a burdened society. While we can conjecture, with
Rawls, that (a) does not require a great deal of resources, there is no reason to be-
lieve that (b) will not be much more costly. 
Consider, second, the informational requirements connected to the DOA. not only
is (b) likely to involve significant amounts of resources, it also might require the abil-
ity to master significant amounts of information: a capacity we might not really pos-
sess (see Fukuyama, 2006). In fact, as recent historical experience tells us, and as
Rawls himself admits, ‘there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for well-ordered
peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and social culture’ (LP: 108;
see also Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Flournoy, 2006). note how we can relatively
easily observe a certain connection between a society’s social and political culture and
its ability to develop well-ordered institutions. On the other hand it is rather more
difficult to prescribe how certain social and political traits of a burdened society would
have to change in order for it to become well-ordered. For example, we can conjec-
ture that relegating women to a position of subjection in society can lead to over-
population and, in turn, underdevelopment and the inability to meet the basic needs
of persons. But observing the connection between women’s rights and overpopulation
will not be enough in order to know how to reform a social and political culture that
attributes a subordinate role to women. Political cultures and social structures are
not comprised of linear cause-and-effect mechanisms. Their transformation is not
something that can be achieved by observing and then altering isolated elements. 
Third, consider the morally problematic aspects of the DOA, namely, its long-term
effects on the moral and political character of a people, and the extent to which we
should be prepared to accept that the latter are deeply shaped by outsiders. The moral-
ly problematic aspects of the DOA can be grasped if we consider the kind of re-
sponsibilities that are clearly attached to the idea of, among other things, radically
changing the ‘virtues’ of a society’s citizenry, its social and political institutions and
much else in the process (see Williams, 2011: 66, 198). Rawls is fully aware of this
problem, as when he states: ‘the well-ordered societies giving assistance must not
act paternalistically, but in measured ways that do not conflict with the final aim of
assistance: freedom and equality for the formerly burdened societies’ (LP: 111). Rawls
also mentions the idea that well-ordered peoples should not tie assistance to the de-
velopment of liberal institutions. yet, the latter point can only partially defuse the
worry that we have raised. Well-ordered peoples can say to a burdened society, ‘you
do not need to become liberal to receive our help’. But they cannot really say, ‘you
will receive our help and you can choose how to develop your institutions the way
you see fit’. 
Burdened societies are burdened precisely because of the way in which their in-
stitutions have developed over time. If we believe that such institutions should change,
then it seems clear that we cannot avoid deciding, at least in part, how such social
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and political institutions are to be designed. Well-ordered peoples may not suggest
liberal solutions, but they will have to suggest some solution. This claim is confirmed
by the fact that, in general, exercises of institution-building abroad often rely on force
and do not really cater to local ideas of legitimacy (see Pei, Amin and Garz, 2006).40
In the end, the impression is that if one undertakes profound institutional reform
abroad (eventually changing some of the deepest elements of a foreign social and
political culture), one cannot do so in a way that is purely morally neutral. And this
is especially the case given that some burdened societies might not necessarily wel-
come the proposed changes. 
3.3 The ‘advice’ interpretation
here I address an important objection to the critique of the DOA that I have put for-
ward in 3.1 and 3.2. The objection is as follows: it might indeed be true that the DOA
is too demanding, if, and only if, we consider it as a duty to directly alter the politi-
cal culture of a burdened society. yet, the objection continues, the DOA is not that
type of duty; it is instead a way of signalling that well-ordered societies are under
a duty to try to assist those that are burdened to become well-ordered. They should
not coerce them or pressurise them. What they are required to do is simply to pro-
vide advice and perhaps some form of financial assistance in order to put that ad-
vice into practice, but nothing more can plausibly be required of them. As one pas-
sage in LP suggests, Rawls believes that ‘there is no easy recipe for helping a burdened
society to change its political culture. Throwing funds at it is usually undesirable, and
the use of force is ruled out by the Law of Peoples. But certain kinds of advice may
be helpful’ (LP: 110). In other words, the DOA does not prescribe anything along the
lines of the institution-building duty I have examined in the sections above, but is
instead a duty of advice and support. This interpretation would also solve the moral
problem tied to the deeply intrusive nature of the DOA. If the DOA is simply constructed
as ‘advice’, the decision to follow the advice or not is one that burdened societies will
be allowed to make for themselves. 
A reply to this objection concedes that this reading of the DOA might make it more
plausible in terms of what well-ordered societies are required to do; the content of
the duty, enumerated as ‘advice’ and the ‘possibility of material assistance’, would
indeed be more reasonable. But, crucially, it would also make the DOA unworkable.
It would become what we can call a futile duty, because its results in terms of the fate
of burdened societies would probably be marginal. Burdened societies lack the po-
litical culture to become well-ordered: this is the crucial distinction between different
40. For example, Pei, Amin and Garz believe that two of the most important lessons to be drawn
from the American experience with nation-building concern the use of force and the relative
neglect of local political demands: ‘First the United States must sustain its commitments of
troops, time, and money despite domestic political opposition. Second, the United States should
balance the demands for greater legitimacy by political opposition in the target country with
reconstruction needs’ (Pei, Amin and Garz, 2006: 81). 
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types of nonideal theory in LP. Some societies are unwilling to comply with LP (i.e.
outlaw states) but other societies are simply unable, and that is what justifies our
different attitudes towards them. The fact that such societies (that is, burdened ones)
are unable to comply cannot simply mean that they lack the resources to do so. As
we have seen above, resources might be necessary, but given Rawls’ take on the role
of initial economic endowments to societies that are required to become well-ordered,
they are certainly not what is at issue. If we consider the DOA as simply a duty of pro-
viding advice, such duty would probably be ineffectual in all most relevant cases, as
the weaker a society’s social and political culture and institutions, the less likely it
is that simple advice and resources will make a difference. 
Furthermore, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the advice interpretation is
that, by reducing the Society of Peoples’ level of commitment, it also leaves the ful-
filment of the human rights of burdened societies’ citizens more open to chance. Giv-
en Rawls’ discussion of the DOA we have no clear idea about whether human rights
are respected in a burdened society. If we believe that the duty of the Society of Peo-
ples is only one of advice, and if we do not know if the human rights of a burdened
society’s citizens are being fulfilled, then LP (in this interpretation) seems to require
a simple commitment to providing advice in cases where human rights are not re-
spected.41 This would have great human costs for LP because, among other things,
it might imply that the human rights of many who are living in burdened societies
would not be guaranteed. In fact it would seem to lead to the paradoxical conclu-
sion that those who live in burdened societies have even less chance of seeing their
basic human rights fulfilled compared to those who live in outlaw states. Against out-
law states LP prescribes intervention, yet for burdened societies it cannot: in LP the
use of force is limited to self-defence and specific cases of non-compliance.
But perhaps I have radically misconstrued the problem. Perhaps burdened so-
cieties, precisely because they are not ‘unwilling’ but ‘unable’ to comply with LP, would
gladly accept the help offered. I doubt this could be a convincing scenario – or, at
the very least, not one we could take for granted. Conceptually speaking, there is no
reason (or at least none is provided by Rawls) to imagine that a burdened society
would gladly accept the revisionist implications of the DOA. There is no reason to
assume that burdened societies are conscious of their limits and are simply unsuc-
cessfully striving to become well-ordered. This is a depiction one can accept only if
one also assumes that agents who cannot take responsibility for their fate are also
aware of their limits and try to overcome them. But why should we assume that a
society lacking the social and political institutions required to become well-ordered
should have this type of awareness? 
41. It should be stressed that ‘not respecting human rights’ is not necessarily to be conceptualized
as the violation of negative rights. In other words, the argument I am making does not pre-
suppose that institutions of burdened societies are necessarily callous. The fulfilment of hu-
man rights requires substantive positive action and a great deal of institutional capacity – pre-
cisely the kind of elements that a burdened society may plausibly lack. 
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4. SKETChInG A POTEnTIAL SOLUTIOn
In the previous section I criticised the DOA for being excessively demanding as an
international principle of assistance. The DOA seems to be caught between two ex-
treme scenarios. On the one hand, if it is interpreted at face value as a duty that re-
quires stringent application of its goals, then its emphasis on the transformation of
the political cultures of burdened societies is unsustainable. On the other hand, if
the duty is interpreted as one that entails ‘advice’ and a modicum of financial sup-
port, it seems to be ineffectual as it would rely on the idea that burdened societies
are unable to become well-ordered because they are somehow simply ignorant of
the processes and ideas that could lead them to become so. In this section I want to
offer the initial sketch of a potential solution. Briefly stated, my solution is to imag-
ine a two-speed scenario for the DOA based on the human rights record of a burdened
society. 
The DOA is often interpreted by its critics as a duty of ‘advice’, and by its supporters
as an institution-building duty (see Armstrong, 2009). My contention so far has been
that neither understanding of the DOA is plausible or reasonable. I should stress that
this is not, strictly speaking, an interpretive claim, it is a substantive one. The goal
of this section, then, is not to provide the best interpretation of Rawls’ text (though,
the section might contingently do so), but rather, if I am correct, to provide a reframing
of the DOA that, while compatible with the overall structure of LP, provides a more
sustainable solution to the problem of burdened societies. 
The basis for my solution is to partially abandon, at least initially, Rawls’ focus
on the political culture of burdened societies. I want to maintain that the proper tar-
get of a stringent duty of assistance in LP, even when it comes to burdened societies,
is the comparatively less ambitious goal of fulfilling the basic human rights of all cit-
izens of those societies (see Jones, 2001). It is only once this comparatively less de-
manding duty of assistance is fulfilled that LP can concentrate on the idea that a bur-
dened society should become well-ordered. Conceptualising the DOA in this way, we
can divide Rawls’ view of international economic assistance into two different stages.
If the human rights of the citizens of a burdened society are not fulfilled, the Soci-
ety of Peoples should see its collective duty of assistance towards burdened societies
as a more stringent one that does not, strictly speaking, require the assent or approval
of burdened societies themselves. If, on the other hand, citizens of burdened soci-
eties have their basic human rights fulfilled, then the Society of Peoples should in-
terpret the DOA as a less stringent duty of counsel and advice and resource availability,
coupled with an appropriate system of incentives to lead burdened societies to be-
come well-ordered. 
In section III I have highlighted what we can call the problem of resources. There
I argued that whilst resources might not be relevant when judging if a society is well-
ordered (or to its prospects of becoming well-ordered), this does not imply that re-
sources will not be necessary to help burdened societies in their path to developing
well-ordered institutions. I also stated that, given that we have no real guarantee that
well-ordered peoples would be rich in the ideal theory of LP, the material resources
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needed to fulfil the DOA might be lacking; however, concentrating on basic human
rights would require fewer resources on the part of well-ordered peoples. More pre-
cisely, in LP, whilst respecting human rights is one of the necessary conditions that
a regime should meet in order to be considered well-ordered, they are not sufficient.
Thus it should be clear that ensuring human rights are protected within burdened
societies is, at least comparatively, less demanding than ensuring burdened societies
become well-ordered. 
Furthermore, if well-ordered peoples decide to concentrate on the fulfilment of
human rights in burdened societies, they would also be able to more effectively mo-
bilise resources. The perceived legitimacy of their foreign aid would be augmented
by the minimal moral goal of preventing severe and avoidable destitution and in the
meantime would provide a clearer remedy to what Rawls calls the ‘problem of affin-
ity’ (paragraph 15.5 is in fact titled ‘Duty of Assistance and Affinity’, LP: 112). Ac-
cording to Rawls, ‘[a] legitimate concern about the duty of assistance is whether the
motivational support for following it presupposes a degree of affinity among peo-
ples, that is, a sense of social cohesion and closeness, that cannot be expected even
in a society of liberal peoples’ (LP: 112), let alone in a society of liberal and decent
peoples. A comparatively less ambitious DOA aimed (initially) at the protection of
the basic human rights of the members of burdened societies would be more effec-
tive in reducing the social and cultural distance between different peoples given the
urgency of the human interests it would protect, and would thus (again, compara-
tively) address the problem of affinity highlighted by Rawls. 
Concentrating on human rights would require less information too. The focus on hu-
man rights effectively sidelines the importance of the political culture of burdened
societies and instead concentrates on its implications. If such implications include
the violation of basic human rights, the judgements involved will be based on in-
formation that is more readily available. For instance, it seems more plausible to as-
sess whether the basic needs of a population are met rather than if its institutions
are freely upheld by the citizens, and it is easier to know if the physical integrity of
persons is guaranteed than to know if all groups in society are properly represent-
ed, and so on. not only do basic human rights violations seem easier to ascertain,
but they also seem, at least prima facie, comparatively easier to remedy in terms of
the required institutional reforms. 
This is in line with what Rawls himself would prescribe as a central component
of his strategy to help burdened societies, namely to progressively increase the re-
sponsiveness of social and political institutions to citizens’ requests. Rawls ac-
knowledges that basic human rights are an important first step in that direction (see
LP: 108–11). For instance, when explaining the DOA’s second guideline, Rawls main-
tains that ‘[w]hat must be realized is that merely dispensing funds will not suffice
to rectify basic political and social injustices (though money is often essential). But
an emphasis on basic human rights may work to change ineffective regimes and the
conduct of the rulers who have been callous about the well-being of their own peo-
ple’ (LP: 108–9). This would mean that concentrating on basic human rights could
still have a knock-on effect for the institutions of burdened societies; insisting on their
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fulfilment could be seen as a milestone towards the more ambitious goal of build-
ing well-ordered institutions. 
Once basic human rights are guaranteed in a burdened society, though, the task
of the Society of Peoples is not over. how can we help burdened societies to become
not only societies where human rights are fulfilled, but well-ordered peoples? One
of the main problems faced by the DOA, as I have argued in section III, is that im-
posing a system of institutions ‘from the outside’ is not the kind of task that decent
and liberal peoples should undertake. At the same time, at least if we accept the frame-
work provided by LP, the goal that all political communities become well-ordered
is not one we can easily let go of. A moral and conceptual middle ground can be found,
or so I suggest, if we conceive of the relationship between burdened societies and
the Society of Peoples as based on the idea of positive incentives to become well-or-
dered. Incentives have several advantages. First, and granting that basic human rights
are fulfilled, they need not be coercive. Second, they would allow greater input from
the citizens of burdened societies when it comes to the specification of the relevant
institutional goals. Third, they would make it easier to recognise that longer times-
pans may very well be necessary to reform the political culture of a burdened soci-
ety. Fourth, as opposed to coercion, they might generate less resentment from the
members of burdened societies, and compared to mere advice, might have a high-
er chance of being effective. 
COnCLUSIOn
I have examined Rawls’ position on international economic justice. I have consid-
ered some of the major criticisms that have been levelled against LP. The main thrust
of such criticisms is that the DOA and Rawls’ understanding of international inter-
dependence are unrealistic and that they entail a set of obligations that are not ro-
bust enough to fully capture the extent of our duties of global economic justice. I have
rejected these criticisms because, in my view, they fail to fully take into considera-
tion the nature of Rawls’ position. Furthermore, what many of Rawls’ critics have
failed to appreciate is not how little Rawls’ LP asks well-ordered peoples to do, but
rather how much. The DOA can be pictured as a very demanding duty of assistance
that asks well-ordered peoples to transform some of the deepest elements of a so-
ciety’s culture. As I have explained in part 3, this is too much to ask and much more
than we can realistically achieve or allow ourselves to attempt. however, this does
not mean that the Rawlsian framework cannot contain an alternative understand-
ing of the DOA that aims for the same goal, but treads a more plausible path towards
it. I have tried to imagine such a path in part 4. 
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Conclusion 
1. ThE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ThE TEXT
Before rehearsing the arguments that I have developed over the course of the book,
let me make a few remarks about what motivated my attitude towards Rawls’ LP. Even
on this point – that is, how we approach a philosophical text – I believe Rawls has
something valuable to teach us. When discussing his style of lecturing Rawls famously
declared that:
I always took for granted that the writers we were studying were much smarter
than I was… If I saw a mistake in their arguments, I supposed those writers saw
it too and must have dealt with it… I looked for their way out… I assumed there
were never plain mistakes, not ones that mattered anyway.
(Rawls, 2000: xvi–xvii)
In the same way, introducing some of his lectures on political philosophy (on hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, hume, Mill and Marx) Rawls stated that:
when we discuss these writers our first effort is to understand what they say, and
to interpret them in the best way their point of view seems to allow. Only then
shall we regard ourselves as ready to judge their solution from our point of view.
I believe that unless we follow these guidelines in reading the works of these…
philosophers, we fail to treat them as conscientious and intelligent writers who
are in all essential respects at least our equals.
(Rawls, 2007: 104)
Rawls’ approach conveys a certain amount of humility that, the historical record
seems to agree, was characteristic of the man himself. nonetheless these brief re-
marks do more than simply suggest a trait of character. They tell us about the over-
all interpretive attitude that we should try to adopt towards the classics in the canon
of moral and political philosophy. Our attitude, Rawls is telling us, should as far as
possible be to look first for solutions to the texts’ perceived inconsistencies and mis-
takes, only resorting to criticism when we are, to the best of our ability, certain that
inconsistencies and mistakes are the only explanation. Arguably, Rawls’ work has
now entered the canon of western political thought and I have thus consistently tried
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to apply the same approach recommended by Rawls to my interpretation of his own
work. 
These prefatory remarks about interpretation are also more specifically relevant
to the book’s main goal. One of its primary contentions was the rejection of the idea
that Rawls’ work on international justice was an inconsistent extension of his domestic
theory of justice. When looked at from a higher vantage point, one independent of
the debates concerning the content of LP, the idea that the whole of Rawls’ work on
international relations is essentially inconsistent with the rest of his corpus is, I be-
lieve, overly simplistic, and highly implausible. 
Of course, the assumption of continuity can only provide a baseline to our en-
quiry. Authors, even the most eminent, are capable of mistakes and our attitude to
their work, even conceding their superior intellect and knowledge, cannot simply
be one of admiration. The point is, rather, that we should be able to present their
work in the strongest possible version we find available in order to criticize it. To as-
sume incoherence, to picture one of Rawls’ major contributions as the result of er-
ror or simply, as some do in conversation, as the result of old age, violates the dic-
tates of interpretive charity (see Davidson, 1984) and cannot assist us in making
progress. 
2. ThE ARGUMEnT OF ThE BOOK
In this book I have tried to rescue Rawls’ LP from the charge that it is an incoherent
and implausible extension of Rawls’ work to the domain of international relations.
My analysis took as a starting point the polarized features of the intellectual debate
surrounding Rawls’ work on international justice. On the one hand, Rawls’ critics
have tended to approach LP as a blind spot in the Rawlsian corpus, seeing LP as sim-
ply incoherent with Rawls’ domestic theory of justice. On the other hand, those who
have defended Rawls’ work on international justice have, in my view, swung to the
opposite extreme, attempting a piecemeal defence but often without highlighting
the deep changes that Rawls’ theory has undergone. The goal of this book, then, was
to reconstruct Rawls’ work as coherently emanating from his understanding of lib-
eralism and, at the same time, to do so without obscuring the main points of tension
between his domestic and international theories.
The two main discontinuities between Rawls’ theories that I have highlighted were
the fact that the main actors in LP are peoples rather than persons and the fact that
LP is not an egalitarian theory of justice. Both features are understandably troublesome
for Rawls’ readers.A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism both relied on the idea
that individuals were the main unit of concern for a liberal theory of justice and that
the best or most reasonable conception of justice for a society understood as a fair
scheme of social cooperation between free and equal persons was an egalitarian one
based on a strong interpretation of reciprocity. Indeed, Rawls’ domestic work promised
to reconcile the idea of individual rights and liberties that is central to the classical
liberal tradition with the socialist aspiration towards a society of equals. 
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To those who were attuned to understand Rawls’ work in this way, with all the
tensions that reconciling freedom and equality necessarily involved, LPmust have
seemed an incredibly strange book since, apparently, these tensions have simply evap-
orated. Superficially, some might have felt that LP presented an entirely different ap-
proach to the whole of political philosophy, not simply a friendly amendment to Jus-
tice as Fairness for the purpose of addressing global politics. yet, at least so I have
claimed in this book, these apparent inconsistencies can be explained from within
Rawls’ conceptual toolkit. 
The book started, in chapter 1, by clearing the deck of perhaps one of the most
original attempts to interpret LP as a coherent extension of Rawls’ domestic theory
of justice. The basic idea of the so-called practice-dependent interpretation of Rawls’
work is that the differences in both the subject and character of Rawls’ domestic and
international theories are simply explained by his attempt to construct justice for ex-
isting practices (see James, 2005, see also chapter 1). Pictured in this way, Rawls’
theory opts for peoples and for sufficiency rather than equality, because the main
agents of international relations are peoples and because the practice of international
relations does not imply egalitarian distributive obligations. I have resisted this view
of Rawls’ work for one main reason: this view of LP, and of Rawls’ philosophy in gen-
eral, seems hostage to the idea that it is methodology that drives our philosophical
choices. But, then, how can we justify the outcome of our reasoning process to those
who disagree with us about the content of moral and political principles? The an-
swer, so I claimed in chapter 1, cannot simply be that it is our method that requires
a specific set of moral and political principles. Method is important but it cannot be
all that it takes to justify where we stand on morally controversial issues such as those
discussed in LP. 
Instead, in chapter 2, I have claimed that one of the most important Rawlsian
ideas, and one that was present in Rawls’ work from the start, was the attempt to con-
struct a shared and mutually acceptable justification for basic social and political ar-
rangements to those who live under them. In my view, this idea strikes to the core
of Rawlsian liberalism. Rawlsian liberalism is justificatory liberalism. Justificatory
liberalism starts from an ideal of respect for persons and adopts a specific under-
standing of justification, namely public justification. Public justification, following
Rawls’ insight, is not simply the statement of logical connections but, rather, proceeds
from shared premises and tries to give reasons that all can reasonably accept. In turn,
shared premises that constitute the basis of our public justification are to be found
in the public political culture for the political context that one is addressing. 
This understanding of Rawls’ political philosophy, so I claimed in chapter 3, al-
lows us to dispel the charge of incoherence that many have lodged against Rawls,
and explains some of the central features of his LP. Chapter 3 proceeded to show first
that extending the content of a liberal egalitarian conception of justice to global pol-
itics would be misguided. All the main ideas Rawls uses to construct his domestic
conception of justice, from the idea of primary goods to the features of the original
position, are centred on aspects of a liberal democratic understanding of person and
society and we cannot simply assume that these understandings are valid for the world
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at large. At least, this does not seem to be what Rawls’ commitment to respect and
public justification require. At the same time, by looking at the global public polit-
ical culture, we can also understand why peoples are the main unit of analysis in LP
and why the latter is not egalitarian. The global public political culture, Rawls seems
to believe, provides us with a conception of persons as being deeply attached to their
political communities and of peoples that are not necessarily preoccupied with the
continued accumulation of resources and wealth. 
In the end, this suggests a rather different picture of LP, one in which peoples
are the main unit of analysis for the theory, but where persons are still, as in the cos-
mopolitan outlook, the main unit of moral concern. In other words, at least so I have
claimed, LP presents a normative theory for international relations that is in line with
the desire to present a publicly justified global order, and in so doing remains true
to the ethos of cosmopolitanism. To use a rather crude slogan, we can say that LP is
a truly cosmopolitan theory insofar as it is not simply happy to settle, as many cos-
mopolitan theories seem to do, for what it sees as valuable about persons (such as their
ability to use resources and opportunities to autonomously develop their conceptions
of the good) but also tries to integrate what it claims to see as valuable to them (their
desire and pride in developing their cultures and ways of life within the bounds of
just and decent institutions). 
While chapters 1 to 3 present this distinctive interpretation of Rawls’ work, chap-
ter 4 tries to defend and yet at the same re-elaborate Rawls’ understanding of in-
ternational economic assistance. Once again, I start by examining the main criticisms
that have been levelled against LP ’s of the DOA and find them unpersuasive. All such
criticisms suggest deep flaws in Rawls’ reasoning. My aim in chapter 4 was to show
that, properly (or perhaps simply charitably) read, Rawls’ text does not contain the
many inconsistencies his critics wish to attribute to him. To mention just a few items
in the long list of critical reactions to Rawls’ treatment of international economic as-
sistance, I have tried to show that reading Rawls’ proposal in terms of the world as
we see it is inappropriate. The world as we see it, crippled as it is with many injus-
tices, relationships of domination and power, extreme poverty and destitution, ag-
gressive wars and destruction and the overwhelming and unnecessary loss of human
lives, is emphatically not the template within which to understand the prescriptions
of Rawls’ realistic utopia. Rawls’ ideas concerning the origins of economic and po-
litical development and the responsibility that each political community bears for
its being well-ordered are not the result of a cynical endorsement of the current sys-
tem of international economic and political governance; rather, the chapter claims
that, if understood at the level of ideal theory, and matched with his conspicuous
DOA, LP offers a good approximation of a just and peaceful world order. Furthermore,
as I have already stated in the introduction to this book, what seems even more strik-
ing is that by attacking Rawls and (allegedly) exposing major flaws in his reason-
ing concerning international economic assistance, the critics have, in my view, ne-
glected other aspects of Rawls’ account that were deserving of closer scrutiny. 
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3. WhAT CAn WE LEARn FROM ThE BOOK?
I have tried as far as possible throughout this book to draw back from making grand
claims or sweeping generalizations. nonetheless, it seems appropriate to attempt to
extract a core message from the book itself that goes beyond the detail of its argu-
ments. In what follows I want to lay out what I see as the fundamental lesson the book
seems to provide. This message is not really ‘shown’ in any sustainable sense of the
term by the chapters in this work, yet it constitutes some of its deeper structure and,
to some extent, speaks to its deeper aim. 
The message is that the idea of moral equality, perhaps the bedrock of cosmopolitan
thinking, is in fact an insufficient guide to the establishment of our reciprocal obli-
gations at the global level. More precisely, I believe that one of the book’s deeper aims
consisted in showing that the idea of moral equality does not necessarily imply the
idea of distributive egalitarianism. Clearly this point is contestable and, by any rea-
sonable interpretation, not entirely new in debates within contemporary political phi-
losophy. In fact, just glancing at the development of libertarian thinking (and here
I mention just one example) it seems clear that to see persons as morally equal does
not necessarily suggest, let alone demonstrate, that their political relationships should
be guided by an egalitarian conception of distributive justice. 
This, of course, does not entail the view that moral equality has no role to play
in our discussions of distributive justice, or that there are no arguments in favour of
egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice. Instead my suggestion, and indeed the
suggestion that runs as a thread through this book, is the more modest point that
moral equality is at best a starting point for our understanding of distributive obli-
gations, and that other factors such as the nature of the political context in which
we are operating, and the way in which we picture the main agents within such con-
text, are also important and constitute a necessary step in our justificatory process
towards establishing the content of a conception of distributive justice.
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